Speed in a crisis: What Europe can learn from Ukraine on emergency reconstruction

Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine exposed vulnerabilities not only in the military and energy architecture of Europe—but also in the EU’s institutional architecture.  Over three years of war, Ukraine has innovated to create a model of emergency reconstruction that allows it to mobilise resources within a matter of weeks and respond to destruction rained down by Russia. In contrast, the EU’s procedures fail to match those of Ukraine. Europeans should learn from the Ukrainian approach and upgrade their internal rules in order to better assist Kyiv and others during emergency situations.

How Ukrainians have gone it alone (but should not have to)

In June 2022, Russia’s destruction of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant threatened the water supply of more than 1.5 million people in eastern and southern Ukraine. Metallurgical plants reliant on water supply in the industrial centre of Kryvyi Rih came close to shutting down, while the agricultural sector nearly lost vital irrigation. International organisations were slow to react: project documentation and preliminary approvals from institutions, such as the European Investment Bank or European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, entailed at least a year of work preparations. As a result, Ukraine acted immediately: without formal procedures, but through a complete mobilisation of state resources, equipment procurement, organisation of supplies and construction of alternative water pipelines. The Ukrainians completed the emergency remedial projects in time—crucially, civilians and industry were not left without water.

Ukraine took similar action in the energy sector. Starting in autumn 2022, systematic strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities became part of Russia’s military strategy. Hospitals, heating systems and transport infrastructure were all at risk. The Ukrainian government decided to build protective shelters for substations in concrete and steel, on an industrial scale. International partners were unprepared: they had no precedents, methodologies or tools to support this type of project. The defence of critical facilities against missile and drone strikes was financed entirely by the Ukrainian state budget. It was risky and expensive, but successful. In the spring of 2024, when the strikes intensified, these defence structures protected power supply in Kharkiv, Odessa and Mykolaiv.

With international mechanisms failing to keep pace, Ukraine developed its own fast-track financing system. This system was based on three elements:

• Clear recognition of the project as a “crisis” based on predetermined criteria: destruction of key facilities, threats to life support, logistics or national security.

• Parallel start-up of design, logistics and works—even before all formal phases complete. This allows construction and installation work to begin within 4-6 weeks of an incident.

• Built-in transparency and monitoring mechanisms: external audits, standardised contract forms, standard project documentation and regular public reporting.

All these elements were implemented under a limited budget, during constant attacks and with a destroyed regulatory infrastructure. Ukraine proved that fast, transparent and accountable project implementation is possible even in the most difficult conditions. Its response also effectively shielded the EU: thousands of Ukrainians would have left their homes had they lost access to electricity and water for a prolonged period, potentially causing refugees to head westward.

Rules for exceptional times

In comparison to Ukraine’s emergency efforts, European financing mechanisms are slow and cumbersome. The standard procedure with the EIB, the EBRD or the Connecting Europe Facility involves numerous stages: feasibility study, environmental and social assessment, preliminary approval, tender, final approval, signing of the agreement and start of implementation. Even with maximum political support, the cycle rarely lasts less than 15 months.

EU rules such as directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement impose additional constraints. This directive contains no simplified procedures for infrastructure projects in times of crisis or war. The European system simply lacks rapid response mechanisms.

Yet the covid-19 pandemic showed that the EU can act when it wants to. Its creation of the NextGenerationEU programme allowed for the rapid mobilisation of more than €700 billion, allowing direct procurement and pre-financing.

Today, in the face of growing infrastructural and hybrid threats, Europeans should make such exceptions systemic rather than temporary. To achieve this, the EU should create a permanent fast-track mechanism to finance crisis infrastructure projects. It should work in parallel with the usual procedures, and introduce:

• a special “crisis infrastructure project” status with formalised criteria for granting this status.
• exemptions from lengthy environmental impact assessment procedures—if there is minimal risk.
• the possibility of direct contracting of contractors and suppliers.
• an advance financing model in parallel with approvals.
• mandatory external verification and audit.

The EU will need to adapt the existing legal framework. The European Commission and the European Council should modify provisions of 2014/24/EU that block emergency intervention. They should also create a new instrument—the European Emergency Infrastructure Crisis Response Fund. This would be similar to the existing rescEU or Solidarity Fund programmes, but would have a higher degree of flexibility and operational autonomy.

The EU’s existing regulatory procedures serve an important purpose: they provide environmental, social and legal safeguards, ensure the proper use of public funds and support a predictable decision-making framework. Preserving these standards is not a weakness. But this commitment to standards requires adaptation in situations where delays come at the cost of human lives, the collapse of vital sectors or the destabilisation of entire regions. The new fast-track mechanism would offer an exceptional framework for temporarily bypassing these, under specific criteria. It is not an alternative to order—it is a form of order appropriate to the situation.

The Ukrainian experience has already proved such a system can work. Kyiv’s approach does not mean going soft on standards—but finding exceptional ways to complete emergency responses in exceptional circumstances. Today, the EU can adopt an existing, tested and legally sustainable mechanism for crisis management around attacks on infrastructure. This is not a question of aid to Ukraine; it is a question of Europe’s own readiness for the next crisis, which will not wait for procedures to be finalised. Indeed, even Europe’s foes will be all too aware of this institutional inertia. Kyiv has shown how to act; Europeans can learn from this.