Scholz’s populism playbook: Why Germany needs to tackle fringe-party influence to preserve EU unity
Germany’s political chaos is giving populist fringe parties unprecedented influence over policymaking. As internal divisions deepen within the governing coalition, these parties are shaping the political discourse and threatening the country’s – and the EU’s – stability
German politics is in chaos. In early November, Chancellor Olaf Scholz, leader of the majority Social Democratic Party (SDP), unceremoniously dismissed finance minister and Free Democratic Party (FDP) partner, Christian Lindner, from the coalition government after disagreement over economic reform plans. The decision means Germany will hold a snap election in early 2025. But a historic lack of direction from the “traffic light” coalition is already providing fertile ground on which electoral populism can flourish. Now the European Union must ensure that decisions made by its most populous and influential member state do not undermine the conditions on which the bloc was originally founded.
In September 2024, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and far-left Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) successfully exploited public fears about migration in Germany to win decisive victories in state elections in the country’s east. Then, in response to a Syrian refugee admitting to stabbing and killing three people in Solingen, Scholz implemented temporary border controls to ostensibly regulate uncontrolled migration flows into the country. While the AfD and BSW parties are yet to hold significant positions within the government, their electoral success is having a clear influence on Scholz’s migration policy. But as populist narratives gain traction throughout the country, pressure is mounting on Germany’s governing coalition to adapt or risk losing support among the majority of the population.
Scholz’s decision demonstrates that both internal and external influences are disrupting the status quo within the halls of power. The AfD and BSW are utilising their growing platforms to further their anti-immigration agenda; internal divisions, characterised through Scholz’s dismissal of Lindner, are creating a space whereby populist parties can seize on public fear and uncertainty. The result is Germany’s centre-left government embracing a migration policy anathema to both its own socially liberal ideology, and the founding principles of the EU. By reintroducing border controls, Germany risks undermining the ‘open border’ of the Schengen Area and causing a ripple effect that could destabilise the entire bloc. It also demonstrates how, when given the conditions to thrive, populist narratives can rapidly influence government policy – even when fringe groups hold no official government role.
It would be especially dangerous for the EU should this trend continue past Germany’s upcoming election, given that the bloc has wars on two borders and faces a second Donald Trump administration. America’s president-elect is causing the EU to promptly reassess its foreign and domestic policies; the union must stand united behind its foundational democratic values. But for this it needs its most populous, most influential, and most economically successful member state. The EU cannot afford Germany to kick-start a trend of isolationism that finds further fuel in populist movements all over Europe: the conviction of populist supporters that “solving one problem will solve all other problems” is particularly concerning given that the Schengen Area, which was designed to foster unity among European nations, is integral to cross-border integration. In developing restrictive EU border controls, the German government is therefore challenging the very principles underlying EU membership.
Germany is not the only country whose commitment to the EU principles of freedom of movement, democracy, and dignity in the face of adversity have been called into question. The Netherlands, under far-right Freedom party (PVV) leader Geert Wilders, recently asked Brussels if the country can ‘opt-out’ of EU asylum rules. But the Netherlands now has a coalition government in which the very fringe party that once challenged its status quo is its largest; in Germany, the AfD and BSW are playing on public sentiment to pressure the ruling coalition – which does not include them – to take drastic domestic security measures. Scholz’s temporary migration measures, including tighter border controls, increased capacity of detention centres, and larger on-street police presence, suggest he views migration as not only an external ‘threat’ to its security, but also to his own political stability. This is a dramatic departure from the previous “Wir schaffen das!” (“We can make it!”) stance taken during the 2015 refugee crisis under former chancellor Angela Merkel.
But Scholz’s move is all the more surprising considering he was the vice chancellor in Merkel’s centre-right coalition. At this time, Germany served as a role model in how to handle the human impact of wars in Syria and Afghanistan humanely – in 2019, Germany was among the five countries with the highest refugee populations. But now it seems that not enough long-term rational thinking remains for the incumbent government to prioritise providing safe, humanitarian passage over domestic fission. Furthermore, the coalition’s lack of direct action against the negative influence of fringe parties means internal political fragmentation is rapidly developing into a crisis of confidence in its own deterrence ability. Even the more centrist political factions are being pulled toward populist positions as they try retain their voter base in an increasingly polarised environment.
The dynamic is dangerous for multiple reasons. First, it undermines Germany’s political stability, which has long been a pillar of European unity. There is a danger that, unless the government finds stability in its governance and ideology, its politicians will continue to be driven by short-term solutions that win voters, rather than addressing deeper structural problems. Given Germany’s influence, this could in turn undermine the principles of cohesion and humanity for the EU, and its current and future citizens. The German government therefore must ensure that its recent pandering to populism is not the first step toward a broader abandonment of European solidarity. To achieve this would also be to recognise that – if adopted in the long-term – its temporary migration policy poses a significant threat to Germany’s place as the voice of reason within an increasingly fractured EU.
Second, the impact of fringe-party influence in Germany could extend to its neighbours. As populist parties gain ground in other EU member states, such as France and the Czech Republic, there is a risk that national governments will follow Scholz’s convictions and prioritise short-term political gain over long-term European integration. This trend is particularly concerning given the growing global challenges, including the war in Ukraine, the climate crisis, and the rise of authoritarianism, which require coordinated and collective action. If populist parties continue to dominate the political landscape, their influence at the supranational level could grow and weaken the EU’s ability to act as a united front.
To safeguard the values that underpin the EU, it is imperative that German policymakers adopt a more compassionate and rational approach to migration. This means rejecting the pressures populist parties impose on sitting governments and their polices by standing united on issues which could be polarising – such as migration. Furthermore, other member states can reaffirm their commitment to core EU principles, including free movement and solidarity within the Schengen Area, by not taking a leaf from Scholz’s populism playbook. By encouraging a fairer distribution of responsibilities, the EU itself can also prevent states taking unilateral action that lead to a regression of cohesion. Instead, it should emphasise why its member states should continue to commit to the values which underpin its foundations – even when its own resolve is being tested.
Germany can only help foster EU-wide cohesion if its government resolves its differences and ensures that ideological divisions do not lead to ineffective decision-making. In this regard, its election in spring 2025 might provide some clarity. However, both the incumbent and new administrations must also address public concerns around migration and security in a more transparent, fact-based way. A comprehensive vision for integration, which addresses public concerns about social cohesion while providing a realistic pathway to inclusion, is a good place to start.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.