Pyongyang’s power play: How the EU should respond to North Korean troops in Russia

Seven thousand kilometres from home, around 10,000 North Korean soldiers are lined up along Russia’s border with Ukraine, preparing to fight on the frontlines of its war. Some units entering Russia’s Kursk region and already coming under Ukrainian fire. Despite the distance, North Korea’s support for Russia’s war is reaching new strengths. Even if the immediate military impact could be limited, Europeans must prepare for an expanding military partnership between North Korea and Russia. This requires not only bolstering support for Ukraine but also strengthening security ties with South Korea, building upon EU high representative Josep Borrell’s visit to Seoul on Monday.

The deployment of North Korean troops to Russia represents a significant shift in European and Asian security relations. For the first time in generations, troops from east Asia are actively engaging in a European conflict

Despite integration challenges – including communication barriers and differing military doctrines – the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia represents a significant shift in European and Asian security relations. For the first time in generations, troops from east Asia are actively engaging in a European conflict.

North Korea’s troop numbers are likely too small to tip the balance of what has become a protracted, attritional conflict. With Russia set to lose around 1,000 soldiers daily during winter operations, according to UK ministry of defence estimates, the North Korean contingent would barely offset a week’s losses. However, this deployment supplements Pyongyang’s already substantial military aid in other areas, including millions of artillery shells and ammunition rounds. More importantly, it demonstrates that Russia’s autocratic partnerships – with China, Iran, and North Korea – can deliver tangible military benefits.

For Pyongyang, the Ukraine conflict offers multiple strategic advantages. It provides valuable combat experience for an army that hasn’t engaged in active warfare since the Korean War, while being able to test the performance of North Korean military equipment. Beyond the military rationale, North Korea’s partnership with Russia has already yielded significant economic benefits, including essential supplies of food and fuel. This reduces North Korea’s geopolitical dependence on China.

The mutual security pact that came out of Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea in June suggests deeper military cooperation is likely in future. As part of this pact, Russia may provide advanced technology in areas from missiles and nuclear capabilities to satellites and submarines – developments that would significantly impact security across north-east Asia and beyond.

The more pressing concern for Europeans is the potential for expanded North Korean military involvement in Ukraine. This could involve much higher numbers of troops: Pyongyang maintains one of the world’s largest active military forces, exceeding 1.3 million personnel. While the army is primarily focused on Korean peninsula security, further deployments cannot be ruled out. This would not only provide Russia with additional military resources but also allow Putin to avoid politically costly domestic mobilisations.

Europeans’ response must begin with enhanced intelligence cooperation. Information sharing between European countries and South Korean intelligence services regarding North Korea-Russia military cooperation needs strengthening. The Korean National Intelligence Service has been especially important for Europeans seeking information on North Korean troop activities. NATO’s integration with east Asian partners, particularly South Korea and Japan, should likewise develop further to understand and counter the evolving threat along the Ukrainian border.

Borrell’s visit to Seoul provides a crucial opportunity to lay the groundwork for deepening and potentially upgrading the long-standing EU-South Korea strategic partnership. One option would see the European Union pursue a “comprehensive strategic partnership” agreement, generally the highest tier of diplomatic agreement which Seoul offers, and carrying a title that matches the level of the Russia-North Korea deal signed earlier this year. Formal trilateral cooperation between the EU, South Korea, and Japan would also signal joint resolve, as would increased high-level contact between President Yoon Suk Yeol and European leaders, including European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen. 

North Korea’s troop deployment should also serve as a catalyst for building broader EU-South Korean security arrangements. For Europeans, however, the big prize remains persuading South Korea to arm Ukraine. Seoul’s reconsideration of its position on providing military aid to Kyiv deserves European diplomatic support. Yet South Korea remains cautious about direct military involvement, wary of Russian retaliation and domestic resistance to engagement in what some view as a potential Korean proxy war in Europe. Even so, there are indications its position may be softening. President Yoon Suk Yeol has termed North Korea’s troop deployment “a serious risk to our national security”, and Seoul could soon send observers to monitor North Korean activities in Ukraine.

Building upon this momentum, a deepened EU-South Korea security partnership could stretch across a range of security domains, from humanitarian support to military-industrial collaboration. If sending a full suite of lethal aid remains challenging, then more defensive systems – for instance including air defence capabilities – might offer a middle ground. Recent progress in Poland-South Korea defence cooperation also demonstrates the potential for broader engagement in European rearmament efforts. 

Taken together, this week’s high-level diplomatic engagement in Seoul should set the stage for a more robust partnership between the EU and South Korea, and one that responds to the increasingly interconnected nature of European and Asian security challenges.