Putin’s longest war: Calling time on Russia’s endurance myth

On Sunday, January 11th, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine reached a grim milestone: it passed the 1,418th day, making it longer than Russia’s Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany (1941-1945). So far, the outcomes of these two wars are vastly different.The Soviet Union was caught by surprise when Nazi Germany, its erstwhile ally, attacked in 1941. Yet in under four years, with the indispensable help of their Western partners, the Soviets expelled the Nazis from their soil and pushed all the way to Berlin. In that span, Moscow rebuilt and extended its dominance through half of Europe, including parts of Germany. What the Soviets managed to grab in Europe militarily, diplomatically or through coercion, they held for another 40 years.

Contrast that with Vladimir Putin’s full-scale attack on Ukraine. In 2022, Russia was on the offensive: it controlled the timing of its own attack and had the advantage of planning and preparation. But 1,418 days later, the so-called “special military operation”—planned to last for days, or weeks at worst—has turned into Putin’s longest war (his campaign in Syria did not involve the full engagement of Russia’s military).

For nearly four years, Russia has wreaked unspeakable terror on Ukrainian citizens and cities, killing tens of thousands and forcing millions to flee the country. Rolling blackouts have plunged whole cities into darkness and cold just as temperatures dropped below zero. Yet despite all of this, Kyiv still controls roughly 80% of its internationally recognised territory. Since 2014–15, when Russia first seized 7% of Ukraine, Moscow has captured just another 13%—some 116,206 square kilometres. By contrast, in 1941-1945, the Soviet Union not only reconquered the lands it had annexed in alliance with Hitler prior to 1941 but further expanded its overall territory by an additional 1.3 million square kilometres.

Russia’s growing fragility

While projecting invincibility to the West, Russia is facing serious problems.

Battlefield progress is extremely costly. Russia is losing soldiers and equipment at a rate that has long passed what it lost in its ten-year-long invasion of Afghanistan: most conservative calculations assess that manpower losses in Ukraine already equal 16 Afghanistans. In 2025, the rate of deaths grew faster than at any time since the war began.

And it is not just its poor battlefield results. Russia’s economy is set to deteriorate further in 2026. Global oil prices are dropping, slashing Russia’s oil export revenues and its war budget. At current oil prices, Russia faces a 60% shortfall in its oil revenues—~$67bn, roughly half of its official defence budget. Ukraine’s drone strikes on refineries and pressure on Russia’s oil-smuggling shadow fleet have further eroded Moscow’s revenues.

Some of Russia’s oil companies are already unprofitable despite huge tax reductions, and the economy is overheating, forcing factories to borrow at unsustainable rates to feed the front. The sovereign wealth fund is running dangerously low, forcing Moscow to sell gold reserves to cover the budget deficit. These trends can continue for months, but they are not sustainable for years.

All this strains the Kremlin’s ability to deliver on its social contract, which in theory offers Russians stability and income in exchange for loyalty. Regional budgets are collapsing under the weight of war payments—one week of war in Ukraine costs more than 75% of Russia’s regions’ budget for a year. Recruitment bonuses that once soared into millions of rubles are now slashed amid bankruptcy in regions like Samara and Tatarstan. If the Kremlin opts for general mobilisation, it could trigger social unrest more severe than the one seen in 2022.

Moreover, the war is now affecting Russia’s own territory much more than the Kremlin ever envisaged. In the past few months, Ukraine has started to retaliate for Moscow’s attacks on its energy infrastructure, causing blackouts inside Russia, especially in regions bordering Ukraine. Kyiv is also advancing its cruise missile and ballistic missile programmes into serial production, including the domestically developed Sapsan ballistic missiles and the Neptune-type subsonic cruise missiles that are already striking deep into Russia. All of this dents Moscow’s monopoly on blackouts and deep strikes.

Finally, Russia is also running out of arms as its vast Soviet stockpiles are dwindling. Its refurbished Soviet equipment is being depleted rapidly and could lead to an eventual decline in combat intensity. Operational tempo has already slowed—strategic bomber sorties have halved (from 14-16 to 8 per raid) to conserve airframes, and Russia is increasingly relying on drones.[1] On the ground, the life expectancy of new recruits is less than 4 weeks.

For whom the bell tolls?

Ukraine faces its own huge challenges in both manpower and equipment, exacerbated by a drop in Western assistance. And Russia is learning its lessons; it has changed its tactics and adapted, rapidly increasing its scale of military production and deploying thousands more soldiers. Ukraine may lead in battlefield innovations, but Russia has an advantage in its ability to scale up production. Inevitably, the argument goes, Kyiv will need relief long before Russia reaches its own limits. That seems to be the view of Trump’s administration as well; it carries the view that Ukraine should accept what is on offer now, before it is too late. 

Yet wars are rarely linear. Kyiv might be on a weaker side now, but Russia’s poor results in Ukraine over the past few years should make everyone pause before forcing the Ukrainians into one-sided compromises. Granted, Ukraine most probably would not hold without Western support—but Russia relies heavily on support from China, North Korea and Iran. If Western support for Ukraine continues, Putin is unlikely to be in a better position in a year or two. If the four years of the war demonstrated anything, it is that its outcomes are not predetermined by military parameters alone.

Time to call Putin’s bluff

Ukraine cannot stay in the fight forever. But for almost four years, the Ukrainians have managed to hold off the Russian army in a way that half of Europe could not do more than 80 years ago. Their resilience is under-appreciated, and Russia’s own advances and ability to prevail are exaggerated. The West, including the White House, should not fall for Putin’s bluff. His war is already lasting longer than the USSR’s Great Patriotic War, with much less to show for it.

The notion that “time is on the Russian side” betrays a lack of strategic patience and, even more importantly, squandered opportunities to exploit Moscow’s growing structural vulnerabilities

This should prompt a recalibration of European assumptions about the time and leverage they have on the Kremlin. The notion that “time is on the Russian side” betrays a lack of strategic patience and, even more importantly, squandered opportunities to exploit Moscow’s growing structural vulnerabilities. Sustained, predictable assistance for Ukraine is more likely to generate a stable political settlement than one-sided compromises that sow resentment and instability. The EU’s allocation of a €90bn support package for Kyiv is a step in the right direction.

The same logic applies to Russia’s economic fragility: European policymakers should shift their approach of incremental sanctions towards enforcement-driven measures to amplify the fiscal and industrial pressures already present in Russia. Cracking down on sanctions evasion—especially in high-end dual-use components, targeting export hubs in third countries and enhancing detection of shadow fleet activities—would all deepen the Kremlin’s economic strain, raise the costs of the war for Russia and directly strengthen Ukraine’s hand in any negotiations.

To counter Russia’s advantage in industrial scaling, European leaders need to integrate Ukraine into long-term European defence programmes and capability commitments faster. A ramp-up in European and Ukrainian military production, together with Kyiv’s increased capabilities to strike Russia’s military industry and logistics, would underscore to Moscow that waiting out Western support is not a viable strategy.

Finally, European leaders should use this blend of pressure and predictability to reset the diplomatic baseline for any eventual settlement, where earlier efforts have fallen short. The objective is not to rule out negotiations but to ensure they are meaningful negotiations rather than posturing for the US. That will only happen once it is clear to the Kremlin that prolonging the war will yield diminishing returns.

By complementing intense diplomatic efforts with increased military and economic pressure on the Kremlin, the West can shatter the illusion of Russia’s endurance and help level the negotiating field. In doing so, it can steer this war toward a settlement that brings real peace and deters future aggression.

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[1] Author’s interview with NATO officials, Brussels, December 2025