Putin in Kursk: The meaning of political theatre
Putin’s visit to Kursk revealed an effort to buy time and keep focused on his ultimate war goals
Problem
Vladimir Putin often ensures his more consequential statements are preceded by a fitting piece of political theatre designed to create context, atmosphere or decoration. True to fashion, his choice to visit Kursk dressed in military fatigues this week was almost certainly geared towards the audience in the White House. Putin was positioning himself as a military leader busy expelling an enemy that has invaded his country—thus engaged in a just war that one cannot argue against.
The aim behind the show was likely to keep Russia’s maximalist war goals on the table while not exhausting President Donald Trump’s goodwill.
Europeans will want to be alert to this display. But more importantly, they need to consider what they can do to limit the choices of a Kremlin that still wants to redraw the map of Europe.
Solution
Putin spelled out the conditionality of Russia’s approach to the ceasefire offer the day after his Kursk performance. He stated that any ceasefire must not enable Kyiv to regroup and resupply its troops. In parallel, other Russian officials have acted as outriders talking up the political demands Moscow wants enshrined in a settlement: Ukraine must not benefit from Western security guarantees; it must not host Western troops; and the “root causes” of the war must be addressed, such as NATO enlargement.
Europeans will point out that it is Moscow’s demands that stand in the way of peace, not Ukrainian stubbornness. But if this comes from the European Union and others, such rhetoric is likely to fall on deaf ears in the White House, or be even counterproductive.
Therefore, Europeans’ best hope to bring about a lasting peace is to prepare to support Kyiv—in the hope that its readiness to reject a deal that would undo Ukraine as a sovereign country ends up changing the calculus in Washington, if not yet in Moscow.
Context
The US president’s approach to the war in Ukraine and worldview of major powers led by strongmen have been a godsend for the Kremlin. For the first time since 2022, Moscow can truly hope to win. Prior to Trump’s return, battlefield victory would not have begot political victory: Russia would have remained a pariah, frozen out by the West. Trump has disrupted everything. But even the settlement he is offering Putin still falls far short of Moscow’s actual war goals.
Therefore, Moscow’s task now is to maintain Trump’s goodwill, while nudging his peace offer closer to Moscow’s aims. It needs to postpone a “premature” ceasefire that would benefit Ukraine, while creating the impression that it is Kyiv, not Moscow, that stands in the way of peace. Putin’s visit to Kursk gives us some idea of how Putin plans to walk that tightrope.
Should Moscow fail to transform Trump’s approach, the fallback scenario is a continued war of attrition—against a Ukraine supported by Europe (if or when Trump loses interest) or by the United States (should it keep supporting Ukraine). Moscow is prepared for this. After all, a prolonged war of attrition peppered by nuclear threats was its baseline scenario if Kamala Harris had won. Under that scenario, Moscow would have hoped for things to change once the liberal international order falls. Now, it is immensely bleaker to find oneself continuing a war of attrition even in the post-liberal world.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
