Pragmatic partners: The EU’s new model for engagement with South Africa

South Africa broadly aligns with Europe on democratic principles—but its deep ties to Russia and China, and role in BRICS-led initiatives, are straining relations with the West.

Pretoria champions a pro-human rights foreign policy and a rules-based international order, but nonetheless abstained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine while simultaneously criticising Israel. It is also strengthening relations with the Iranian regime amid the latter’s ongoing repression of women, protesters and minorities. South Africa’s strategic hedging means it is difficult for Europe to navigate politically, despite Europe and the US being South Africa’s major trade partners.

Europe nevertheless shook off the fatigue and distrust which has defined its relationship with South Africa and approached the seventh EU-South Africa summit, which took place in March 2025, with a clear intent to recalibrate relations. As the first high-level engagement between the two since 2018, the summit was designed to signal Brussels’s commitment to Pretoria as a geopolitical partner—as well as to amplify their shared economic, technological, and industrial goals amid intensifying global competition.

For its part, Pretoria did not significantly shift its foreign policy posture, continuing to emphasise a nuanced, non-aligned approach that prioritises global strategic autonomy over ideological alignment. This is despite its economic interests remaining heavily tied to the West. However, the EU backed its own rhetoric up with substance by announcing a bold €4.7bn investment package under the Global Gateway and launched talks on the first-ever Clean Trade and Investment Partnership (CTIP) (a new model of cooperation focused on industrial competitiveness and clean energy).

Europe’s focus on investment demonstrated how it is utilising foreign policy tools to gain a global technological and industrial edge without alienating key powers like South Africa. For the EU, such countries are becoming increasingly important allies as the world order further fragments.

Geopolitics meet geoeconomics

At the summit, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen remarked that “We know that others are withdrawing… [but] we are doubling down with our support. We are here to stay.”

Her words are in deliberate contrast to America’s increasingly confrontational approach towards South Africa; the US has recently severed key diplomatic engagements by expelling South Africa’s ambassador, cutting aid and withdrawing from the Just Energy Transition Partnership, which is a $13bn multi-donor package aimed at supporting South Africa’s transition from a coal-based to a cleaner economy. America seems to be growing frustrated with Pretoria’s foreign policy choices, in particular its criticism against Israel and stronger ties with Iran.

Now America’s increasing divergence with Europe in transatlantic strategy vis-à-vis South Africa may be symptomatic of a broader shift in how both engage with other countries across the world: the EU is increasingly opting for more inclusive and long-term pragmatic engagement, while the US under President Donald Trump is acting assertively toward nations that it feels do not resonate with its direct interests.

During the summit, the EU and South Africa pledged to export the latter’s electric and hybrid vehicles to the EU, suggesting that South Africa is also taking a tentatively pragmatic path in terms of its economic policy and growing industry. It seems to be strategically hedging against US tariffs and the potential suspension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a decade-long trade programme which provides duty-free access to the US for select African exports.

South Africa is a major AGOA beneficiary; automotives rank just behind precious metals in its top exports. As such, the EU’s renewed positioning might offer the bloc as an economic counterweight to the US while also further diversifying the European supply chains away from China.

Europe’s economic diplomacy in the making

The $4.7bn investment package and launch of CTIP negotiations largely revolve around energy-related sectors and connectivity, in line with Europe’s Global Gateway priority areas. While CTIPs are still largely undefined, they aim to be an evolution of the soft-law agreements (memoranda of understanding) which the EU has signed over the past three years with resource-rich countries like the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, and Zambia—or “strategic partnerships”.

For Europe, these strategic partnerships aim to secure access to green hydrogen value chains and critical minerals, while supporting green industrialisation in Europe and partner countries. They are also geopolitical in that they are a step towards helping the EU diversify its supply chains away from reliance on China and navigate rising protectionism. This includes mitigating the impact of the US Inflation Reduction Act and China’s export restrictions on critical raw materials.

However, despite Europe’s intent, they have struggled to bridge the gap between policy ambitions and on-the-ground realities to achieve their stated industrialisation interests. Key obstacles include Europe’s lack of mineral extraction capacity and limited de-risking mechanisms for private sector investment; for Africa, challenges range from unstable energy supply and infrastructure deficits to a shortage of skilled labour and industrial capabilities needed to move up the value chain.

CTIP has the potential to be a more structured and impactful tool—but if Europe does not address the bottlenecks, this new type of partnership risks facing old hurdles.

South Africa: a stronger partner, with caution

Compared to countries involved in the strategic partnerships, however, South Africa presents better conditions for investment collaborations like CTIP. It has established financial markets, advanced institutional frameworks and an industrial base that includes automotive, energy and mining sectors—for example, South Africa is the world’s top producer of platinum group metals, essential for developing fuel cells and clean energy solutions.

South Africa’s structural advantages mean CTIP could more easily and effectively lead to high-value collaboration that would benefit both parties. To date, South Africa already exports more high-value products to the EU than many of the other sub-Saharan countries: representatives at the summit identified renewable and low-carbon energy, hydrogen, sustainable fuels and critical minerals as areas for cooperation.

Notably, the inclusion of “low-carbon” energy suggests that the EU is broadening its policy scope, moving beyond an exclusive focus on renewables and acknowledging the practical constraints of partners like South Africa, which remains heavily dependent on coal and gas. Rather than pushing for an immediate green transition, the EU may be embracing a more pragmatic and staggered approach to decarbonisation that reflects South Africa’s calls for a “just” energy transition.

Here, the EU’s strategy considers South Africa’s socioeconomic realities, its energy dependency on coal, and the need to safeguard jobs and livelihoods in vulnerable communities. This will go a long way towards rebuilding trust and fostering a more equal, cooperative relationship between the parties. Energy diplomacy is developing into a tool for political rapprochement, as well as to further climate action. If the EU approaches this correctly, it will position the bloc as a more responsive and credible partner than in previous years.  

Energy diplomacy is developing into a tool for political rapprochement, as well as to further climate action If the EU approaches this correctly, it will position the bloc as a more responsive and credible partner than in previous years

Still, caution is warranted. Despite South Africa’s relative advantages, it presents notable challenges for investors. Persistent ambiguity in its foreign policy—particularly its non-aligned stance on global geopolitical issues—creates uncertainties for long-term strategic engagement. Domestic issues such as regulatory unpredictability, bureaucratic inefficiencies and ongoing energy supply concerns further complicate the investment landscape. These factors underscore the need for carefully calibrated, flexible partnerships that can navigate both opportunity and risk.

Europe’s pragmatism amid pitfalls

Europe is taking a pragmatic approach to South Africa which compartmentalises political differences to maintain access to critical resources and markets—and to maintain geopolitical influence. This strategy reflects Europe’s recognition of South Africa’s importance as a political and economic partner amid shifting global power dynamics. It is prompting the EU to adopt a more tolerant stance towards the two partners’ divergences in pursuit of broader strategic goals.

However, the challenge lies in translating this recalibrated partnership into effective, results-driven engagement. Anxiety among European investors remains: for the EU to be competitive against state-backed competitors like China and the UAE, it must offer flexible, attractive financing mechanisms which ensure that private sector engagement is supported by robust derisking tools, including investment protection. Such an approach will incentivise investments, especially in high-risk sectors like critical minerals.

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The EU will return to South Africa in November 2025 for the G20. The real test is whether Europe’s efforts to refine its economic policy tools in the face of a shifting global order will translate into tangible influence; and whether Brussels and Pretoria remain effective partners.

EU success in this arena depends on its ability to effectively balance principles with interests. It needs to sustain its usual agenda while adapting to the complexities of a multipolar world. This means the EU should recognise South Africa’s strategic autonomy and non-aligned positioning while demonstrating that, for Pretoria, engagement with Brussels delivers concrete benefits.

Only by demonstrating that partnership with the EU delivers can Brussels hope to compete for influence—and relevance—in the new global order.