Polls, peril and partnership: Why South Korea and the EU are natural allies

European and South Korean citizens share strikingly similar views on key geopolitical questions, according to ECFR’s latest global public opinion poll. Specifically, they agree on the negative impact of the new Trump administration on their country and peace in the world, and agree that Russia is an adversary whose behaviour in the international arena is destabilising and poses a security threat. At the same time, most South Koreans consider the EU a geopolitical actor equal to America and China.

Just as the US grows more erratic and unreliable as a partner and security guarantor, EU and South Korean public opinion emerges as a strong foundation for deeper bilateral cooperation, reinforcing their robust partnership.

Sceptical towards Trump

South Korean public opinion is aligned with Europeans against a second Trump administration. South Koreans are actually even more sceptical than Europeans. A large South Korean majority of 67% consider president Donald Trump’s election a negative thing for their country, compared with a plurality of 38% of Europeans. Likewise, half of South Koreans think Trump will jeopardise world peace, compared to more than 40% in Europe.

Although ECFR’s polling was conducted in November 2024, after Trump’s election but before his inauguration, these negative views can be expected to have only solidified since then. The US administration has antagonised European leaders, exemplified by American vice president J.D. Vance’s Munich Security Conference speech, and undermined its security, as seen in the spat with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in the White House.

South Korea has a mutual defence treaty with Washington and relies heavily on the US to deter North Korea’s nuclear threat. Even if Trump is more committed to his east Asian partners than his European ones (given South Korea’s key position in the American competition with China), the rapid geopolitical changes in Europe are already stoking debates in South Korea about the reliability of its own alliance with Washington. A second US-focused question from the survey reveals Europe’s and South Korea’s central foreign-policy conundrum. When asked what the US represents for their respective countries, 21% of Europeans and a whopping 40% of South Koreans still consider Washington an ally; 50% and 45%, respectively, see it as a necessary partner. These numbers starkly underscore the perceived dependencies on the US and sit uncomfortably with the predominantly negative perceptions of the new administration.

Aligned on Russia

In stark contrast to the Trump administration, South Koreans and Europeans are in broad agreement about the profound challenge that Russia poses to their countries. More than half of those polled in both places consider Moscow either a rival or an outright adversary. In fact, “adversary” is the most common answer, with 36% of people sharing that view in South Korea and 44% in the EU11.

Europeans and South Koreans agree on a host of other questions surrounding Russia’s war in Ukraine: most notably that it is a war between “the West and Russia” and “democracies and autocracies”.

Both publics also feel that Moscow is mainly responsible for the bloodshed in Ukraine, while a majority of Koreans consider the latter to be part of Europe.

At a time when Trump has begun embracing Russian narratives that blame Kyiv for Moscow’s attack on Ukraine, these results demonstrate strong alignment on core international values among the European and South Korean publics. They suggest that South Korea could emerge as a more important partner for Europe in supporting Ukraine and countering Russia’s security threats with reduced or no US involvement.

Policies that support Ukraine or weaken Russia, such as signing on to new rounds of sanctions or delivering more aid to Ukraine, will be easier to defend to publics that share the core concerns underlying these decisions. As South Korea may soon be heading to the polls to elect a new president, the pervasive negative perceptions of Russia among the South Korean population will also make it more difficult for any future South Korean leader to move closer to Russia again.

The link between European and east Asian security

The results support the oft-cited notion of a merging strategic environment of the European and east Asian security theatres, with Russia providing the crucial link—through its war in Ukraine on one side and its closer security ties with North Korea on the other. In June 2024, Moscow and Pyongyang signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, in which they pledged to “immediately provide military and other assistance” if the other party “falls into a state of war due to armed invasion from an individual or multiple states”.

Their growing partnership has already had significant negative security consequences for both Europe and South Korea. Recent estimates suggest that North Korea may have provided over 6 million artillery rounds to Russia, or roughly 50% of the total used in Ukraine, making Pyongyang a key enabler of the war. The North Korean government has also provided an estimated 12,000 troops to fight at the front line in the Russian region of Kursk, contributing to Moscow’s successes in taking back most of the region over recent weeks.

In return, Russia offers food aid, cash and possibly advanced military technology. This not only props up the regime in Pyongyang, rendering its collapse less likely, but also increases the risk of North Korea developing high-end weapons and capabilities, which will complicate effective deterrence for South Korea. For example, the recently unveiled development of the North’s first-ever nuclear-powered submarine is likely a direct result of Russian support. More advanced capabilities could embolden Pyongyang in its hostile rhetoric towards Seoul, raising tensions and increasing the risk of conflict on the peninsula.

A unique window for closer ties

This new geopolitical landscape has opened a unique—almost imperative—window for closer strategic ties between the EU and South Korea. Russia’s security threats in Europe and the Korean peninsula, coupled with an increasingly untrustworthy Trump administration, serve as the key drivers. Against the backdrop of domestic political uncertainty in European countries and in South Korea, our poll suggests that public opinion can act as a stabilising force for future strategic cooperation between the EU and South Korea. The EU is a desired partner for South Koreans, half of whom view the EU as an equal power to the US and China, exceeding the confidence levels of Europeans themselves.

Our poll suggests that public opinion can act as a stabilising force for future strategic cooperation between the EU and South Korea

Half of South Korean respondents also consider the EU’s policies toward their country “different” or “very different” to those of America, suggesting that they see the EU as acting independently from the US. This perception will become increasingly helpful for Europeans when engaging South Korea if Trump’s policies become more erratic in the future.

Defence and intelligence

South Korea can help European countries shoulder more responsibility for their defence and deterrence of Russia. The government in Seoul has already been aiding Ukraine; it sent $394m in financial aid to Kyiv in 2024 and gave 300,000 155 mm artillery shells to America in 2023, allowing Washington to send more supplies to Ukraine. South Korea also has a growing defence industry, touted for its cheaper prices and fast delivery times. It can help Europe bolster its own defence capabilities. In 2022, Seoul signed a massive $14bn arms deal with Poland. South Korea could even set up production facilities in Europe and support the direct rearmament of Ukraine during a ceasefire or after a peace deal is reached.

Intelligence sharing between European agencies and the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) can also help counter the deepening ties between Russia and North Korea. The NIS was the first to report that North Korean soldiers had been dispatched to Russia and it provided regular intelligence on the deployment. With Moscow’s growing military ties to Pyongyang, having access to reliable information about developments in North Korea will become increasingly relevant for European security. Conversely, South Korea could profit from European countries’ experience with Russian hybrid threats in the Baltic Sea, such as sabotage of undersea cables.

Economic opportunities

There are many opportunities on the economic front, too. The EU and South Korea find themselves squeezed between Trump’s nationalistic trade agenda and growing competition from heavily subsidised Chinese producers, be it in the car industry or in semiconductors. Trump’s threats to close off the US market will make the EU a more attractive alternative to Korean producers of batteries and electric vehicles. The EU has a single market, a population of 450 million people and predictable, legally binding decarbonisation goals. It is also getting tougher on unfair competition from China; in December, it imposed duties on electric vehicles, which will make South Korean products more competitive too.

The geopolitical situation for the EU and South Korea seems dire: a Russia that threatens security for both, a China that puts enormous pressure on companies in home and global markets, and an America that has become much less reliable under Trump, even antagonistic in the eyes of many Europeans. ECFR’s new poll has shown that both Europeans and Koreans are aligned on these key issues.

In a Trumpian world, the EU and South Korea are not entirely alone. As an old ally drifts away, this difficult geopolitical moment could bring Europe and South Korea even closer together.