Point-scoring over protection: How Russia’s politicking harms Sudanese civilians

Last week, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution aimed at protecting Sudanese civilians from violence at the hands of Sudan’s warring parties. Western diplomats say that Russia killed the British- and Sierra Leonean-penned resolution in response to British support for US authorisation of Ukraine’s use of its longer-range missiles for strikes deep into Russian territory.[1] In doing so, Russia grounded the international community’s most substantive attempt yet to shield civilians in a civil war marked by a blatant disregard for human life.

Moscow’s denial of protection to Sudanese citizens, seemingly in retaliation for London’s and Washington’s expanded support for Ukraine, is a performative act with deadly consequences. With a man-made famine and the world’s most acute displacement crisis as a result of military, ethnic, and tribal violence, Sudan is arguably the worst place to be a civilian. The main belligerents, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), have not prioritised protecting populations in their areas of control against each other’s attacks. Now, there is even less hope for improvement of this dire situation.

Moscow’s move also damaged the interests of its ally in Sudan, the government in Port Sudan led by the SAF. The resolution’s text singled out the SAF’s battlefield enemy, the RSF for abuses in Darfur, Gezira, and Khartoum; would have pushed the RSF to retreat from its offensive on the North Darfur capital El Fasher, a particular black hole for protection that has seen vast civilian death and displacement; and would have afforded new levels of recognition to the Port Sudan government.  The veto appeared to catch even the Sudanese delegation by surprise, which only belatedly backed up its ally in Moscow.[2]

The vote illustrated Russia’s willingness to hold multilateral initiatives on Sudan – and even its ally’s interests – hostage to its antagonism with the West. In doing so, Moscow has revealed just how unsuited such multilateral forums have been to respond to Sudan’s war.

Even in the lead up to the vote, the resolution had been heavily watered down to accommodate Russian demands. References to peacekeeping and peace building were removed and the Port Sudan government was to be afforded heightened recognition as the country’s “Transitional Sovereign Council”, over its rival, the paramilitary RSF. When the draft resolution was sent to vote, it ultimately contained limited provisions for the protection of civilians due to relentless dilution. The resolution did however provide provisions for monitoring a prospective ceasefire and for implementation of the Jeddah Declaration, a limited – and so far, toothless – agreement between the warring parties that includes a commitment to protect civilians. But even if Russia hadn’t vetoed it, the resolution as it was tabled would have bound civilians’ rights to safety to the tenuous question of a ceasefire – heightening the risk of civilian protection measures failing.

Russia defended its actions by claiming the draft impinged upon the Port Sudan government’s right to control the country’s borders and to protect its own civilians. However, over the 19 months of war, the SAF have regularly failed to provide such protection, often retreating from major towns such as Wed Medani and Zalingei as RSF forces encroached, leaving civilians unprotected. The provision of protection is an obligation for SAF if it is indeed the country’s sovereign army as it claims. Abdicating on this responsibility undercuts the legitimacy of the government in Port Sudan, even as such measures have been promised in the Jeddah Declaration and by head of state, Abdelfatah al Burhan, during his speech to the UN General Assembly in September.

Even as the watered-down resolution offered only limited measures to immediately improve the safety of Sudanese people, Russia’s veto is a setback to tepid multilateral attempts to respond to the conflict in Sudan at the UN and hold the warring parties to international law. “We won’t be able to propose anything new on Sudan for the foreseeable future”, said one senior British official in the aftermath.[3]

Russian meddling at the UN is no reason for European diplomats to resign from efforts to protect civilians from the world’s worst humanitarian crisis

But Russian meddling at the UN is no reason for European diplomats to resign from efforts to protect civilians from the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, where civilians have been persistently targeted or killed collaterally during the conflict. As the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s special envoy to Sudan, Lawrence Korbandy, pointed out in a recent interview, if Sudan is unable to protect its citizens, intervention on protection becomes necessary. European policymakers should apply similar thinking to fulfilling their obligations to help protect a civilian population from those purporting to provide such protection.

The treatment of Sudan’s conflict and humanitarian crisis as secondary to great power competition at the UNSC suggests that concerned actors should seek other avenues for action. With no end to the hostilities in sight and little appetite remaining at the UN or in Port Sudan for deploying a force to provide physical protection, European policymakers must consider alternative approaches. These could include the provision of concerted funding and diplomatic cover to local protection initiatives already being implemented by civic actors on the ground. Currently, these initiatives operate with little if any external support, and European action could make a significant difference.[4] Many of these local security arrangements have now “evolved into deals that secure safe routes, de-escalate violence, and provide tangible protection outcomes, such as safe passage for civilians and displaced populations, as well as the resumption of trade and aid”.[5] Often these deals are brokered by local traditional leaders and tribal groups working jointly to engage encroaching warring parties to secure assurances of nonviolence. To support such localised initiatives, the EU should modify the internal mechanisms of its funding instruments, which remain oriented towards support to the UN and international NGOs – both of whom are ill-equipped for the dynamism of Sudan’s context.

With Russia’s power play rendering a UN Security Council response to Sudan’s generational conflict unlikely, these locally led arrangements are currently the only functioning protection initiatives in Sudan. To ensure the protection of Sudanese civilians, they deserve thoughtful and programmatic European support.

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[1] Interviews with EU, UK and US diplomats, 19, 20, 22, 26 November 2024. According to CNN, the UK has also supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles to Ukraine that were, like the ATACMS, first used on 20 November, two days after the Russian veto. 21 November 2024.

[2] Interviews with EU and UK diplomats, 19, 20, 22, 26 November 2024.

[3] Phone conversation with British official, 20 and 22 November 2024.

[4] Days before the UNSC vote on protection of civilians in Sudan, IGAD tabled a proposal to deploy a non-combatant unit to Sudan’s capital, Khartoum for an extendable six months to protect civilians and support peace efforts. Ayin Network, ‘Lawrence Korbandy, IGAD special envoy to Sudan: Efforts to mediate the conflict’, 19 November 2024.

[5] Confidential report based on field research in Sudan, October 2024.