Podium of power: Von der Leyen’s State of the Union address confronts Europe’s defence preparedness

When Ursula von der Leyen walked into the Strasbourg hemicycle to deliver her 2025 State of the European Union address, she knew the stakes were high. Russia has launched ever-more frequent and intense attacks against Ukraine in the past few weeks, with several Russian drones entering Polish airspace the day prior. In Gaza the situation is worsening every day, while EU member states still cannot agree on a common stance towards Israel. And, over the summer, the European Commission president struck a trade deal with US president Donald Trump that many Europeans saw as a humiliating concession.

Stuck in the middle

To complicate matters further, the parliamentary audience facing von der Leyen was much less welcoming than it had been in previous years. She survived a vote of no confidence in July—but two more (one from the Left party, and one from the right-wing Patriots for Europe) are already being prepared. Even the centrist, pro-European majority that has long sustained her commission is growing restless and openly questioning her record. It was crucial, therefore, that von der Leyen’s address struck the right tone.

Von der Leyen rightly did not mince her words: the EU is in a fight. The international order, she warned, is shifting from rules-based to power-based

The commission president’s delivery was strong and even moving at times, particularly as she described a Ukrainian child abducted by Russian troops. Her story of a Greek firefighter working alongside Spanish colleagues to battle wildfires in the Asturias painted a vivid illustration of European solidarity. On substance, the speech was marked by a stark assessment of Europe’s predicament. Von der Leyen rightly did not mince her words: the EU is in a fight. The international order, she warned, is shifting from rules-based to power-based. If Europe wants to assert itself as a global actor, it must find the stomach to stand up to hostile forces—which means becoming stronger, much more quickly. But this is easier said than done.

Confirm, promise, deliver

Von der Leyen’s address, in some respects, followed that familiar shopping list of sectoral announcements. While it flagged many new instruments and programmes, few carried real weight—but when it comes to defence policy, delivery is of the essence. On military equipment, for instance, the task is clear: buy more, buy better, buy faster, buy jointly—and buy European. The commission’s priorities in this field are broadly correct, but what is missing are concrete results: after all, the EU does not need a stream of scattered announcements with little to show for them. But it does need to make real on its promises of security, autonomy and competitiveness.

On defence, von der Leyen outlined five initiatives that may prove consequential.

• First—and most important—is a reparations loan for Ukraine, leveraged from the cash balance of Russia’s immobilised assets (though leaving the principal of the assets themselves untouched). While details remain sketchy, Kyiv urgently needs new revenue streams if it is to withstand Russian firepower.

• Second, von der Leyen announced an EU “drone alliance” with Ukraine, which it will fund by front-loading €6bn from the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loan. This development is vital to increase or accelerate financial support to sustain the Ukrainian war effort: boosting drone-manufacturing capacity could tilt the odds in Ukraine’s favour.

• Third is the launch of an “eastern flank watch”. Announced in the wake of Russia’s drone incursion into Polish airspace (which was swiftly followed by reports of another Russian drone entering Romanian airspace), this initiative should afford the EU better surveillance of its Russia-bordered member states to ensure “no movement of forces goes unnoticed”. Talk of a “drone wall” is politically appealing and a strong, reassuring commitment; hopefully it will also be feasible.

• Fourth is an initiative to get new common defence projects off the ground, with clear goals for 2030, which is set to be presented at the next European Council. This is a crucial development—several PESCO projects, for instance, are yet to yield tangible outcomes.

• Fifth is a “European Semester”, or how the EU oversees member-state budgets and public finances on defence. With European policy now refracted through the prism of security, it makes sense for the commission to adopt a structured, cross-cutting framework which coordinates member-state actions, issues recommendations on their priorities, and oversees their plans to achieve a level of harmonisation. But this must bring about change and avoid becoming another layer of routine EU procedure.

On the tragedy unfolding in Gaza, von der Leyen went much further than before—perhaps hoping to calm unrest on the left wing of her parliamentary coalition. She pledged to put bilateral support for Israel on hold and proposed sanctions against extremist ministers and violent settlers, as well as a partial suspension of the Association Agreement with Israel on trade-related matters. Previously, the European Commission had already proposed the partial freezing of Israel from its €95.5bn Horizon research funding programme. Now the ball is the council’s court.

On the US trade deal, von der Leyen sought to set the record straight, framing an amicable settlement as the best economic outcome. Yet it is equally clear that the agreement stemmed from Europe’s geopolitical and security dependence on Washington. The episode underscores a deeper truth: the EU must shoulder greater responsibility for its own defence, both to safeguard its citizens against all types of threats and to shield its economy from the side effects of military vulnerability.

Beyond defence, towards preparedness

There is no question that more action is necessary on defence. Beyond von der Leyen’s new outlines—and existing initiatives such as the EU’s “Readiness 2030” white paper for European defence, Security Action for Europe (SAFE) or the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), all of which focus on financing and equipping Europe’s armed forces—the bloc needs to build genuine preparedness. This requires securing access to raw materials, boosting industrial capacity, ensuring energy redundancy, making budgets more flexible and procedures more agile. It requires a whole-of-society approach, with extraordinary powers and sound legal rules that allow EU institutions to act in cases of emergency and respond to any threat type.

On Gaza, even modest measures have failed to gain consensus among member states, meaning it is unlikely that the new proposals against Israel will advance. The commission is right to put such ideas on the table—and deserves credit for doing so—but the situation on the ground demands more than good intentions. Unless member states can agree on a common stance with regard to the Middle East, Europe will never fulfil its ambition of becoming a geopolitical power.

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Overall, the European Commission president’s speech was serious, occasionally stirring and broadly on target. As the threat from Russia gets starker by the day and trust in the US security umbrella wanes, the EU is developing a clear path towards protecting its member states—and especially its eastern flank—more broadly. Europe’s fate, however, will be not be determined by lofty words in Strasbourg. Instead, von der Leyen needs to prove her intentions by standing by the hard choices she makes—and following through on the actions they require.