Pendulum policy: Why Meloni keeps swinging between Brussels and Washington

Ever since Giorgia Meloni was elected prime minister of Italy in 2022, other European leaders have struggled to place her politically. Concerns about a post-fascist coming to power have largely receded internationally, given Meloni’s strong support for Ukraine and good relations with European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen—as well as former US president Joe Biden. However, the prime minister is no European integrationist; her vision has remains purely nationalist. Frictions with her European partners, particularly French president Emmanuel Macron, persist.

Donald Trump’s return has offered Meloni the chance to align herself more closely with the new American presidency and the politics it espouses. However, Trump’s trade war has hit Italy and forced Meloni to criticise Trump for the first time in recent weeks

But one thing is certain: she will never resolve these ambiguities. Donald Trump’s return to the White House has offered Meloni the chance to align herself more closely with the new American presidency and the politics it espouses. However, Trump’s trade war has hit Italy, an exporting country, and forced Meloni to criticise Trump for the first time in recent weeks. As a result, the Italian government has moved closer to Brussels, as the competence on trade is exclusive to the EU. Arranging today’s bilateral meeting with the US president has only confirmed this ambiguity.

This encounter will be Meloni’s most significant diplomatic engagement to date. Her mission to Washington was somewhat boosted by Trump’s surprise decision last week to impose a temporary truce in the trade war with Europe, which eased tensions between the EU and the US. Prior to this, Meloni advocated negotiation and put herself forward as a potential mediator—while figures in France and Germany fretted about Meloni freestyling, she maintained close contact with European Commission in the run-up to the visit. At the same time, circumstances also do not entirely favour her. Italy is one of the countries in Trump’s crosshairs: it has a trade surplus with the US of almost $74bn and spends only 1.5% GDP on defence.

Still, Meloni will take the trade question head on in the Oval Office and reiterate von der Leyen’s proposal for zero duties on cars and industry, something which Trump has already rejected. She will likely emphasise that reaching a compromise is in everyone’s interest. This position is not dissimilar to the incoming German government, under likely chancellor Friedrich Merz, whose programme sets a goal to a negotiate with the US on tariffs.

Meloni toeing the line of European unity has frustrated parts of the Italian right (her coalition partner party the League, in particular) which wants something to show for Meloni’s longstanding friendly relationship with Trump. Although formal negotiations are the responsibility of the commission, Brussels likely agreed that Meloni should try to leverage her relationship with Trump to leave a possible channel of negotiation open.  Indeed, the Italian position remains to help broker a broader agreement between the US and the EU, with the political ambition to culminate in a US-EU summit at June’s NATO meeting. 

But potential tensions are already emerging between Meloni and her EU partners over issues such as digital services and imbalances in the technology sector. This point is closely related to the US administration’s campaign in favour of deregulation and “freedom of expression” on social platforms. Meloni has stated that she shares some of US vice-president J.D. Vance’s criticism of Europe in this regard. A more open Italian stance on such questions could weaken the regulatory system that the EU has established in this area.

Similarly, Meloni has said she is willing to promote large-scale European purchases of US liquefied natural gas to balance trade. In fact, one of Trump’s biggest criticisms of the Europeans is that they buy too little from the Americans. With this in mind, Meloni has also repeatedly criticised the European Green Deal and openly called for a thorough revision of the programme. Meloni could use gas purchases from the US to strengthen Italy’s position with Trump, while simultaneously weakening green policies in the EU.

Other tensions are to be found in the defence realm. Meloni seems to be in denial that the Atlantic alliance is not in turmoil—despite Trump’s unreliability and the statements, from several American figures, of wanting to dismantle it. Italian governmental figures are aware that, if the US was to withdraw from the alliance or end up crumbling it from within, Italy would be in big trouble. It is a non-nuclear weapon state and has not yet planned significant investments in defence, like Poland or more recently Germany.

Furthermore, Italian public opinion does not seem to support new defence spending or the European ReArm plan. Italian opposition parties and the League are riding this new “pacifism.” Meloni has defended Italy’s adherence to ReArm, pointing to its precautionary and deterrent functions—but while Brothers of Italy voted in favour of the plan at the European Parliament, the League voted against. This demonstrates again the notable political ambiguity of the current government majority. In Washington, the prime minister reiterated Italy’s new commitment to increase its defence spending to 2% GDP in the near term, even as Trump pushes for 5%.

Domestic political constraints, and structural economic and spending constraints, overlap with Meloni’s profound ideological aversion to true European cooperation. But Italian public opinion, and that of its business community, is generally pro-European and aware that Italy should not be tied exclusively to an unreliable Trump. She will likely not undermine Europe’s united front on tariffs; yet, at the same time, she may continue the pendulum policy between Washington and Brussels, agreeing with Trump and Vance on topics including disparagement towards “woke” ideology and the so-called globalist elite.

The reality is that Italy needs both the EU and the US. Meloni’s method to avoid alienating either Washington or Brussels is to try to demonstrate that the West, beyond the controversies, is alive and united. This is the only condition through which Italy can gain time to remedy its own dependencies and weaknesses.