Out of the rubble: The new Gulf response to Israeli aggression
The Israeli attacks on Doha, and America’s support of them, has caused Gulf leaders to majorly rethink their security. This could lead to a new Gulf-led security format
Israel’s September 9th airstrike on Qatar has shattered Gulf states’ assumptions about regional security. The attack targeted senior Hamas leadership—which Doha had hosted at Washington’s behest—and marked the first direct Israeli attack on a Gulf monarchy and staunch US ally. It showed that mediating no longer guarantees safety, US military and economic relations no longer guarantee protection, and that unchecked Israeli aggression can reach new heights.
Even though Gulf capitals conducted shuttle diplomacy or mediation with Hamas, Hizbullah, the Houthis and in the recent war between Iran and Israel, it did not guarantee their immunity. Rather, the Gulf states are now unavoidably entangled in an escalation with Israel, which is threating to pull them into direct conflict. This is likely to discourage them from continuing mediation efforts, depriving Europe and the US of crucial diplomatic channels to rogue actors. Already, Doha is growing reticent to keep its mediation role: officials are considering asking Hamas’s political leadership to relocate—a decision that could compromise future US/Israeli negotiation efforts to end the war on Gaza.[1]
But the reality that Gulf states find now themselves in could also push them to seek new security formats independent of America. This would offer Europeans an opportunity to engage with Gulf states to direct the Middle East towards de-escalation rather than militarisation, including by increasing pressure on Israel to pursue diplomacy over war.
What US security?
The Israeli strike exposed how Gulf capitals misread their leverage in Washington—and shows they need to adapt. US president Donald Trump picked the GCC states for his first state visit in 2025, which lavished him with pageants, huge economic deals and even a luxury jet. But any hopes that Trump was closer to Gulf priorities and more able to restrain Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu have since been dashed. The Trump administration ignored Gulf pleas to rein in Netanyahu in the Israel-Iran war. Now, it has tolerated its closest ally striking Qatar—home to al-Udeid, the largest US base in the Middle East. Washington notified Doha only after the attack began. (Ironically, hosting al-Udeid had brought an Iranian retaliation in June, already putting into question that inaction would guarantee the security of Gulf monarchies.)
This is a sobering recalibration for Gulf rulers. If they once viewed US influence over Israel as stabilising, they now face the possibility that Netanyahu pursues a unilateral vision free from American constraints
This is a sobering recalibration for Gulf rulers. If they once viewed US influence over Israel as stabilising, they now face the possibility that Netanyahu pursues a unilateral vision free from American constraints. The implications reverberate far beyond Doha. If hosting US forces no longer deters strikes, but as in the case of Iran, invites them, a rethink is in order. While Gulf leaders do not yet see an alternative to US security guarantees—as proven by Qatar’s intentions to double-down on getting stronger support from Washington—at the very least Gulf leaders want more sovereignty and autonomy over decision-making and the operational management of their own defences.
Checking the unchecked
Initially, Israeli aggression after October 7th was tactically useful to the Gulf monarchies. In Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, Israeli strikes weakened Iranian-backed forces. Over time, however, it has become clear Israel is intent on reshaping the regional order recklessly and with impunity. Israel’s increasing belligerence has entrenched instability, fragmented Arab states and risks roping the Gulf monarchies into military escalation. All of this amplifies the threats emanating from the region towards European interests, too.
Beyond words of condemnation, the Gulf (and Arab) response to Israeli aggression has been very slow, with hesitation to deploy any leverage. For months, efforts to form a counterweight to both Iran and Israel stalled. Recently, however, there has been a marked shift, with new attempts to close ranks among Gulf players. In early September, Emirati president Mohammad bin Zayed travelled to Riyadh to repair the strategic alliance with Mohammad bin Salman after nearly two years of estrangement. And within days of the Israeli strike on Qatar, both Mohammad bin Salman and Mohammad bin Zayed met the Qatari Emir in Doha. While presented as solidarity, such visits are likely part of an effort to coordinate a tripartite Gulf leadership—bringing together the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar as the core of a renewed front to contain both Iran and Israel.
Then, on September 15th, Arab and Islamic states met in Doha for an emergency summit. Reading the final communique, you would not know they faced a watershed moment. Creating a shared vision between the 52 members of the Arab-Islamic meeting was virtually impossible. But the weakness of the communique will likely push the Gulf trio to be more ambitious in their own responses.
Gulf capitals are already reaching out to Turkey and Egypt to restore their military deterrence, with discussions scheduled on the sidelines of UN general assembly to form a new 6+2 framework on regional security.[2] The mutual defence deal signed on September 16th between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, stipulating that an attack to one party should be considered an attack to both, hints at the ongoing discussions. The geopolitical goals of this front likely include halting Israeli strikes in the Levant, preventing state collapse in Syria and Lebanon, crowding out both Iran and Israel in Iraq and Yemen, and deepening Gulf influence within Yemen and Iraqi political circles, all while reducing their reliance on external actors, namely the US.
To this end, practical cooperation on defence with Israel, for example the networking of air defence radars, may be walked back and closing air space to Israel has been floated.[3] Some Gulf officials insist it would be smart to also enhance a security dialogue with Iran to signal to Israel that there are more ways to limit its room for manoeuvre.
The Gulf countries also have some geoeconomic instruments to deploy against Israel, such as divesting Sovereign Wealth Funds capitals from Israeli firms or, in the case of the Abraham Accord countries, receding from lofty related deals. The UAE in particular, which has consistently acknowledged the strategic benefit of relations with Israel, may now see Israeli overreach as doing so much damage that these relations are now simply too toxic to maintain. The biggest single source of leverage would be the UAE walking away from the Abraham Accords, but this could be a long way off: Abu Dhabi likely knows it can only play this card once, and it has reserved it for when Israel officially annexes the West Bank.
A new European partner
A cohesive Gulf-led front—if it materialises—offers a new hope of pushing back against Israel. It could become a strong partner for Europe in stabilising the Levant, managing post-conflict Gaza, and containing Israeli strikes in Syria and Lebanon. With the lack of a credible alternative security guarantor, it is highly unlikely that the Gulf states will turn away from the US, but their leaders will almost certainly resume the strategic hedging that characterised the end of Biden’s presidency. European diplomats should seize this opportunity to be the go-to interlocutors for regional security and defence.
This opens a space for Europeans who share key underlying goals such as constraining Israel’s reckless behaviour, salvaging a diplomatic option with Iran, preserving the conditions for regional deal-making on Gaza, and strengthening state institutions across the Middle East. European leaders have openly expressed their solidarity with Qatar and recognise that Israeli behaviour in the region is promoting instability. They should now reach out to their Gulf counterparts to be involved in discussions for this new 6+2 framework in New York. Key EU member states can offer their active support to contain Israel, starting with seizing the momentum for the recognition of a Palestinian state at the French-Saudi initiative there and pressure Israel, for instance with a full arms embargo, as long as it embraces conflict.
[1] Author’s interview with Qatari officials, over the phone, September 10th 2025
[2] Author’s interviews with various Gulf officials, online, September 10th-18th
[3] Author’s interviews with various Gulf officials, online, September 10th-18th
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
