Not so fast: How Poland’s next president could hamper its foreign policy ambitions

A lot is riding on Poland’s presidential election. The country is still reeling from eight years of rule by the Law and Justice (PiS) party—a period marked by democratic backsliding and strained ties with Brussels and European capitals. Since his 2023 victory over PiS, prime minister Donald Tusk has led a remarkable recovery in Warsaw’s European engagement. The results of the election on May 18th, or in the second round on June 1st, could either reinvigorate these efforts or condemn them to a slow, steady unraveling.

Rafal Trzaskowski, from Tusk’s Civic Platform party, is leading in the polls. If he can keep this up, Tusk will be emboldened to strengthen Warsaw’s strategic realignment with the European centre. If PiS candidate Karol Nawrocki catches up, however, Tusk’s foreign policy agenda will face long-term obstacles. While Nawrocki is likely to support a pro-America and pro-Ukraine approach, he could block Tusk’s efforts to make Poland a key player within the European Union.

Europe, maybe

Since coming to power, Tusk has normalised relations with Brussels and pushed through some pro-European policies, particularly in the realm of security and defence. Warsaw has embraced European defence initiatives, secured Poland’s comeback to the Weimar triangle alliance with France and Germany, participated in the E5, finalised a bilateral treaty with France, advanced negotiations with Britain, and will soon pursue similar arrangements with Germany. The current president, PiS-affiliated Andrzej Duda, has been unable to substantially constrain Tusk’s foreign policy reorientation as no foreign policy laws have passed through parliament for him to veto. In the next presidential term, however, there will be ample opportunity.

Nawrocki would likely deploy his presidential veto not only to obstruct judicial reforms but also to express his reservations about closer EU integration

Should Nawrocki prevail—a figure who declares, “I will be a president who will not agree, […] for the European Union to be a quasi-state, and for Poles in ten years to be citizens of the European Union of Polish origin” —Tusk could still maintain a pro-European agenda. The prime minister’s cabinet has primacy in conducting foreign policy even if presidential consultation is required. The risk, however, lies in the presidential veto power that Duda has so far wielded to block Tusk’s judicial reform efforts. Nawrocki would likely deploy this veto not only to obstruct judicial reforms but also to express his reservations about closer cooperation with the EU.  

In the leadup to the election, PiS leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski, has criticised Tusk’s decisions on Polish security as tantamount “to giving Brussels and Berlin Polish money for armaments and control over our army, ” arguing that Poland “cannot agree to giving away key attributes of our sovereignty.” Nawrocki, who has followed his party in opposing deeper European security cooperation, will likely back up such rhetoric by vetoing legislation that pivots Poland further towards the EU.

Poland’s recent cooperation agreement with France, for example, could be jeopardised as it requires presidential approval that Nawrocki might not be willing to give. Not ratifying the treaty would outcast Poland from a very small group of France’s closest allies (Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain) before it has even got the chance to join. Nawrocki would instead likely understand regional security cooperation to be with Britain, the Nordics and Baltics, and Romania, rather than with the EU or France and Germany, viewing Poland as a central European leader, rather than a European one.

America, always

However, the new president—whether Trzaskowski or Nawrocki—will not greatly alter Poland’s approach to other key foreign policy domains. While the orientations of the two main parties differ in rhetoric, their policies on key issues transcend partisan divides. Both are anti-migration, committed to spending 5% of GDP on defence, oppose Russian influence, and want the Ukraine war to end without enabling future Russian aggression. Most importantly, both are keen to continue Warsaw’s close ties with Washington, no matter who sits in the Oval Office.

Poles consistently rank as the most pro-American nation globally, and there is a consensus that Polish-US relations are a strategic priority serving the country’s security interests. Tusk and Duda set aside their profound domestic disagreements to jointly visit Washington during Joe Biden’s presidency, presenting a unified diplomatic front. Nawrocki similarly advocates a robust transatlantic partnership.

Nawrocki, who met with US president Donald Trump earlier this month, shares far more ideological affinities with the American president than his opponent. But in Poland, security considerations supersede ideology. Even with Trump at the helm, Tusk has declared “security cooperation with the United States is now at its highest possible level”.  In late April, Poland acquired 400 advanced AIM-120D medium-range air-to-air missiles from the US and finalised a bridge agreement with Westinghouse-Bechtel for Poland’s first nuclear power plant.

However, Tusk has tried to reduce Poland’s excessive security dependence on the US by deepening defence and security partnerships with European countries. He has met with Paris on its nuclear deterrent programme, while his foreign minister has said that both NATO and the EU defend Polish sovereignty rather than limit it. Trzaskowski has echoed the need for a strategic recalibration with Europe in response to Trump’s presidency, whereas this is absent from PiS’s policy vision.

Ukraine, mostly

Similarly, the presidential candidates’ positions on Ukraine are superficially alike. They both acknowledge the need to resolve Russia’s war and pledge continued Polish support for Kyiv if elected. Trzaskowski has also moved towards right-wing positions such as supporting the idea of limiting social welfare to Ukrainian migrants. However, he is keen to prioritise security cooperation against Russian aggression, while his opponent wants historical reconciliation for the Volhynia massacre before agreeing to support Ukraine’s European integration.

A Nawrocki victory will not preclude Tusk from participating in the coalition of willing countries supporting Ukraine. But both he and Tusk will not send Polish troops to Ukraine, especially as Tusk has argued it is not the right decision from a military and strategic perspective as it would deplete Poland’s own defences. Moreover, there is a lack of consensus among Tusk’s coalition partners, and the decision would prove unpopular in the lead up to the country’s next parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, a Trzaskowski presidency might allow Tusk to be less cautious on Ukraine by increasing military equipment transfers or deploying Polish personnel in a different format to Ukrainian territory.

Poland, divided

Closer to home, a Nawrocki victory would substantially diminish the prime minister’s domestic political capital. Not only would it weaken Tusk’s room for manoeuvre, but it would also strain his already fragile ruling coalition as its members would likely disagree on how to respond to an opposition president, what to compromise on and where they should stand firm. Disagreements are already splintering the coalition on issues such as civil partnerships and abortion and support for the government is low.

A period of cohabitation where a PiS president can veto Tusk’s efforts to restore democratic institutions (a mandate on which he was elected) would likely lose him the 2027 parliamentary election. That would spell the end to Poland’s newfound role in a “core group” of European countries bolstering European defence and security and taking key strategic decisions.

Conversely, a second defeat of PiS, this time over the presidency, could exacerbate the fractures between the party’s moderates and hardliners, both desperate to change direction to fix their electoral appeal.

For now, Poland is a pertinent example of recovery from the populism and authoritarianism spreading across the continent. The upcoming presidential election will determine how possible this trajectory is. Europeans can rest assured that Poland’s core security priorities—maintaining strong ties with the US and supporting Ukraine—will stay consistent across party lines, reflecting a deep national consensus. What remains to be seen is whether Poland will emerge as a key player in the EU and in its security architecture or be unable to fully commit to either.