North-south aligned: Why Italy should join the Three Seas Initiative

The tenth annual Three Seas Initiative (3SI) took place in Warsaw at the end of April. The platform, established in 2016 by 12 EU member states with shared Iron Curtain experience, aims to foster cooperation between countries in northern and southern Europe—and to harness the Baltic, Black and Adriatic sea regions via a network of energy, connectivity and infrastructure projects.

Now the 3SI member list boasts Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, all of which are NATO allies except Austria. And the initiative continues to grow: in 2022 and 2023, the 3SI named Ukraine and Moldova as partner-participants, while Albania and Montenegro also gained this status in 2025.

Rome is in a prime geographical location for the initiative’s southern reaches; Meloni understands its growing strategic importance for participating countries. But Italy’s past and present governments have not considered the 3SI an urgent geopolitical priority

Italy, however, is missing. Rome is in a prime geographical location for the initiative’s southern reaches; prime minister Giorgia Meloni understands its growing strategic importance for participating countries. But Italy’s past and present governments have not considered the 3SI an urgent geopolitical priority. Now Meloni needs to look beyond Italy’s traditional geographical interest areas of the Western Balkans and the southern Mediterranean, engage in more radical formats of regional cooperation, and take a more longitudinal approach to its economic security.

Italy’s interest in the Three Seas Initiative

1. Joining the 3SI would strengthen Italy’s already strong foreign policy orientation towards the Western Balkans, which has long been a priority for successive Italian governments. The 3SI includes Croatia and Slovenia: in the former, 300 Italian companies operate with €8bn worth of trade exchange, while Italy is Slovenia’s second-most important EU trade partner and third-most important trade partner globally. In April, Polish president Andrzej Duda also announced that the 3SI had granted Montenegro and Albania partner-participant status. With both countries politically and economically vital to Italy, its inclusion in 3SI would only serve to deepen Rome’s Western Balkan ties.
2. Italy should join the 3SI to continue demonstrating both its support for Ukraine’s fight against Russia and for Moldova’s EU accession path. Meloni is still surprising other European capitals by keeping Italy’s aid support for Kyiv a government priority, despite a shared European suspicion around Meloni’s possible “Trumpian drift” in which she may accept a ceasefire deal at any cost. Italy’s involvement in an additional format of dialogue, which goes beyond bilateral or EU framework relations, would confirm Meloni’s commitment to supporting Ukraine not only politically, but also via investment and practically with concrete projects—especially in a future reconstruction phase. Italy has also shown a renewed political commitment to Moldova, which is already a 3SI partner country, in supporting its EU accession path. Joining the 3SI would be an additional tool for Italy to prove this commitment.
3. Italy’s participation in the 3SI could improve its current position in the EU and strengthen Meloni’s relationship with other European capitals, such as Warsaw, as well as relations with countries such as Germany. The latter, an official partner of the 3SI, has had a somewhat frosty alliance with Italy over the past few years—but even if Italy will never be part of the Weimar Triangle, Rome should still diplomatically engage with its members. It could achieve this by going beyond bilateral or EU-led relations and through regional formats of cooperation.
4. Likewise, Italy should join the 3SI to avoid being isolated from formats of regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. For Italy—given the current impasse in its geopolitical relationships with both France and Spain—3SI membership would make it more integrated among other EU member states by developing policies in the common regional interest. Furthermore, Duda announced that Spain and Turkey will join the initiative as strategic partners, leaving Italy as the only big southern voice on the 3SI periphery. This is vital as Rome seeks to strengthen its presence in North Africa and beyond, becoming the region’s main point of reference for the EU. While it aims to achieve this especially through the Mattei Plan, joining the 3SI would also help to serve this purpose.
5. The 3SI has a transatlantic dimension: the US, an official partner since its creation, has always strongly backed the project. Although former president Joe Biden was more aligned with the 3SI on how it could counteract Russian influence, under President Donald Trump this might shift towards managing the already tangible Chinese economic presence and diplomacy in the 3SI region—especially eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. Meloni embraces Trump’s view, especially since her decision to not renew Italy’s Belt and Road Initiative membership in 2023. As such, a strong political connection between Meloni and Trump remains, despite issues regarding Italy’s defence spending not yet meeting US targets. Trump’s interest should reassure Italy that America is firmly retaining the 3SI and its interests under its own political umbrella.
6. Italy is highly invested in developing its capabilities in energy, connectivity and infrastructure, as showcased during the 2024 G7 and through Rome’s ongoing support for the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). As the Italian special envoy for IMEC recently pointed out, the 3SI and IMEC have aligned goals: the city of Trieste, perfectly located almost in the middle of 3SI countries as well as multiple Italian ports, is primed to host European infrastructural, energy and connectivity aspirations.

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Meloni cannot afford further political isolation from Italy’s European allies—but her prioritisation of transatlantic relations over European relations, and her own unique way of collaborating with the EU, complements her decision to generally stay out of major European partnerships. This does not, however, detract from the fact that Italy’s geopolitical and economic role in Europe should be stronger. Italy could use the 3SI to better influence the EU’s inner cooperation circles, such as the Weimar Triangle, and become more visible in its role as a regional economic leader.

If, for Meloni, full membership is too daunting, perhaps Italy could be like Germany and the US—and begin by joining the 3SI with ‘partner’ status as a first step.