No cash, no bullets, no say: A 10-point memo for Europe on Ukraine

DATE DECEMBER 4TH, 2025
FROM: ECFR EUROPEAN SECURITY PROGRAMME
TO: EUROPEAN LEADERS
SUBJECT: UKRAINE’S AND EUROPE’S CHOICE

1. Ukraine faces a fork in the road moment. It can either accept a bad deal imposed by the US and Russia or continue its defence in the knowledge things are going badly on the battlefield.
2. The choices are Ukrainian but the implications are European. President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukraine’s people are the decision-makers. Yet what they do will reverberate far beyond Ukraine and set the contours for Europe’s own security for years to come.
3. Europeans’ existing role is running out of road. So far, the Europeans have been helping Kyiv avert or delay these toughest of choices by trying to substitute for US aid—and by racing to ameliorate the Trump administration’s various (unpalatable) attempts to end the war on terms unduly favourable to Moscow.
4. The EU approach is now almost exhausted, for several reasons.
   • First, key interlocutors in Washington and Moscow agree on Europe’s role: they see involvement of, or coordination with, the Europeans as a hindrance to the process. America has made clear it does not want to listen to Europeans asking for changes to the terms of the deal under discussion.  
   • Second, Ukraine is facing an increasingly precarious military and financial situation. Russia continues to press not just in the east of the country, but is making advances in the south-east, and Ukraine continues to suffer from manpower shortages. The near-constant pummelling of energy infrastructure has plunged the country into a daily schedule of blackouts and cold. Kyiv’s fiscal position is also bad: its projected budget deficit for 2026 is equivalent to 18.5% of GDP. The EU estimates that Ukraine needs around €137bn in additional combined financial and military support in 2026-2027. Without new commitments, the country will run out of cash in April.  
   • Third, domestic corruption scandals have undermined Ukraine’s political leadership in the eyes of the country’s public as well as the political elites. The president will need to make new arrangements in parliament to ensure the legislature continues to function—and win back some of society’s trust. Different political and business groups are ready to take more power and resources, but not more responsibility, leaving Zelensky in a weakened position at home.
   • Fourth, while European support helped fill some gaps left by the US halt in financial and military aid, it is nowhere near enough to keep Kyiv in the fight, especially against the current trends. In the past six months alone, international military aid to Ukraine has dropped by 43%. Unless this volume grows, things look very difficult for Ukraine. The question would then be why continue a fight that seems impossible to turn into Kyiv’s favour.
5. No war is linear. The first choice is with Washington now. Before Kyiv makes its decisions, Washington will need to make its own: will it slow down its pursuit of a deal or move forward quickly? Will it press Ukraine to modify its position even further so that Russia accepts a revised offering? Will the US back its offer of a bad peace for Ukraine with reliable security arrangements? Reportedly, recent talks between the US and Ukraine have not included meaningful discussion on this issue, even though press reports suggested otherwise. 
6. Ukraine’s capacities are already undermined by America’s choices. Black swans can occur. Before the full-scale invasion, many underestimated Ukraine’s ability to resist. But Europeans are running the risk of over-estimating the country’s capacity now, unless they step up their support. An irony is that the more Ukraine is weakened by the US, the more likely it may be that Putin will choose to continue the fight.
7. European leaders need to recognise the realities listed in the six points above before they once again demand a seat at the negotiating table. The simple truth is that Europe has provided a lot to date—but it is still insufficient to really help Ukraine or to win a hearing in Washington and Moscow. 
8. Europeans can shift these trends. They should try to improve the terms of the deal but need to stump up money and weapons to do this. This is where the EU’s choice on using frozen Russian assets comes in. The options are obvious: Europeans either find a way to convert the Russian assets into a war chest for Kyiv and for themselves; or they bridge the financial gap some other way. The discussions have dragged on inexcusably for months, often distracted by hopes for a positive shift in Washington, the need to firefight other political crises or sometimes simple bureaucratic inaction. 
9. For Ukraine, every day of uncertainty about funding means it is unable to plan its own defence. It cannot procure new military equipment, purchase gas to compensate for Russia-inflicted losses or pay its soldiers on time. Each new delay means Kyiv goes into the next round of talks weakened.
10. It is now decision time for Zelensky—but also for Europe. If Europeans do not back up their soft talk about peace with sufficient hard power, both financial and military, then being left out of the room will be increasingly seen as Europe’s strategic choice—a choice of irrelevance.

The author would like to thank Jim O’Brien, Nicu Popescu and Leo Litra for their input.