Navigating a new America: Harris or Trump, Europeans need a collective US strategy

Every time America changes president, European leaders work hard at establishing a close personal relationship, only to lament when the pendulum swing of politics strikes again. This year’s oscillation feels particularly unnerving.

Challenges to Europe’s security will be daunting if Donald Trump makes it back to the White House. Trump has promised to end the war in Ukraine in “24 hours”, while his vice-president pick, JD Vance, has alluded to a “peace plan” that appears more tailored to Russia’s views than Europe’s. Trump also said that Russia could do “whatever the hell they want” to delinquent NATO allies, and some in his camp are pushing for reducing US participation in NATO to nuclear deterrence while pulling out all troops. This is a huge contrast to Kamala Harris, for whom the support to NATO is “ironclad”. She has promised to continue supporting Ukraine and has repeatedly celebrated the importance of America’s alliances.

Europeans will come up with somewhat different strategies to engage the new president depending on who wins. If it’s Harris, Europeans will extend good wishes along with aspirational goals. If it’s Trump, Europeans will focus on offering him quick wins and cross their fingers to get in his good graces. In both cases, Europeans are likely to elbow their way into Washington to try and become the president’s bestie and go-to European ally, including at the expense of fellow Europeans. They may engage in transactional bargaining – buying US weapons in exchange for security guarantees or supporting US policy on China in the hope that the United States reciprocates on Russia – and hope for the best. 

In the absence of a meaningful pushback, Americans will continue to ask Europeans for forgiveness rather than permission

But this is the wrong approach. It dilutes the collective power of Europe, including that of the European Union, and leaves individual member states exposed to pressure from the US. In the absence of a meaningful pushback, Americans will continue to ask Europeans for forgiveness rather than permission, even if the policies of the new US administration run counter to European interests.

As I argued in Foreign Affairs with Giovanna de Maio, Europeans need to come up with a collective plan to engage with the US. There are fundamental interests that all EU member states need to protect, far beyond the issue of the security of Europe. Together they need to be willing to defend and promote these interests, including when dealing with their greatest ally. It is high time that the EU drafts a strategy for engaging with the US, one that stands the test of time and presidential variations. This needs to be a group effort – consensus is key. Such a strategy can be drafted by the collective intelligence of EU institutions, but it needs to be supported by the leaders of EU member states and can extend to include close partners such as the United Kingdom as well as Ukraine and other candidate states. Such a strategy needs to tackle areas of vital importance – Russia, China, and the Middle East, but also trade, defence, climate, and technology.

Regardless of who wins in November, Europeans will be facing a more self-interested America in the future. Despite vast differences between Harris and Trump, there are pre-existing trends that will affect US foreign policy. On Ukraine, the next administration will continue to be guided by prudence and fear of escalation. The conflict threatens European interests much more than American: as Washington looks for a negotiated solution, it may fail to consider the enormity of the consequences of a bad deal for Europe’s security. The US will also remain obsessed with winning its all-out technology and industrial competition with China and may force measures on Europe that will directly affect its prosperity.

In the Middle East, unconditional US support for Israel does not lead to stabilising an increasingly explosive region. And, as the US leads the world in crude oil production, the need to finance the energy transition of the rest of the world is not its greatest focus. America’s priorities are shifting, and they will overlap with the EU’s less and less. Europeans must reckon with this fact and adapt their entire approach to this new, somewhat overwhelming reality.

America’s shifting priorities also have direct consequences on the type of responsibility that Europeans must bear in the security realm. EU member states cannot afford to continue to delay the type of defence investments that are needed to pick up a bigger share of the security effort, both in Europe and beyond. It requires an ambitious plan to produce crucial capabilities that are now provided by the US. The EU needs to work on improving its synergy with NATO. And individual member states must continue to work to provide security guarantees to Ukraine, and other neighbours.

Taking responsibility for its security while fiercely defending its interests will demonstrate the EU’s maturity and strength. It will allow the bloc to speak with one voice when leaders go to Washington, and to defend core interests in transatlantic forums such as the Trade and Technology Council or EU-US summits. It will also signal Europeans’ readiness to engage with the US, regardless of politics. Down the line, it can only lead to a healthier transatlantic relationship.