Mirror, mirror: Why the EU should do more, and care less, about its image

European leaders seem to care about the EU’s external image. In January, an ECFR poll showed that people outside Europe had more faith in the EU’s global standing than Europeans themselves. This finding has since featured in speeches from the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, and Poland’s foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski.

For all its traumas, the second Trumpian era probably looks to them like an opportunity for the EU to forge closer ties with the rest of the world. Indeed, that is how the European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, and the president of the European Council, Antonio Costa, have said they will approach it. But reasserting the EU’s global position is not just an opportunity: it is also a pressing need, if Europeans want to avoid becoming increasingly isolated on the economic, political and strategic fronts.

Preparing for this—under pressure from a US administration that excels at painting the EU as weak, hypocritical and decadent—may intensify the salience of external image in European leaders’ imaginations. Caring about what people think can be anxiety inducing, though.

Just as well ECFR’s new interactive data site is now online to help soothe the nerves. Anyone looking for easy answers on the EU’s image, however, is set for a disappointment. The global public opinion data (collected in November and December 2024) reveal a distinctly mixed picture. To improve the bloc’s external image, Europeans will have to interrogate what that means and then, as the psychoanalytic adage goes, “do the work”.

Mixed feelings

There is some good news in the data. Rare are the places in the world where people see the EU as a “rival” or an “adversary”. And absolute majorities in almost all the countries we polled see the bloc as a “power” like the United States and China. (This is the case in seven of the nine non-EU countries where we asked this question. The exceptions are Turkey and South Korea). Many people across the world also believe the EU’s global sway is increasing.

But most of the data tell a bittersweet story. In several countries, more people describe the US (in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and India) or China (in South Africa) as their country’s “ally” than they do the EU. Likewise, in places as diverse as Turkey, the US, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and South Korea, people are much more confident about the United States’ and China’s rising global influence than they are about that of the EU. Moreover, a good chunk of people around the world believe the EU is vulnerable to falling apart. This is a majority view in Russia and China, and it is shared by pluralities in Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey and the US. This point, however, tends to divide publics: over a third of respondents in all the non-European countries we polled express confidence in the EU’s resilience.

These results might be even less edifying today, given Europe’s disappointingly slow, meek and disunified reaction to the situation in Gaza

This comes on top of ECFR’s January 2023 findings that, compared to China and the US, the EU was less often seen as “strong”; and pretty much only its own citizens believed the best was to describe it was “principled”. Meanwhile, many respondents in China, Turkey and, unsurprisingly, Russia viewed the bloc as “hypocritical” and “untrustworthy”. These results might be even less edifying today, given Europe’s disappointingly slow, meek and disunified reaction to the situation in Gaza—which, in the eyes of many people in the world, very likely looks like proof of the EU’s hypocrisy, double standards and untrustworthiness.

Doing the work

In light of such complexity, it will come as no surprise that improving the EU’s image abroad involves accepting uncomfortable truths and then working through their implications.

First, as any good therapist tells their client, European leaders cannot fully control how the bloc looks to people looking in. The EU’s image is shaped by history and culture that filters in different ways through the eyes of people in different parts of the world. It is not von der Leyen’s annual state of the union address but the Eurovision Song Contest (which, controversially, Israel almost won this year) that the global audience is watching. This could lead to a fatalistic conclusion: introspection is pointless, leaders should do foreign policy regardless of public opinion abroad.

Second, the therapist reminds the client that a lack of control over what people think is not a licence to give up on being a positive influence. This suggests the EU should improve its public relations and communications. Indeed, it has become commonplace to argue that the EU is bad at these things. Unlike China, for example, the EU seems to be less successful in converting its major economic ties with Africa or Asia into real political influence. The EU should, in turn, work harder to emphasise what it does well and actively challenge misinformation—this line of thought would suggest. This may well help somewhat. But it is a technical solution that will not be sufficient to solve a political problem.

Third, the therapist notes the importance of a stable internal concept that leads to actions that match. The EU cannot stand for lofty values while at the same time abandoning them; for instance, in relation to Israel’s actions in Gaza or when it comes to migration. This suggests European leaders need to focus on integrity. Otherwise, the EU will remain an easy target for accusations of hypocrisy. India’s foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, for example, famously observed in 2023 that “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.” Meeting that challenge requires more than just communication: it demands that Europe lives up to its values through its actions. (The EU’s announcement on May 21st that it will review its trade cooperation with Israel over the Gaza offensive is a step in the right direction.)

But even this would not be enough. Soft power remains a crucial element of the EU’s power overall, but gone are the days when it could stand in for strength. To thrive in the world’s latest “strongman” era, the EU needs to practise self-care too and hit the gym. This implies getting serious about its own security and support for Ukraine. If Europeans fail to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty, people’s perception of the EU as weak and declining will likely deepen. After all, why should anyone listen to a “weak power”, or want their governments to invest in stronger partnerships with it and its members?

The EU’s global image might be shaped by history, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, by popular culture events like the Eurovision. On some occasions, the EU’s public relations and communications efforts will prove useful. But image is also decided on the battlefields of Ukraine, in Gaza and at the EU’s borders. European leaders need to assume their agency and responsibility in those real-world events, and thus demonstrate the EU is faithful to its values, as well as a serious and resilient international player. But even then, they should do it to make their own countries safe and to defend the values they have internalised—not just to look better in the mirror.