Look what you made us do: How to realise a European-led NATO

Over summer 2025, European leaders hustled from one summit to the next, with plenty of informal consultations in between. Maybe then it dawned on them that their actions leading up to 2029—the year of NATO’s 80th anniversary—might well decide whether the alliance sees through the 2030s in peace and strength.

During US secretary of defence Pete Hegseth’s latest appearance at the NATO headquarters in mid-October, he shared two insights about what deters Russian aggression. “Number one”, he said, “a lethal, capable and European-led NATO. Number two: a combat-credible Ukrainian military”. Whereas the Trump administration’s position on Ukraine continues to oscillate, taking yet another turn after the latest phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, the president is attempting to unburden the US from leadership in NATO with remarkable consistency.

A four-year plan

In June, at the NATO summit in The Hague, Europeans picked up Trump’s 5%-of-GDP cudgel and turned it into their new defence investment plan for 2035. They agreed to invest 3.5% in core defence expenditures and another 1.5% in defence-related infrastructure and activities. Some might bank on benign changes in the security environment between now and then—such as Russia suddenly abandoning its desire to redraw borders by force—or updated capability targets that produce the same deterrence bang for fewer bucks. There is also an American presidential election scheduled for November 2028…

Europeans wasting the next four years hoping that America’s pivot from Europe—and Russia’s designs for the continent—will disappear into thin air would all but doom Europe’s collective security

And in 2029, NATO allies will review their progress. Yet, European intelligence services warn that by then Russia could be in a position to launch another armed attack on Europe; it is already intensifying its grey-zone campaign. Moreover, US Republicans will want to campaign in 2028 on the initial results of Washington’s effort to reduce America’s defence commitments in Europe and transfer a greater share of the defence burden to European allies. Europeans wasting the next four years hoping that America’s pivot from Europe—and Russia’s designs for the continent—will disappear into thin air would all but doom Europe’s collective security.

Rather, Europeans must use this time to make NATO, its structures and its forces mostly European. American contributions should be welcomed as an accelerant to Russia’s defeat, should the Kremlin dare to stage a future attack. But Europeans cannot afford for their defence to depend on America any longer.

Towards a most European NATO

The Pentagon is, as part of its Global Force Posture Review, examining its global military deployments. European leaders and other America-watchers expect that Washington will reduce the size of its European contingent. It remains to be seen which units the Pentagon specifically intends to withdraw from the continent. Rotational deployments seem to be emerging as America’s first target for reducing its footprint in Europe; this could be followed by the permanently deployed forces and units promised by the Biden administration which are still due to arrive (such as the US army’s long-range fires unit earmarked for Germany in 2026). Either way, Europeans need to focus on building a credible, deployable European force posture that leaves no gaps in NATO’s deterrence and defence plans and toolkit.

To do so, Europeans need to address persistent shortfalls in firepower and capacity, and to anticipate the loss of enabling capabilities—such as intelligence, logistics and command functions—that could accompany the US rebalancing of its global commitments. This includes intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to identify and track threats and targets, command and control to orchestrate offensive and defensive action at scale, and heavy-lift logistical support to move troops and materiel.

NATO’s latest capability targets, adopted by all defence ministers in the alliance in early June, foresee a considerable expansion of allied ground forces from roughly 80 to 130 brigades of about 3,600-5,000 soldiers each. Add to this the necessary growth of air, maritime, cyber and space components: most (if not all) will need to be European, covering frontline, reinforcement and rear-area missions. Europeans will need to integrate drones of various types and enhanced firepower (traditional artillery and long-range fires) across these forces. To address personnel challenges, some countries have even floated the reintroduction of conscription. However, this lacks widespread public support, especially among those of fighting age. Neither the EU nor NATO can mandate solutions here; national governments need to swiftly resolve the issues of recruitment and retention.

New chains of command

Europeans in NATO should also prepare a phased transition of command authority from US general and flag officers to Europeans (and Canadians) at major military headquarters. A memorandum from Hegseth calls for a 20% reduction of four-star positions across the US armed forces and additional reductions of general and flag-officer posts due to an ongoing realignment of US commands and headquarters. Of America’s around 40 four-star positions, four have traditionally supported NATO directly, including the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the commanders of NATO’s air and land component commands (AIRCOM and LANDCOM, respectively), as well as Allied Joint Force Command Naples. They are personifications of the transatlantic nuclear-deterrence and defence linkage, representing the alliance’s most powerful member. Many more US generals and admirals of lower ranks serve in other critical NATO functions.

Recently, however, the Trump administration nominated a three-star general to serve concurrently as the new commander of the US Air Forces in Europe and as commander of AIRCOM. Other positions will likely see similar downgrades in short order. Europeans should work with the Trump administration to facilitate this optimisation and cost-cutting measure. They should propose a Europeanisation of NATO’s command structure, appointing European four-star officers to lead the NATO air, land and maritime commands, with US three-stars serving as their deputies to ensure continued integration.

The changing of other positions should follow through to 2029—including, eventually, SACEUR. Non-US general officers currently lack experience in leading at many of NATO’s highest echelons, but a European-led NATO means they need to acquire it one way or another.

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Conversations about defence adaptation are quick to centre around whatever latest tech promises the most revolutionary battlefield effects. But without clarity around how to organise and integrate capabilities and allied forces, any effort to adopt new tech or doctrinal innovations will dissolve into chaos. Rather than sowing uncertainty, confusion and disorder within the alliance, a composed NATO with less America—and under European leadership—should be capable and willing to defeat and unravel the Kremlin’s warmaking potential.

This piece originally claimed, wrongly, that the commander of NATO’s maritime command (MARCOM) is American. The error was corrected on 31st October 2025.