Knowing the score: Why EU rearmament must be grounded in political consensus

“The times they are a-changin” and—six decades after Bob Dylan released his folk classic in the decade of “peace and love”—politicians are breaking long-standing taboos on European defence almost daily.

In March, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen proposed what has, for the last 70 years, seemed unthinkable: a plan to rearm Europe. However, to approach this in the “old-fashioned way”—with each country expanding their own national armed forces—would be inefficient, producing duplicated and disconnected capabilities across the continent. More importantly, Europe’s 20^th-century conflict history warns against it. Allowing EU member states to rearm independently, without coordination or clear direction, poses a grave risk to European cohesion—particularly considering the rise of far-right parties, nationalist rhetoric and democratic backsliding across parts of the continent.

As such, while defence remains a national competence deeply tied to sovereignty, any European-wide initiative depends on successful integration. Article 42.2 of the Treaty on the European Union explicitly anticipates the “progressive framing of a common Union defence policy”, stating that it “will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides.” So EU treaties not only permit a fully-fledged European defence policy—they envision it. But any such development must be grounded in a cohesive political discourse.

Integration, not fragmentation

Defence integration was on the table from the very start of the European project. In 1950, shortly after French foreign minister Robert Schuman presented the Schuman Declaration, the Pleven Plan laid out a vision for joint European defence. Then, following the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, its member states negotiated a treaty to create a European Defence Community (EDC).

There were two reasons to create the EDC: first, to prevent the return of war to the European continent; second, to counter growing Soviet hostility. While the second reason is now as relevant as during the early years of the cold war, the first reason disavows the claim that European integration is a pacifist project. Europe’s founding fathers were explicit that peace can only be guaranteed through joint defence, leading to their pursuit of the EDC from the outset. This is also why, when the EDC project collapsed, Jean Monnet expressed his utter disappointment by resigning his role as president of the ECSC’s High Authority.

Now von der Leyen is channelling Monnet, and other EU founding fathers, through her affirmation that Europe can achieve “peace through strength”. Only by pooling military resources can EU member states build up real deterrence against external threats and, as Schuman said, render conflict within the bloc “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”.

For the EU, however, this is no time to bring back the EDC from the ashes. In order to avoid repeating past mistakes, it must instead create solid common institutions to frame the “Zeitenwende” and first back any surge in military spending with political unity.

European political unity

As well as the EU founders’ stance on a common defence policy, they also espoused the need to complement military cooperation with political integration. Should the EDC have been successful, it should have been paired with a supranational European Political Community (EPC)—an earlier iteration of French president Emmanuel Macron’s initiative of the same name. While the latter is little more than a forum for dialogue, the EPC of the 1950s aimed to forge a shared European stance on matters of strategic geopolitical importance. Now, as the war in Ukraine prompts the EU to confront its growing defence responsibilities, it needs a similarly strong political framework to match its military ambitions.

A rearmament drive without proper governance risks undermining the values it seeks to defend: peace, democracy and the rule of law. Consequently, the EU must guarantee that weapons do not fall into the wrong hands and that member states cannot use them against each other. There can also be no doubt that such weapons serve only to uphold European ideals—and not to threaten or weaken them. For that, rearmament must go hand-in-hand with political coalescence.

What can the EU do?

Today’s fragile and fractious security environment makes it clear that the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy—with its limited ambition and intergovernmental nature—is not fit for purpose. It certainly does not provide the political cement that is needed to support the building up of Europe’s military strength.

And, while current efforts to reinforce Europe’s defence sector are pointing in the right direction, the EU must go further than creating the fiscal space for member states to rearm, or incentivising joint procurement of military equipment and supporting the European defence industry. It needs to develop a common framework that aligns member state efforts, ensures accountability, and guarantees that defence policy serves shared European objectives.

The fact is that the EU urgently needs a political umbrella and a legal pathway to connect its member states as they step up development of their military arsenal. As US president Donald Trump’s ambivalence towards NATO jeopardises the alliance’s cohesion, it is essential that ties among EU members become closer than before. This is not about replacing NATO, however, but about strengthening its European pillar.

Securing political bonds

Some EU member states might be unwilling to share in their defensive power, particularly given that defence and security are such sensitive areas. If no consensus can be reached among all 27 members, for example due to Hungary’s diverging view on the war in Ukraine or how the EU should approach its dealings with foreign powers like Russia, then the EU can try to make progress with 26 members instead. It could also achieve this through another “coalition of the willing”.

Mechanisms such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), Enhanced Cooperation, or a potential supplementary treaty could provide a stable framework for further integration. These would allow for closer collaboration between a subset of EU member states that are willing to go the extra mile and promote deeper unity within the bloc, particularly on foreign and security matters.

A debate is looming over guns vs. butter. But this is essentially flawed and misguided—in reality, Europe should ask whether it can justify having more guns without forging a stronger political bond between those who wield them

Such strong political bonds might look like an unattainable mirage, but they are both legally feasible and necessary for Europe to succeed in today’s confrontational geopolitics. It is but a matter of political will: Europeans should expect their leaders to rise up to the occasion because, as the Schuman Declaration states, “world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it”.

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A debate is looming over guns vs. butter. But this is essentially flawed and misguided—in reality, Europe should ask whether it can justify having more guns without forging a stronger political bond between those who wield them. This should go beyond what exists at the NATO or EU level: such a bond needs to account for not only solidarity and mutual defence, but truly foster a common perspective on Europe’s use of military power. Just as there can be “no taxation without representation”, there should be “no militarisation without integration”.