Island hopping: Why Azerbaijan’s meddling in the Comoros should worry the EU
Baku is attempting to exploit anti-French sentiment in the Comoros, a move right out of Russia’s foreign policy playbook. Europeans should act fast to secure their Indian Ocean ally
Last month, the Azerbaijani government hosted a conference on the “illegal occupation of Mayotte by France”. It was a curious gathering: over a dozen activists from the Comoros, a tiny country comprising a cluster of islands between Madagascar and Mozambique, pitching up in Baku, a capital in the Caucasus. It resulted in a memorandum of cooperation with a group advocating the return of one island, Mayotte, from France to the Comoros. It was also followed by a communication campaign on various social media channels aimed at Comorians. Curious though it was, the conference pointed to Russia’s growing influence over some of Europe’s far-flung outposts.
The Union of the Comoros is a long way from Europe. But its distant location and modest size should not discourage European policymakers from paying more attention to the archipelago, as it is located at an important crossroads in the Indian Ocean and has proven to be a loyal ally to the West. It comprises four islands. Three of those are Comorian territory and the fourth, Mayotte, is a French overseas territory over which the Union claims sovereignty.
In a 1974 referendum, the majority of Comorians chose to quit France, but Mayotte voted to remain with the former colonial power. This was confirmed in a 2009 referendum when it chose to become an overseas department. Both referendums are rejected by the Comorian government, as well as the United Nations and the African Union which recognise Mayotte as part of the Comoros.
Half century on, the Baku Initiative Group (BIG), launched in 2023, is seeking to confirm the claim. It purports to be an international NGO “dedicated to fostering international partnerships in the fields of decolonisation and human rights” but is funded by the government of Azerbaijan and has links to various other independence movements, notably in New Caledonia, another French territory.
Those who returned from Baku characterised the BIG event as a major step towards the return of Mayotte to the Union of the Comoros and a “relaunch of the debate on the international level”. While it may not necessarily be any kind of step towards the return of Mayotte to the Comoros, the conference was certainly a step towards further destabilisation of Comorian attitudes towards France and, by extension, Europe.
To be clear: the Comoros have no diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan, no evidence exists of any prior interaction between the two, and there is no legitimate reason why Azerbaijan would suddenly express interest in a very remote country of less than one million people. Rather, it appears that the main goal of the BIG is to challenge French influence in its overseas territories as a direct response to French rapprochement with Armenia, Azerbaijan’s regional rival.
Such sudden Azeri interest in undermining French influence abroad is a strategy straight out of the Russian playbook. The BIG’s efforts in France’s overseas territories align closely with Moscow’s foreign policy goals, including undermining France’s influence in its former colonies. The BIG’s strategy and events are inspired by Russia, which has been working hard to get more attention from the Comorian government.
The Comoros has proven to be a loyal European ally, especially on the war in Ukraine; including in UN general assembly votes and President Azali Assoumani’s missions to Kyiv and Moscow in June 2023. Azali continues to yield influence on the continent after his successful chairmanship of the African Union and has been an advocate for closer cooperation with Europe.
The Comoros cannot be neglected by the West just because it may seem too small and too far away. This makes it easy prey for Russia
The Comoros cannot be neglected by the West just because it may seem too small and too far away. This makes it easy prey for Russia and its allies. Moscow is currently planning to open a fully-fledged diplomatic mission in the capital Moroni.
Russia has previously played territorial disputes in the region to its advantage. It meddled heavily in the 2018 presidential campaign in neighbouring Madagascar and successfully unearthed a largely forgotten dispute between Antananarivo and Paris over the uninhabited Scattered Islands. Ever since, the topic has been a thorn in the Franco-Malagasy relations and to a lesser extent Malagasy-European relations. Russian diplomats never miss an opportunity to point out that Russia has always considered the Scattered Islands as part of Madagascar, the same way as the BIG is doing with Mayotte.
Parallels between the two cases can be easily drawn especially that the Russian embassy in Antananarivo is also accredited to Moroni. Just as in the Malagasy case, Russia officially recognises Mayotte as integral part of the Union of the Comoros and has been positioning itself as the only partner of the Comoros who cares about the return of Mayotte to the administration in Moroni. This could soon grow into a multilateral foreign policy issue between the Comoros and the European Union.
Diverging from their government’s general position, many Comorians want to move on from France as their main partner and resentment towards the former colonial power remains high.[1] On the other hand, what Russia, China, and their proxies do have to offer is a sense of partnership and equal treatment that simply comes with the lack of colonial past. But Comorians recognise that there is more to Europe than France. It is therefore critical that EU member states with no colonial past engage more in sub-Saharan Africa. Recruiting more diverse staff in delegations, as well as in development and humanitarian agencies, is crucial to fostering more equal relations. It will help convey the message that the EU is committed to the social and economic development of sub-Saharan countries, the Comoros included, and that this is not another tool of neo-colonialist agenda – a common perception in the former colonies. But given the geopolitical positioning of Moroni up until now, especially on the war in Ukraine, relatively little work is required from European diplomats to keep Comorians close.
Although combatting violence against women and children, entrepreneurial programmes, and the blue economy, which are currently the focus of EU programmes, are issues crucial to the development of the Comoros, the EU should also invest more in security sector reform; better tools for surveillance of porous maritime borders; countering trafficking and extremism; and support to the education system at all levels. The current work done by Expertise France on the Arms Trade Treaty is a good start, but a comprehensive security sector reform is long overdue amid political violence, trafficking, and extremism in the country. The EU could also expand its cooperation in the field of agriculture given the weak food security in the Comoros and European expertise in that area, especially of individual member states such as Poland or Ireland which have no colonial legacies. Promotion and of private sector investment opportunities and incentives would also strengthen European soft power in the region.
More widely, Europeans need a more diversified and sustainable long-term strategy for their engagement with the Comoros, and other sub-Saharan African countries – something that Russia cannot and does not want to offer. Europeans need to prove that they want and can create an equal partnership that will benefit sub-Saharan Africans and their economies.
[1] Based on author’s conversations with Comorian officials, Moroni, 2022-2024
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
