How Europeans can go beyond “limiting unpredictability” and respond to the MAGA doctrine

An alliance once was, no longer

Europe’s security and integration have been inextricably linked to America for decades. In the aftermath of the second world war, the transatlantic alliance was not just a military arrangement but a political covenant grounded in the “liberal order”. NATO provided the security architecture, while the EU constructed the economic, political and legal infrastructure of a peaceful, rules-based order in the continent. European countries flourished under this umbrella—they built robust welfare states and became the world’s largest trading bloc and America’s closest economic partner.

That geopolitical consensus is now history. One year after the US presidential election, the Trump administration is not just disrupting transatlantic ties; it is actually redefining them around a different political idea. It is now clear that the MAGA movement is seeking to reorder the alliance via transnational political networks, selective media backing, political campaign coordination and, in some cases, direct electoral interference in allied democracies. In Germany and Poland high-ranking officials from the US administration supported candidates closer to their political ideology. Far-right parties across the European continent increasingly operate as national branches of this broader ideological movement. This is not an episodic deviation; it is a systemic realignment.

What is especially striking is the lack of coordinated European response. American political figures travel to European capitals to openly support far-right movements, but Europeans make no formal rebuttal, offer no narrative counter-offensive and display little recognition of the scope of the challenge. While all this is happening in Europe, the administration is dismantling the pillars of democracy like independent judiciary or press freedom, leading to democratic erosion in America as never before. In many European capitals, leaders still appear caught between strategic dependence and political denial. Even when the US president claims that the EU was created to “screw the United States”, there is only silence, which surely goes well with a president that prefers to do “business” with member states instead of EU institutions. European officials mostly focus on “limiting unpredictability” with the US (to share the phrase common in diplomatic circles currently).

Europe’s leaders are still stuck on their path dependencies. They are hoping to keep America, their historical security provider, as engaged as possible, for as long as possible. They are not yet ready to help Ukraine and face the Russia challenge alone. While smart diplomacy with a certain dose of give and take is surely necessary, leaders must identify the broader strategic imperative to work for. The EU has to face the MAGA doctrine with its own alternative vision.

New Schengens

What alternative vision can supporters of the European integration project devise to take on the MAGA doctrine? The answer will define the course of Europe’s history.

Trump’s actions have already catalysed important steps in Europe in the realms of defence, technological sovereignty and supply chains. But any ambition for a strategically sovereign EU remains unevenly shared among decision-makers. Geography, ideology and history all shape how member states interpret the urgency. Yet, precisely when unity is most needed, political fragmentation is growing. Far-right parties have entered government across Europe, increased their presence in the European Parliament and are extremely wary of further integrationist steps.

Paradoxically, the strategic imperative must begin with abandoning the illusion of uniform progress

Paradoxically, the strategic imperative must begin with abandoning the illusion of uniform progress. First of all, the EU must not allow itself to remain paralysed by the slowest-moving parts of its machinery, nor try to move according to Hungary’s national agenda. Instead, flexible integration, allowing groups of countries to move ahead (using the treaty principle of enhanced cooperation), must become the norm, not the exception. The creation of the Schengen area shows this can work. It can become the new modus operandi, as long as at least nine EU member states take part.

Defending what is European: Territory, single market, democracy

Next, the EU needs to move quickly to address urgent policy challenges. Defence is the clearest test case. As NATO’s reliability becomes a matter of political contingency in Washington, the bloc must invest in its own capacities. A group of European countries is already working through a coalition of the willing, but this momentum must be institutionalised and resourced properly. Like Schengen, what begins as differentiated integration should be folded into the EU’s formal architecture over time.

As historian Adam Tooze has pointed out, Europe’s defence problem is not one of resources. In 2024, European NATO members collectively spent $454bn on defence—far surpassing Russia’s military expenditure. The continent already fields 1.47 million active-duty personnel—more than the US. The problem is one of structure: there is an absence of strategic coordination, integration and coherent deployment across national lines. European defence industries are also strong; complementarity should become their watchword. They should think together to become something beyond the mere sum of national industries.

But defence is only one piece of a much broader challenge. To build true strategic capacity, the EU must act across a wider front, by expanding its budgetary firepower, overhauling its outdated fiscal rules, completing the capital markets union and investing in critical cross-border infrastructure. These are not mere technocratic fixes. They are assertions of European sovereignty, foundational steps toward a bloc capable of shaping its own geopolitical future.

Building Europe’s strategic capacity must be anchored by the EU’s political leadership—above all, the European Council and the European Commission—around the core principle of providing security and prosperity to European citizens. The EU should take the lead in delivering European public goods that transcend national borders: in defence, energy, infrastructure and investment. Member states, for their part, should pool resources and commit to voluntary but binding mechanisms that enable collective action in these areas. Rather than eroding national sovereignty, this approach would forge a flexible European sovereignty—one that enhances each nation’s ability to act through shared strength.

But strategic capacity is not merely a matter of regulatory engineering. It is, above all, a question of political vision and requires democratic energy and ideological clarity. Today what is needed is not just a reaction, but a sense of direction. Pro-European leaders must start shaping the EU’s path forward, even if it means doing so among a smaller group of member states. They must offer a political answer to the Trump doctrine. It must make a compelling case for democracy, pluralism and European integration in a multipolar, unstable world, working with partners across Europe, and beyond.

A future worth choosing

The EU must articulate what it is “for”: a bold vision of what Europe can be without the crutch of American guardianship. That vision should be framed not in defensive terms but as a strategic imperative, a future worth choosing. Europeans must work out their political and policy response to the MAGA ideological doctrine. If the European project is to endure the disruptions of the coming years, it must evolve beyond a common market and a web of treaties. It should have a vision for its own future. It should invest in building strategic capacity at national and EU levels, while confronting long-term challenges with coherence and credibility. It must assert itself as a strategic political actor in its own right. The EU’s only real path forward is to move from hesitation to decision and action.