How Europe can influence Trump’s deal-making with Iran

America and Iran are engaged in a diplomatic flurry to broker a new nuclear deal, which President Donald Trump says is “very close”. Having been direct stakeholders in nuclear talks with Iranian officials for over two decades, European leaders have been actively excluded from negotiations this time. Europeans should now redouble their efforts to get close to the US administration and demonstrate they can be helpful in achieving Trump’s repeated ambition to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons.

European leaders must act swiftly because their influence diminishes over time. In October, the “snapback” mechanism under the 2015 nuclear deal—which enables existing parties to that agreement to unilaterally reinstate UN sanctions against Iran—expires. Britain, France and Germany, “the E3”, hold the snapback leverage and are the driving force behind European policy on Iran. They should apply this leverage strategically, by using the threat of snapback to incentivise Iran into concessions that help America reach a strong nuclear deal, while averting military conflict with Iran.

In return for this, the E3 should request from Trump close consultation and alignment of transatlantic policy on Iran. Through a more coordinated approach, Europeans could improve their poor relations with members of the Trump administration who have clashed with European leaders over Ukraine policy but are in favour of a diplomatic settlement with Tehran.

The battle for Trump

On Iran, Trump has so far made three things clear: he wants a deal that avoids war, negotiations that focus primarily on curbing Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, and direct benefits for America from the deal. Yet he has been unclear about the acceptable limit of Iran’s nuclear programme: whether he wants its “total dismantlement” or whether he would allow limited enrichment consistent with the requirements of a peaceful civilian nuclear programme. His administration has also sent mixed messages over this key issue. The source of this confusion is Trump’s approach to the negotiations: he wants a quick deal but is not concerned about the details of its content, allowing two broad camps in his administration to pull him in different directions.

The first are the “restrainers”, a new generation of foreign policy thinkers in the Republican party, who are sceptical of US military entanglements abroad and want America to pursue a more realistic and restrained foreign policy. The restrainers are eager to avoid military confrontation with Iran and seek a political solution to deny Iran pathways to nuclear weapons. They also acknowledge that securing extended restrictions on Iranian nuclear activity would require US concessions, such as economic benefits and allowing limited uranium enrichment consistent with civilian needs.

In stark contrast to Trump’s first presidency, restrainers are now leading figures in the administration. These include, most notably, vice president J.D. Vance and his advisors, as well as top-tier officials in the Pentagon, the Office of National Intelligence and elsewhere in the administration.

Republican foreign policy hawks, the “primacists”, are leading the pushback against restrainers, particularly on the Iran file, where they tend to align with Israel on fully dismantling Iran’s nuclear programme. Prominent primacists in the US government—including the head of US Central Command, General Michael Kurilla; Trump’s former national security advisor, Mike Waltz; and Republican senators Tom Cotton and Lindsey Graham—have long pushed for the full dismantling of Iran’s nuclear programme, traditionally favouring military force to do so. Although these views have lost traction with Trump for now, the primacists are trying to derail negotiations by insisting Iran should not be allowed to enrich any uranium and introducing provisions like restrictions on missiles—a goal that has eluded successive US administrations.

Trump initially leaned towards the restrainer approach. He reached out to Iran’s leadership and reportedly dissuaded Israel from striking Iranian nuclear facilities. The initial offer laid out by his envoy, Steve Witkoff, allowed Iran to continue limited nuclear enrichment, subject to strict monitoring. The technical negotiating team is also led by an advocate of a more realist and restrained foreign policy, Michael Anton. But under pressure from primacists and Israel, the US position on the deal has hardened. This will make it more difficult to come to an agreement as Iran rejects full prohibition of enrichment.

Trump has also maintained a credible threat to encourage Iran to make a deal: he has said that America will use force to contain Iran’s nuclear programme if talks hit a dead end, and he has not ruled out US participation in Israeli-led strikes, even though he put off Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s military initiative targeting Iranian nuclear sites in April. In fact, Trump has subtly threatened Tehran by claiming to be fully aligned with Netanyahu on Iran’s nuclear programme. Recent American military build-up in the region includes weapon systems that could be used to attack Iranian nuclear facilities should diplomacy fail. This is precisely the scenario that primacists are aiming for.  

Securing the European interest

The E3 have serious concerns regarding the US-Iran negotiations. On the one hand, they worry that a future nuclear deal will be too weak on technical terms. Vague limits on enrichment or weak verification measures could allow Iran to build nuclear weapons undetected. They also believe that the Trump administration may miss an opportunity to place checks on other Iranian actions, including its missiles and blocking weapons transfers to Russia. Conversely, the E3 also fear that these negotiations could fall apart because of American maximalist demands, mixed messaging, lack of technical expertise and diminished interest from Trump. This could pave the way for joint Israeli-US military attacks against Iran, the consequences of which could be as destabilising as the 2003 ill-advised US invasion of Iraq.

To address these concerns and better position itself on the Iran file, the E3 and EU should now redouble efforts to influence the American policy direction. Cooperation with the restrainers has so far proven difficult on Ukraine and Russia. However, on the Iran issue, Europeans have a greater overlap with the restrainers than they realise, united by the shared imperative of securing a deal that curbs Iran’s nuclear threat while avoiding military confrontation.

On the Iran issue, Europeans have a greater overlap with Republican  “restrainers” than they realise, united by the shared imperative of securing a deal that curbs Iran’s nuclear threat while avoiding military confrontation

European actors should offer to support the restrainers in three ways, which also strengthens European interests. First, they can offer to vocally champion, at head-of-state level, negotiations and an eventual deal; and forcefully oppose military confrontation. This is a strategy taken by Arab Gulf monarchies, which fully endorsed US-Iran negotiations during Trump’s regional tour last week. This will empower the restrainers when it comes to the inevitable fight in Congress and with Israel over finalising and implementing a potential agreement.

Second, the E3 can offer to press Iran towards swifter concessions in the talks by leveraging the threat of snapback entailed in the 2015 nuclear deal before it expires this October. The E3 can utilise their own track of ongoing dialogue with Iran to incentivise quicker Iranian movement towards a deal. This should be paired with a warning from both the US administration and the E3 to Tehran that the transfer of lethal weapons to Russia for use in Ukraine will derail talks.

Third, the E3 can help the restrainers dispel criticisms of a “weak deal” by pushing Iran to accept measures that enhance international inspectors’ monitoring of its nuclear programme, such as rapidly implementing the Additional Protocol II measures under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Another element of a new deal could focus on gaining Tehran’s acceptance of longer-term nuclear restrictions.

If Iran is willing to concede on such measures, the E3 should urge the Trump administration to distance itself from maximalist demands such as zero enrichment that are certain to derail talks. The E3 should encourage a win-win formula, whereby America can claim victory by blocking Iran from weaponisation-linked activities, including current high levels of uranium enrichment, while Iran is permitted to enrich at low levels consistent with civilian use. 

Lastly, Europeans can help restrainers implement a potential Iran deal. Britain and France, as nuclear states, can offer to cooperate with America in enforcing Iranian nuclear measures. For example, in 2015 Russia took delivery of Iran’s excess stockpile of enriched uranium—something which other parties were unable or unwilling to do—and is rumoured to be considering doing the same in a future deal. The E3 could replicate this model, for example, by supporting measures that further reduce Iran’s capability of making a bomb. The EU can also offer to coordinate closely with the US over how and when economic benefits are provided to Iran, and in which sectors.

An alliance with the primacists is not in the European interest

The E3 will likely face a growing temptation to side more closely with the primacists, either collectively or individually. There is already active outreach by members of this camp pressing E3 members to trigger the snapback mechanism well before its expiration in October as a means to poison the talks. The E3 could mistakenly believe that in exchange for European backing on the Iran issue, the primacists would reciprocate by shifting the US stance on Ukraine. This gamble will likely backfire.

Doing so would certainly spark an escalatory dynamic with Tehran in ways that can derail the US-Iran talks. In the aftermath, Trump may lay the blame on Europe for spoiling his chance to be hailed as a peacemaker, leaving him in no mood to do Europeans any favours. This would all but eliminate whatever faint hope the primacists have of coaxing a more Europe-friendly stance from Trump on Ukraine.

More importantly, triggering snapback sanctions by the E3 paves the way for Iran to follow through on its threat to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In this scenario, Israel and the primacists may succeed in dragging Trump towards confrontation with Iran. The US and Israel would need to commit to regular bombing campaigns against Iran to contain its nuclear advancement—a strategy that would only delay, not destroy, Iran’s programme.  Under such a scenario, Iran is likely to accelerate its march towards weaponising its nuclear programme.

Not only would Europe have to contend with a potential nuclear-armed Iran, but regional escalation would further destabilise the Middle East and potentially drag European governments into military confrontation at a time when they are seeking to return refugees to the region.

Top officials in the restrainer camp resent Europeans, viewing them as free riders. But if they want to bolster the chances of a durable deal with Iran, they need to embrace Europeans, at least on this issue. For European leaders, this could be one policy area to try to forge an alliance with Republican government officials, despite disagreements on Russia. They could use this cooperation to push for a peaceful solution on Iran and improve their relationship with parts of the administration that are generally sceptical of liberal Europe.