Hope and turmoil: The EU’s role in securing Georgia’s democratic future

It was November 28th 2024 when Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party suspended EU accession talks. This followed the European Parliament’s rejection of Georgia’s election result a month prior, whose outcome had laid bare the troubling reality of state capture orchestrated by GD.

Over the years, the regime has consolidated its power by subjugating key institutions, manipulating elections and suppressing dissents. Widespread electoral fraud is extensively documented: experts estimate that, during the October 2024 parliamentary election, 300,000 votes were cast using stolen ID numbers of absent citizens. This democratic upset was followed by Mikheil Kavelashvili replacing the pro-EU Salome Zourabishvili as president in December 2024. Now GD is gaining momentum as a Eurosceptic and Russophile party.

The EU and its Western partners, most notably the US and the UK, immediately imposed sanctions as a response to the fraudulent nature of GD’s re-election—and to demonstrate support for ongoing pro-democracy protests. But to continue effectively protecting the future of Georgia as a democracy, EU countries should work together to produce a comprehensive strategy which demonstrates long-standing support for the Europhile sentiment of much of Georgia’s population.

For its part, Georgia’s path to normalising relations with the EU hinges on ending repression and human rights violations, conducting thorough investigations into electoral fraud, and repealing restrictive legislation introduced before, during, and after the election.

Orchestrated state control

As it stands, however, GD state control extends beyond electioneering and into key democratic institutions such as Georgia’s national bank and constitutional court, enabling the party to undermine civil society and judicial independence. GD recently dissolved the Georgian Parliamentary Research Center, a governmental body which provides evidence-based research to parliamentarians, following staff criticism of violence against peaceful protesters. Even its education sector is not immune, with prime minister Irakli Kobakhidze announcing higher education reforms aimed at aligning the university curriculum with GD’s narratives. The latter move is a direct swipe at the population sector most vocal in its opposition to the GD-controlled system.

On a regional scale, Georgia’s worrying political trajectory could impact the political dynamics in the Caucasus region and the wider eastern neighbourhood. Georgia, which is part of the Middle Corridor trade network providing the shortest route connecting China and Europe, is enforcing a tax-free transit system for seamless access between Europe and landlocked Central Asian countries. But GD is primed to halt this partnership, prompted by its growing Euroscepticism and the bloc’s condemnation of GD’s increasingly authoritarian control and centralisation of power.

Georgia’s withdrawal from the system means the EU losing its cooperative advantage with Central Asia and Caucasus countries to the benefit of Russia and China, whose regional influence could expand via stronger trading relationships. This could further exacerbate European security concerns, as Russian and Chinese territorial influence inches closer to European borders.

No kind words

But the EU will not go quietly. Buoyed by months of protest among Georgia’s population and the bloc’s desire to secure democracy in a strategically important region, European institutions are hitting back.

The EU will not go quietly. Buoyed by weeks and months of protest among Georgia’s population and a desire to secure democracy in a strategically important region, European institutions are hitting back

On January 29th, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) limited GD’s powers of the delegation: the party is now prohibited from observing elections, becoming rapporteurs, and representing PACE at some events. GD responded by announcing that it would “immediately cease its participation in PACE”—but the assembly is working alongside the disillusioned population to emphasise that it requires a confirmed democratic mandate in Georgia before making future concessions. PACE outlined specific conditions for the Georgian authorities to meet by April 2025, including organising new, genuinely democratic parliamentary elections under strict international monitoring, taking immediate steps to enable Georgia to resume its European integration process, ending police brutality and human rights abuses, and releasing all political prisoners.

The EU should also align with the US, the Baltic nations, and most recently the UK, by imposing sanctions on Georgian officials implicated in human rights abuses. Despite Hungary and Slovakia obstructing these initiatives at the EU level (due to their right-wing, anti-EU governments and growing ties with Russia—partly stemming from their traditional reliance on gas) member states could adopt such measures independently.

For example, Georgia’s presidential inauguration on December 18th coincided with the country’s American embassy declaring the US would be applying sanctions against Bidzina Ivanishvili and GD.

Freezing relations

Similarly, Germany has also suspended development projects worth €232m due to Georgia’s plans to freeze EU accession negotiations. Five members of the European Parliament also issued a statement urging EU member states to refrain from legitimising GD’s “self-proclaimed government”. They are also calling for the bloc to suspend the work of the EU-Georgia Association Council, the highest formal institution established to implement the EU-Georgia Association Agreement (a document giving Georgia a preferential trade regime and other advantages vis-à-vis its relation to the EU).

Furthermore, the EU should set clear expectations for Georgia, beginning with an inclusive dialogue between the government and opposition parties to establish the conditions for free and fair elections. The country’s opposition parties are weakened, in part due to GD’s main rival United National Movement—whose damaged image is associated with the low trust rating of former president Mikheil Saakashvili. High-level diplomatic engagement with better-regarded politicians, such as former president Salome Zourabichvili, and ensuring more transparency in civil society funding would justify ramped-up EU involvement for a more united opposition based on pro-European principles.

According to Georgian student Elene Kobakhidze,[1] strengthening civil society should begin with the media, on which GD heavily relies to spread fear and secure support for its ideological narratives, particularly among rural populations. At a national level, the EU needs to help Georgia’s opposition counter media misinformation to prevent the easy spread of such narratives. This is also related to the development of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine: with US president Donald Trump ominously promising to “settle the war”, GD is primed to develop a narrative of fear around a potential ‘second front’ in Georgia. The conflict was pivotal in GD’s rise to—and securing of—power. Now, without intervention, the party could weaponise future decisions to convince Georgians that GD will protect them from Russian aggression.

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Rather than reflecting societal divisions, the anti-GD protests represent a unified stand by the Georgian people against a perceived illegitimate government. This is exacerbated by institutions and countries, such as PACE or EU member states, responding with their own forms of sanctions. In response, Georgia’s governmental authorities have intensified their repression, using more violence, detention of journalists, reports of torture, and intimidation tactics against opposition supporters and their families.[2]

But despite the mounting repression, Georgians remain resolute, advocating not just for fair elections but for their nation’s future. While measures such as asset-freezing can help limit party access to key financial resources, the EU must clarify that these sanctions are intended to restore democracy rather than isolate Georgia or its citizens.

Now the EU must take decisive action to maintain regional stability—but, most importantly, to uphold the democratic aspirations of the Georgian people.

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[1] The authors interviewed Kobakhidze for this commentary.

[2] GD’s violent crackdown on media outlets and journalists has been particularly strong. Advocacy platforms are calling for the release of Mzia Amaghlobeli, founder and director of online Georgian media sources Batumelebi and Netgazeti.