Home alone: Germany’s security and defence policy when its closest allies are gone

When the extreme right and outspokenly Germanophobe party National Rally (RN) did not win the most seats in the French parliament, a sigh of relief could be heard in Berlin. The next French government – whoever will form it – in all likelihood won’t immediately end all Franco-German defence cooperation, or leave NATO’s integrated military command, as RN contemplated.

But the German government cannot afford to relax. Alarm bells should be ringing given the number of times Germany has recently had to hold its breath, fearing the election results of its closest allies. It has been reasonably lucky so far: Joe Biden won the US presidency in 2020. Emmanuel Macron won the French presidency in 2022, and did not lose this month’s legislative election as spectacularly as many feared. But clouds are darkening fast, and there is a danger that these near-misses obfuscate a fundamental problem: Germany is increasingly left home alone, without its closest allies.

Germany’s security and defence policy is more focused and dependent on allied cooperation than that of most European countries. This is not just because of the famously dire state of the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr. Germany has underfunded its military for decades, which means that it has to depend on NATO allies and the United States in particular for its defence. But this situation is being remedied. More importantly, it is in the federal republic’s DNA to work with allies. Germany’s security and defence policy is based on the principle of “never alone”. Since 1949, it has rested on two pillars: one is the transatlantic alliance and the partnership with the US, the other is the European integration project and the close relationship with France. The German constitution (or, more specifically, a 1994 interpretation by the constitutional court), prescribes that the Bundeswehr can only operate internationally within a “system of collective security”, namely the United Nations, NATO, or the European Union.

Put succinctly, apart from direct defence of German and allied territory, the German Bundeswehr is, according to the prevailing consensus, not allowed to do anything internationally without its allies – this would constitute a legal, as well as an ideological, challenge. One year ago, Germany published its first ever national security strategy. In 76 pages, the only partners mentioned by name are France and the US (plus Israel, for whose “right to exist, Germany continues to take responsibility”). France is Germany’s most important partner in Europe, and research shows that without a functioning Franco-German engine, hardly any progress can be made at the European level. France is the only country with which Germany has a mutual defence agreement, the treaty of Aachen, in addition to NATO’s article 5 and the EU’s article 42.7. Meanwhile, the US guarantees Germany’s and Europe’s security through NATO and its nuclear umbrella. Indeed, Germany’s reliance on US guidance has only become more clear in the two-and-a-half years since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

But recent months have demonstrated why such a strong reliance on France and the US could be a problem. France may just have averted a far-right government, but RN still received the highest vote share. Marine Le Pen might well become president in 2027, and her party could win a parliamentary majority in future legislative elections. More importantly, French anti-German sentiment is not limited to RN. The electoral success of the left-grouping New Popular Front has brought 74 members of the Unsubmissive France (LFI) party into parliament, whose leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon is famously anti-German. He wrote a book about the “German poison”, accused Germany of secretly trying to get its hands on French nuclear weapons in a 2018 Le Monde comment piece, and told then-chancellor Angela Merkel on Twitter (now X) to “shut up”. Both RN and LFI have, in the past, also advocated for leaving NATO’s integrated military command, and in the case of LFI, leaving NATO altogether. While it would be unfair to state that RN or LFI voters specifically support their parties because of their anti-German rhetoric, it still means that almost half of French votes have gone to parties that are anti-German, and NATO sceptical.

Across the Atlantic, Donald Trump could return to the White House. During his presidency, Germany was a favourite aim for his criticism. He might still want to take the US out of NATO, or weaken it so substantially that it loses most of its protective power. His newly chosen running mate, Ohio senator J.D. Vance, has in the past called Germany’s Ukraine policy “disgraceful”, its energy policy “idiotic”, and argued that “all of their promises have materialised into manure.” (Germany is Ukraine’s most important European supporter). More fundamentally, given the shifting foreign policy discourse among both parties, and generational change in US society, Joe Biden might be the last US president with a clear European link and immediate concern for European security. America’s ‘pivot to Asia’ already began under President Barack Obama and, given China’s geopolitical power, is guaranteed to continue. 

Going beyond the partners mentioned in the security strategy, and currently in the limelight, there is the Netherlands – with which Germany’s defence is more integrated than any other. Few have taken notice, but over the last few years, the Netherlands has integrated its army combat brigades into German army divisions. But, from a German viewpoint, Dutch politics is developing in a way that could create issues. While so far not specifically critical of the defence cooperation, the Netherland’s new far-right government might become a problematic partner to the German government, given its EU-critical rhetoric. The winner of the Dutch election, Geert Wilders, has in the past supported right-wing, government-critical protests in Germany.

Germany’s model of security based exclusively on allied cooperation is under threat – and might no longer be viable

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it has become an accepted wisdom to say that the German model no longer works: cheap gas from Russia, export to China, security from the US. But behind the latter point lies something more fundamental than a concern over the US. Germany’s model of security based exclusively on allied cooperation is under threat and might no longer be viable.

Berlin desperately needs to act. Most immediately, the government should invest in its own security and defence capabilities. The “Zeitenwende” that chancellor Olaf Scholz noted in his now-famous speech of February 2022 does not appear to have fully reached German consciousness. Secondly, and maybe somewhat counterintuitively, Germany may want to look at broadening its defence cooperations in Europe – so as not to be over-dependent on particular players. Germany (and any other European country) is too small to guarantee its security all by itself – but this shouldn’t be the aim. Europe is based on cooperation and friendly relations among neighbours, and defence and security cooperation can help to foster them. But Germany should aim at being less singularly dependent, and work with other players, such as Poland, the United Kingdom, and the Nordic countries. Germany is increasingly home alone, so it needs to be prepared.