Heart of the matter: How Denmark’s focus on Ukraine and enlargement will define its EU presidency

During last week’s NATO summit, Denmark announced that it will allocate €1.26bn to support Ukrainian production of long-range drones for its war effort against Russia. Danish prime minster Mette Frederiksen’s support for Ukraine—with regards to both military provisions and guiding the country’s accession to the EU—is likely to be a defining feature of Denmark’s presidency of the Council of the European Union.

Its stint, which begins on July 1st and will last until January 2026, comes as US president Donald Trump is showing repeated interest in acquiring Greenland. To be sure, these issues have transformed Denmark into a geopolitical hotspot and ignited global interest in the country’s security. However, they also provide an opening for Denmark’s EU Council presidency to pursue policies which accelerate the country’s journey towards being part of what Frederiksen describes as the “heart of the EU”.

Denmark’s recent journey

When Frederiksen’s Social Democrats took office in 2019, its position was that Denmark’s opt-outs should form the basis of its EU policy.[1] A large parliamentary majority perceived the EU’s stance on defence as a potential threat to the NATO alliance. After all, a strong European defence network could potentially persuade America to reduce its commitment to the continent—even if there is no certainty that Europe can defend itself. In Denmark, subsequent governments decided to put all of the country’s defence eggs in the NATO basket, and not participate in a common European defence and security policy.

Denmark had previously aligned itself with the “frugal four” (alongside Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden) in negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Due to its opt-out on EU-wide justice and home affairs, Denmark also pursued a separate and restrictive asylum and migration policy, including controversial proposals such as “externalising” the processing of asylum seekers to Rwanda. On enlargement, under Frederiksen Denmark adopted a cautious stance, for example opposing the start of accession negotiations with Albania in 2019. The government’s commitment to these positions meant Danes often perceived Frederiksen as a fairly Eurosceptic prime minister.

However, over the past five years, the Danish government has moved Denmark much closer to the EU’s core—a development exacerbated by a series of political tremors. First came Brexit, in which Denmark lost the UK as a close ally within the bloc and the chaos surrounding the UK’s departure made any form of “Dexit” appear deeply unattractive. Second, covid-19 underscored Denmark’s dependence on the EU, as well as the EU’s capacity to act—most notably in procuring and distributing vaccines.

Where Denmark once played a sometimes passive role in the EU, it is now far more active—occasionally even assuming the role of chief whip when fellow member states fail to deliver on defence

Another seismic shift came with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the notion that Denmark’s security is under threat. A referendum quickly followed, abolishing Denmark’s EU defence opt-out and enabling its participation in the EU’s security and defence policies. Denmark reversed long-held positions on the MFF, common debt and state aid; it left the “frugal four” and accepted the use of common debt and state aid for targeted purposes. And, where Denmark once played a sometimes passive role in the EU, it is now far more active—occasionally even assuming the role of chief whip when fellow member states fail to deliver on defence. Indeed, in February 2025, Frederiksen instructed Denmark’s minister of defence to “buy, buy, buy”—demonstrating her commitment to Denmark’s security and emphasising that other  member states should also invest more.

Finally, Denmark has once again become a strong advocate for enlargement, arguing that only a Ukraine within the EU and NATO can be safe and prosperous. This adheres to Denmark’s notable legacy with regards to enlargement: in 1993, the Danish EU Council presidency concluded with the summit that established the Copenhagen Criteria, which became the “bible” for all subsequent enlargement rounds. Until 2002, the criteria paved the way for a “big bang” enlargement with the EU welcoming 10 member states in this period.

Trump’s threat, Denmark’s response

The final tremor—or rather earthquake—is Trump’s ambition to “get Greenland”. The ongoing drama has unquestionably reshaped Denmark’s perception of America: how can you trust an ally that lays claim to your territory? Thus, despite Denmark remaining outside the eurozone and retaining opt-outs on justice and home affairs, Frederiksen’s assertion that the true threat to Europe’s future lies in a weak EU is encapsulated by the country’s pivot towards a unified and integrated Europe. Trump’s threat from the west will only secure its urgency in securing itself at the EU’s heart.

It appears that the Danish public has also embarked on a journey parallel to its politicians, erasing what the historic divide between Danish voters and their elected representatives on EU matters. Indeed, for decades Danish voters were far more sceptical than a majority in its parliament, voting “no” in three referendums on EU issues: the Maastricht Treaty (1992), joining the euro (2000), and ending the opt-out in justice and home affairs (2015).

However, according to a recent ECFR poll, 67% of Danes believe the EU functions well or somewhat well—significantly higher than in other member states. Danes are now also among the strongest critics of Trump: 76% of respondents believe he is bad for America, and 78% believe he is bad for Denmark, while also fearing that its own government is not spending enough for defence. As such, where Denmark’s government and citizens had for decades perceived its EU membership as an economic project, they see it now first and foremost as a matter of national security.

Emphasis on EU enlargement

Given the threats to Denmark’s sovereignty from both east and west, it is unsurprising that the Danish presidency will build on the Polish presidency’s strong focus on security. Frederiksen has made it clear that, although there is no “signature project” for Denmark’s presidency, “the next six months will primarily be spent pushing Europe on security”.

Early in 2025, Danish minister for European affairs Marie Bjerre expressed a desire to open all negotiation clusters with Ukraine and Moldova. While Hungary’s block in the council has tempered this ambition, the Danish government has hinted at the possibility of circumventing the Hungarian veto. Another option is to promote initiatives that enable the gradual integration of candidate and aspiring candidate countries, especially when the formal enlargement process stalls. For instance, Denmark’s presidency can highlight existing EU instruments, such as participation in areas of the single market to help candidates prepare for membership. In parallel, Denmark as a member state may pursue concrete cooperation through bilateral initiatives—such as Frederiksen and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky’s deal on drones, and another agreement which sees the possibility of Ukrainian defence production facilities established in Denmark.

Overall, the presidency is framing its core priority of EU enlargement through a security lens. Denmark describes enlargement as a “geopolitical necessity” and “the only way for the EU to effectively contribute to stabilising the European continent”. But its council presidency faces the inherent challenge of reconciling this geopolitical imperative with the EU’s merit-based approach to enlargement and the EU’s own readiness to expand. Navigating this tension will be a critical task—and the Danish presidency has set ambitious goals.

Knowing the limit

There is a limit to everything. Europe is gripped by multiple crises which cannot be resolved with a single policy instrument and, with regards to EU institutional reform, Denmark’s policy remains fixed. On enlargement, the Danish government has accepted limited expansion of qualified majority voting (known as Passerelle clauses), but still has to broach other measures to make the EU ”enlargement ready”. Denmark will act as an “honest broker” should the European Commission publish its promised pre-enlargement policy reviews in the next six months—but it will also be active in kickstarting debate on the next MFF. After all, observers deem EU budget reforms essential for enlargement.

However, the EU Council presidency also needs to bear in mind the Danish public. While a recent poll indicates strong Danish support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU (even if it does not fully meet the Copenhagen Criteria), a majority of Danes are unwilling to increase Denmark’s EU fiscal contributions to more easily enable such accession of Ukraine and other countries in the future. Nevertheless, Denmark’s EU Council presidency should help consolidate the country’s overall pivot to the “heart” of Europe. Denmark will use its stint to keep Europe together and push for important security-related matters. A second goal is to champion competitiveness with a green twist. After all, the new investments in defence, and helping to secure Ukraine, cannot be carried out without also strengthening the EU’s ability to grow.

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[1] After a 1992 national referendum rejected the Maastricht Treaty, Denmark negotiated four opt-outs: the euro, justice and home affairs, defence and union citizenship.