Funding war, courting crisis: Why China’s support for Russia requires a European response

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China has emerged as a key enabler of the war machine. This occurs not only through the export of dual-use goods, including critical microelectronics and drone components, but also via an expanding energy trade that is bankrolling Russia’s war economy. For its part, Moscow continues to publicly endorse Beijing’s “One China” principle—the diplomatic position that Taiwan is an “inalienable” part of China—to maintain this flow of material and financial resources.

From the 1990s until today, Russia’s support for China has evolved from ritualistic formality to a functional instrument of leverage within the Sino-Russian partnership. A clear shift in Russian rhetoric began in 2022 following its all-out invasion of Ukraine: Moscow moved away from “low-profile pragmatism” on Taiwan toward an explicit operational doctrine.

Presidential joint statements and prime ministerial communiqués now consistently and explicitly advocate for the “One China” principle. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov has also cited the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship in support of China defending its “national unity and territorial integrity”; Vladimir Putin and Russian security council secretary Sergei Shoigu respectively reaffirmed their “commitment to the ‘One China’ principle” and Moscow’s “consistent and unwavering support for Beijing on the Taiwan issue”.

Against this backdrop, Beijing now has the geopolitical incentive to sustain Russia’s war machine in Ukraine. But Europeans need to understand the global security implications of the trade-off at the heart of this relationship.

China and Russia’s scripted alignment

From 2021 to 2023, China’s share of Russia’s dual-use imports grew from approximately 30% to 66%, making it Russia’s dominant supplier of goods with potential military applications. By 2023 China accounted for approximately 90% of goods imports covered under the G7 Common High Priority Items List (CHPL) and, in 2025, EU sanctions envoy David O’Sullivan estimated that China supplied 80% of the components used in Russian weapons production.

These transfers are facilitated by renaming items, shipping through third countries, and making transactions through intermediaries and covert payment systems. Shadow channels continue to evolve, complicating Western efforts to enforce sanctions—a material reliance which translates into Russia’s closer political alignment with China’s lawfare strategy against Taiwan. In this regard, Moscow echoing Beijing’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan is less ideological convergence than a form of strategic quid pro quo; a “political rent” that Moscow pays to Beijing to maintain its war machine.

This transactional relationship also manifests in Russia’s reinforcement of China’s conflation of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2758 with the “One China” principle (in practice, Russia’s support for China’s interpretation of the resolution as formal recognition of its sovereignty over Taiwan). Russia’s actions, and the reference to the resolution in a 2025 prime ministerial joint communiqué, are an attempt to mislead international opinion, alter the cross-strait status quo and strengthen Beijing’s effort to reclassify the Taiwan Strait as internal waters.

In contrast, Taiwan and like-minded Western legislatures—including the Australian Senate, the Dutch parliament, the US House of Representatives and the European Parliament—clarify that the resolution pertains solely to China’s representation in the United Nations. It does not determine Taiwan’s sovereign status. This diplomatic line aims to counter Beijing and Moscow’s framing of cross-strait relations as a domestic matter that undermines Taiwan’s legal standing.

Meanwhile Moscow—in shaping a legal rationale in support of China’s sovereignty claim—is lending diplomatic credibility to China’s regional ambitions.

No room for appeasement

The reciprocal dynamic between Russia and China is prolonging the war in Ukraine, affecting the strategic environment surrounding Taiwan and testing the Western response to a regional crisis

The reciprocal dynamic between Russia and China is prolonging the war in Ukraine and testing the Western response to the conflict. It is also affecting the strategic calculus around Taiwan. Together, these developments facilitate a strategic “coupling” of European and Indo-Pacific security, inexorably linking the two theatres and having broader implications for global stability.

Europeans can use the following measures to counter Russia-China strategic coordination and diminish the incentives for their cooperation.

1.     Europeans need to oppose attempts to change the status quo

European legislatures should follow the Dutch parliament and the European Parliament in clarifying that UNGA Resolution 2758 does not determine Taiwan’s sovereign status. This would reaffirm Europe’s commitment to the international order and directly counter Moscow’s and Beijing’s distortion of international law. Europe should also encourage regular, coordinated naval transits to ensure the Taiwan Strait remains a functional international waterway, and prevent Moscow and Beijing’s coordinated claims from becoming reality.

2.     Europeans need to sustain pressure on the financial flows fuelling Russia’s war effort

Europeans should tighten sanctions against the Chinese firms that support the trade and revenue streams financing Russia’s war economy. This would raise the costs of Moscow’s strategic exchange with Beijing and strengthen deterrence. They should also target the “shadow fleet” that generates Russian oil revenue.

Such measures would require a unified European approach to sustain collective pressure, despite the political difficulties of maintaining consensus among EU member states with differing economic exposure to China—and despite the risk of retaliation.

3.     Europeans must prevent China from enabling Russia’s defence industry

The EU should fully activate its anti-circumvention provisions within the existing sanctions and export control framework. It can do so by tightening scrutiny over third-country intermediaries and restricting re-exports through transit hubs for CHPL items bound for Russia, thereby raising the cost of sanctions evasion. Establishing a formal “watch list” of dual-use violators, alongside lists of companies and institutions involved in these transactions, would raise the risk profile of Chinese entities and impose escalating economic costs that Beijing would have to absorb.

Given the fluid nature of sanction-evasion networks, enforcement measures—including additional listings—are unlikely to eliminate evasion entirely. However, by also targeting the broader networks of intermediaries, affiliated entities and financial facilitators involved in these transactions, the EU can raise the cost and risk of sanctions evasion. This makes large-scale circumvention costly and more difficult.

From rhetoric to action

As Canadian prime minister Mark Carney cautioned at Davos 2026: “We know the old order is not coming back … but we have the capacity to stop pretending, to name reality, to build our strength at home and to act together”. For Europe, applying the aforementioned policy instruments is a proactive way to transform its own rhetoric of defending the international system into concrete strategic action.

The most significant threat of Russia-China alignment is the deliberate dismantling of the international order in their favour. Beijing is watching the war in Ukraine to assess Western resolve and calibrate its regional ambition. Europeans must act not because they are asked to, but because allowing this “strategic exchange” to go unchallenged fuels the war machine on Europe’s borders and invites future aggression against Taiwan. This would fundamentally undermine the rules-based order that anchors European security and prosperity.