From summits to substance: Europe’s chance to meet Africa on its terms

In 2026, Europe returns to Africa with a flurry of summits at a moment of intensified geopolitical competition. Italy will host its Africa summit in the continent itself for the first time; France will convene its Africa–France summit in Nairobi, the first outside the francophone sphere. Russia and Turkey are also scheduling continent-wide gatherings.

The diplomatic bustle will test whether Europe can stand out from the rest—and whether it can move beyond symbolic engagement to steady, effective partnership in an increasingly multipolar and assertive Africa.

The summit boom and Africa’s growing leverage

Africa+1 summits have multiplied over the past decade. China, the US, Russia, Turkey, Japan, India, South Korea and several Gulf states now hold Africa-wide diplomatic formats. Emerging EU players, such as Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia, have also recently joined the fray. In 2025, Serbia held its second Africa conference focused on defence, and upcoming business summits in 2026—US in Mauritius, Germany in Ghana—will offer investors direct access to African markets.

This proliferation shows that African states no longer want exclusive patrons. Instead, they practice “à la carte” diplomacy, matching partners with needs and priorities—energy from one, infrastructure from another, security from a third. Very few continue to seek exclusive alignments, Eritrea being a prime example. Summitry remains a useful tool in a strained multilateral environment. They offer African leaders visibility, diplomatic leverage and access to financing. Kenyan president Ruto is an example: once a fierce critic of Africa+1 gatherings, he is now about to co-host one in his own country.

However, many Africa+1 summits have struggled to translate announcements into delivery. Commitments are ambitious but weakly institutionalised, reinforcing scepticism among African partners. And European initiatives are frequently framed reactively, as efforts to counter Chinese, Russian or Turkish influence. African governments tend to be pragmatic, judging offers by tangible outcomes rather than geopolitical alignment.

The participation of AU-suspended coup governments at Saudi and Russian summits showed how bilateral calculus can erode continental principles.

Summit diplomacy can also undermine pan-African norms. The participation of AU-suspended coup governments at Saudi and Russian summits showed how bilateral calculus can erode continental principles. Europe’s long-standing institutional partnership with the African Union could bolster that coherence (but only if matched by sustained political commitment). The EU-AU relationship would give Europe a strong point of leverage in relation to its competitors. Without it, Europe risks becoming just another summit host, indistinguishable from Ankara or Moscow.

From summitry to sustained presence

Africa prizes continuity. Regular political dialogue, diplomatic presence and implementation capacity matter more than headline events. At the same time, Africans still value historic ties with traditional partners, including the EU and many of its member states. Given the unpredictability of Trump, this could be an opportunity for increased and steady European engagement.

With both Africa and Europe seeking to diversify their partnerships portfolio, European governments should focus on targeted cooperation in areas of shared interest, from energy transition and infrastructure to trade facilitation and digital connectivity. Triangular cooperation also offers a possible pathway. Joint initiatives involving African partners and third actors, such as the Gulf states or India, can reduce zero-sum dynamics. France’s decision to include India in the planning of the Nairobi summit reflects this emerging logic.

Public–private partnerships are another path. Initiatives such as the Lobito Corridor—the link from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia to the Lobito port in Angola backed by Global Gateway—can strengthen Europe’s credibility if they generate visible benefits for Africans rather than simply serving external supply chains.

Italy’s 2026 Africa summit in particular will be a test of whether European engagement can go beyond performance. The conference will put the Mattei Plan under the microscope as Rome seeks to reposition itself as a central European partner for Africa, especially in energy and development. The challenge will be to demonstrate that the initiative extends beyond migration management and delivers tangible, mutually beneficial economic outcomes.

Likewise, France’s Nairobi summit reflects an attempt to reset relations after years of political strain across parts of West and Central Africa. Holding the meeting in Kenya signals an acknowledgement that France must engage Africa beyond its traditional networks and colonial geographies.

The clustering of Africa summits in 2026 will not reshape global politics on its own. But it will reveal whether Europe is prepared to recalibrate its approach in a continent that increasingly defines its own agenda. Africa does not need more summits; it needs reliable partners and results. In order for Europe to not be left behind, it must back words with resources and remain present after the photos have been taken. Less performance, more permanence.