From street to state: Madagascar’s new leader and the case for EU engagement

Madagascar has never experienced a major conflict or natural disaster on the scale seen in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa; the island nation is also abundant in natural resources. But, with an 80% poverty rate, it is one of the poorest countries in the world. At least 1.3 million of its people suffer from malnutrition. Indeed, according to the 2024 Afrobarometer survey, 70% of Malagasy people think the country is headed in the wrong economic direction.

As a result of this widespread dissatisfaction, in mid-September 2025 young people across Madagascar began a wave of protests against the country’s water and electricity shortages. This escalated into demands for governmental change, fuelled by Madagascar’s endemic political corruption. On October 10th, President Andry Rajoelina fled the country, with Colonel Michael Randrianirina of Madagascar’s elite Army Corps of Personnel and Administrative and Technical Services (known as CAPSAT) taking control.

Randrianirina has pledged to improve Madagascar’s social and economic situation, reform its institutions and hold an election within two years. This rhetoric—along with Madagascar’s dire economic situation, and the grassroots origin and spontaneity of the protests—means the EU should not immediately condemn Rajoelina’s ousting as a coup. It should instead approach the new presidency as the result of a popular uprising, which means providing technical support to Randrianirina’s new government on the ground. The EU also needs to avoid restrictive measures which could negatively impact the Malagasy people.

Led by youth

Under the banner of “Gen-Z Madagascar”, the country’s students and members of its youth organisations spent three weeks protesting Madagascar’s domestic and political conditions, with at least 22 people killed in the turmoil. CAPSAT joined the demonstrations after refusing governmental orders to shoot at the protestors; Randrianirina—a colonel of the country’s elite armed forces organisation—seized power as Rajoelina allegedly fled to Dubai. Randrianirina claims that CAPSAT has answered “the call of the people” who gave him power. He has assured the population that there will be no military rule and asserted that the government “belongs to the civilians”. Crucial in this context is the principle of fihavanana, which governs community life in Madagascar and emphasises that conflict should be avoided at all cost. Fihavanana is a major reason the island has remained comparably peaceful—but the recent protests are a sign of generational change. Madagascar’s people have had enough.

Despite governing under a set of promises intended to lift Madagascar out of poverty, Rajoelina’s administration was instead characterised by the repression of dissent and the construction of vanity projects—including a cable car in Antananarivo, and the import of giraffes and elephants to attract more tourists. Many Malagasy citizens also already believed Rajoelina’s presidency was illegitimate due to his acquisition of French nationality. According to the Malagasy constitution, this automatically strips him of his Malagasy citizenship.

As such, France is suspected of having helped Rajoelina, a French citizen, to flee Madagascar. In Antananarivo, there is speculation that France’s rumoured extraction of Rajoelina was part of a deal in return for the former president pardoning French nationals who had been sentenced for plotting a coup in 2021. But for the Malagasy people, France’s intervention significantly reduces the chances of the former president being held to account for his actions. Now its unwanted intervention could damage perceptions of the EU across Madagascar. However, Europeans should still endeavour to engage constructively with developing governmental institutions and Malagasy civil society in order to cement a reputation for investment and state building.

Ignoring the noise

Although the African Union has suspended Madagascar’s membership as a result of Randrianirina’s takeover, and the UN secretary general has condemned the country’s change of government, the EU should take a different approach. The EU is a key trading partner for Madagascar, which is strategically located in the Indian Ocean. Its goods trade was €1.8bn in 2023 and the European Commission committed €459m in the 2021-2027 period for energy, infrastructure and governance. Madagascar also has a considerable European business presence; it is home to European (mainly French) nationals and has a strong tourism industry. For Europeans, the upheaval provides an opportunity for them to solidify their position as relevant trading partners while simultaneously supporting Madagascar’s transition back to democracy and constitutional rule.

Europeans also have solid civil society networks in Madagascar, with the population appreciating their quality expertise—especially in areas of governance or nature protection.[1] As such, they are well-positioned to help the leadership under Randrianirina form new institutions, along with the strong involvement of civil society groups. The EU, its member states, its development agencies and legitimate European private actors should also offer any technical support necessary to help build proper institutions and sustainable reforms. Here, improving Malagasy access to water and electricity, as well as heightening the country’s internal security, are priorities.

The EU should remain cautious as the situation in Madagascar develops, especially given that Randrianirina’s choice of prime minister is already causing some disagreement—but it also needs to stand by the Malagasy people

The EU should remain cautious as the situation develops, especially since Randrianirina’s choice of prime minister is already causing some disagreement. However, it also needs to stand by the Malagasy people. Despite the change of government, the everyday reality for the population remains difficult, especially with the country’s cyclone season imminent. The EU adding sanctions as a result of Randrianirina’s actions will only exacerbate a fragile domestic and economic situation.

In this regard, Europe needs to show that it can be as—if not more—proactive than other global actors. Russian embassy representatives have met twice with Randrianirina and declared their willingness to work together to deepen the partnership between the two countries: the president has already used Russia’s Sputnik media platform to send a message to the international community. However, the EU has more to offer Madagascar than Russia in terms of sustainable, long-term engagement that will benefit the general population. This means Europeans need to appeal to Randrianirina and his new leadership before Russian arms and instructors capture the attention of the new colonel in charge.

Hard work starts now

Madagascar’s problems are by no means over. Its fragile administration is still vulnerable to further destabilisation and internal dissonance. And any given ruling faction, no matter their stripes, tends to promise an election within “18 to 24 months”. Randrianirina has also already appointed a new prime minister, the civilian businessman Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo. Although this has eased concerns that Madagascar will be governed via purely military rule, the “Gen-Z” movement has voiced its discontent with Rajaonarivelo’s links to the former regime. It is also unhappy that those behind the initial protests were not consulted regarding his appointment.

As it stands, however, Europeans should give the Malagasy citizens and politicians who want continued reform the benefit of the doubt. As the EU struggles to remain an influential and decisive partner on the global stage, working with Randrianirina and showing solidarity with the Malagasy population could help strengthen Europe’s reputation as a reliable and useful partner which provides the resources necessary for restructuring. Randrianirina himself asked the international community to prioritise the needs of the population and stand by Madagascar during a difficult time.

Europeans should also learn from the consequences of the 2009 crisis, in which US and European economic sanctions as a result of a coup (staged by Rajoelina) aggravated widespread hunger and malnutrition. The EU should avoid sanctions or restrictive measures against the country as far as possible and instead push for the involvement of the Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions by the United Nations Development Programme, for example. The EU must also provide the necessary technical resources for Madagascar in order to facilitate the return to constitutional rule.  

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The unconstitutional nature of Randrianirina’s power transition means that, from a diplomatic standpoint, Europeans should forgo high-level engagement with Madagascar—at least for now. However, the EU has remained mostly silent on the island’s new leadership, and its ambassador to Madagascar was present at Randrianirina’s swearing in ceremony. The EU delegation in Antananarivo should continue working with civil society on the implementation of existing projects while monitoring the democratic situation. The EU should also evaluate its existing programmes, especially where they involve state actors, and as far as possible avoid their suspension. Such a move would only hurt the general population: and the EU needs to remain open-minded to Madagascar’s political developments.

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[1] Based on the author’s conversations with local stakeholders.