Freeze and thaw: USAID withdrawal and the future of Russia’s pro-European civil society

President Donald Trump’s decision to freeze United States Agency for International Development (USAID) activities shocked European civil society organisations which relied on its funding, and Russian NGOs and media organisations operating abroad. The 27 member states are unable to fully replace USAID, but they—alongside the European Commission’s democracy promotion instruments—should begin providing targeted support for the projects and organisations which can most adequately respond to Russian security challenges.

USAID actively supports Russian projects across eastern Europe, but now around 90 such organisations are reportedly on the verge of shutting down or suspending operations. Independent Russian media, from small progressive outlets like Cherta to internationally recognised platforms such as Meduza and Novaya Gazeta Europe , have also lost significant portions of their income stream, putting them at major risk of closure. Andrei Pivovarov, a Russian opposition figure recently released in a US-Russia prisoner exchange, warned that staff members also face legal consequences—their residence in Europe is tied to their employment, which governments can revoke if employees lose their jobs.

Many Russian NGOs in exile were unaware that their donors were intermediaries for USAID funds, which undermined any contingency planning prior to Trump’s re-election and further complicates the current situation. These donors have advised organisations to pause operations but they cannot predict how long the freeze will last, making permanent shutdowns increasingly likely.

EU member states should ensure that their respective national immigration authorities are aware of the legal residence challenges facing staff members of Russian organisations. Offering temporary alternative employment in the local labour market or facilitating the transition to self-employment or humanitarian visas would bring the necessary stability for disenfranchised diasporic employees.

Bigger picture

The freeze of USAID programmes and the resultant funding crisis highlights a gap in Europe’s approach to its neighbourhood: it turns out that American funding has made possible much pro-Western and pro-democracy soft power in eastern Europe

The freeze of USAID programmes and the resultant funding crisis highlights a gap in Europe’s approach to its neighbourhood: it turns out that American funding has made possible much pro-Western and pro-democracy soft power in eastern Europe. And autocrats in Moscow and other capitals are rejoicing. The current lack of European involvement makes Europe look unserious about a region crucial to the continent’s security and development. It is yet another setback for exiled Russian political, media and civil society organisations, compounding an already toxic atmosphere marked by internal political divisions.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, tensions between figures such as political activist Maxim Katz, the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), initiatives backed by exiled oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky and pro-Ukrainian organisations have demobilised supporters and alarmed Western partners. Vladimir Putin’s political opposition has struggled to engage in constructive debate, let alone reach consensus on key issues, with a major point of contention  whether to focus military support efforts on Ukraine—many Russia-based supporters reject this due to an unwillingness to kill their compatriots.

Allegations of dubious funding sources is also fuelling conflict. The FBK has pointed to claims that Maxim Katz’s spouse worked for Gazprom-Media, while FBK is under scrutiny for receiving donations from Russian bankers accused of money laundering and embezzlement. The most serious scandal erupted in March 2024, when FBK’s Leonid Volkov was attacked in Vilnius. FBK alleges that Khodorkovsky’s close associate, Russian-Israeli billionaire Leonid Nevzlin, orchestrated the attack, along with assaults on FBK director Ivan Zhdanov in Geneva, and the wife of economist and Alexei Navalny ally Maxim Mironov. Moreover, Polish authorities later arrested the suspects mentioned in FBK’s allegations.

USAID freeze causes cracks

This list is not exhaustive: other scuffles have erupted on social media, especially on X, weakening the morale of the Russian opposition at home and abroad. This is typical for diaspora movements, as the absence of stable horizontal institutions (such as political parties and a parliament) greatly decreases the quality of political engagement.

The freeze on USAID will, on the one hand, empower figures like Khodorkovsky, who could provide funding for his projects of choice. On the other hand, the competition for finances could further weaken the cohesion of the Russian democratic diaspora.

Partly, this problem is typical of international financial aid, which tends to detach recipient NGOs from local realities and decrease trust between peer organisations. By acknowledging such unintended consequences, European funders can focus on horizontal trust-building measures, such as European-led and European-moderated dialogue platforms; demand stronger professionalisation of recipient organisations (down to ISO 9001 quality management certification); and promote the merging of smaller projects into bigger organisations.

Options for Europe

In terms of funding, the EU and its members states are the largest global providers of official development assistance. However, most goes to traditional poverty reduction projects, rather than satellite civil-society programmes. The freeze also affected many organisations in Ukraine and other EU candidate countries, making Russian democratic organisations just one of many in need of support.

In the broader context of a Trump and Putin reaching a potential peace settlement without any major democratisation in Russia, the country’s democratic organisations are being damaged by internal conflicts in the midst of a perfect geopolitical storm—and most have neither money, nor power. With the lack of USAID, only the few projects that receive funding from Khodorkovsky, philanthropist Boris Zimin, Nevzlin and other rich Russians can keep working. Zimin and Khodorkovsky have already announced a $600,000 support programme for Russian-language media projects and Ukrainian humanitarian initiatives affected by the freeze. This funding will last for 90 days until the end of the USAID audit.

Since the EU and member states cannot replace the volume of the USAID funding, they should prioritise their support to the most influential and strategically relevant initiatives.

First, Europeans must sustain Russian key independent media outlets. They produce high-quality information about Russian domestic affairs and international relations—this is vital for those in Russia who disagree with the current government and require alternative narratives to the mainstream Russian media in order to stay confident about their beliefs and learn more about Europe. Donors can also support this media by establishing publishing partnerships with the largest European and US outlets to save costs and increase their integration into the global media market.

Moreover, Russian investigative outlets need financial support or service contracts to continue their analysis. They can reveal embarrassing information about regime corruption, enhance European security, and promote potential legal accountability by investigating Russian military and intelligence operations, and revealing sensitive information about Moscow’s security policies or even Putin’s personal health.

Russian human rights defenders, such as OVD-info or First Department, actually save people from political persecution and provide vital information on Russian repression. This work is tangible, since they can intervene to evacuate activists on the brink of imprisonment. Supporting such projects actually saves the lives of those who risked everything in acting against the Russian regime.

Last but not least, Europe can do a lot more in non-monetary support. For example, European politicians and the Norwegian government (the Norwegian Pension Fund owns a significant share of Apple’s huge stock market value) can also support FBK’s campaign to make Apple and other IT giants stop complying with Russian repressive digital laws. Apple had removed hundreds of VPNs and media apps based on requests from the Russian digital watchdog that severely limited access to the same outlets supported by the US and Europe.

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The USAID freeze is another blow to the European approach towards Russia, Ukraine and eastern Europe in general. The overinflated bubble of the American pro-democracy donorship has burst, requiring the EU and its member states to revamp their soft power. But the good news is that Europe can do more with less money by prioritising the most influential organisations, supporting trust-building measures and incentivising private actors to stop complying with Russian repressive norms.