Fragile frontline: The consequences of declining military aid to Ukraine

Russia’s renewed offensive in eastern Ukraine is beginning to yield results. Russia is laser-focused on taking the city of Pokrovsk and other settlements in the Donbas region. By seizing these well-fortified positions, its military can entrench more deeply into areas such as Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Poltava or Zaporizhzhia, which have so far avoided active combat.

Russia’s continued advancement would have adverse consequences for Ukraine’s defence capabilities. But the challenges facing Ukraine’s resistance are also increasingly linked to a decline in international support. Since July 2025, military assistance to Ukraine has decreased by approximately 43% compared to the previous six months. Despite this, many Western governments remain optimistic that Ukraine will continue to withstand Russia’s renewed pressure.

Invest now to save later

 Should the decline in international aid for Ukraine mean that Russia emerges as the victor, Europe would face a strategic threat and fiscal burden which far exceeds the costs of sustained support for Kyiv

Ukraine’s continued lack of funding, decrease in military supplies and dire personnel shortages will have severe consequences, however. Should the decline in international aid for Ukraine mean that Russia emerges as the victor, Europe would face a strategic threat and fiscal burden which far exceeds the costs of sustained support for Kyiv. Calculations show that European allies financing a Ukrainian victory (around $606–$972bn) is significantly cheaper than the cost of reinforcing Europe’s eastern flank (around $1.4-$1.8tn).

Beyond these direct financial implications, a Russian victory would hand Vladimir Putin control of Ukraine’s vast natural supplies and industrial base. A Kremlin-controlled Ukraine could facilitate Russia’s rapid military reconstitution using Ukraine’s human, natural and geographic resources—a move that would shatter NATO deterrence and fracture alliance cohesion. Ukraine’s capitulation could see the fiscal burden on European nations grow as they double defence spending to manage a direct threat on their borders. Simultaneously, they will have to cope with a refugee crisis and the erosion of Europe’s credibility as a guarantor of geopolitical stability.

As of September 2025, 75% of Ukrainians—down from 81% in September 2024—believed that Ukraine can win the war with Western support for sanctions, and with increased military and financial aid. Clearly, Ukrainian belief in a Ukrainian victory is dwindling. To avoid negative financial implications, but also to sustain Ukraine’s morale, the EU needs to issue reparation credit for Ukraine based on leveraging frozen Russian assets. This show of power could restore the EU’s seat at the negotiating table and encourage Russia to consider genuine negotiations towards peace.  

Rowing back resources

As the EU continues to debate Kyiv’s security, the Ukrainian defence is facing renewed Russian military pressure. Moscow has, over the last month, occupied new areas including in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region (accounting for 56% of the total land occupied by Russia in November). Overall, Russia occupied 505km² of Ukrainian territory in the same period. Each month, open-source intelligence service Deepstate presents graphs showing Ukraine’s territorial losses. These show how a lack of consistent external military support for Ukraine usually destabilises the frontline—and even when military support packages are adopted, it takes months before stability is achieved.

General Christopher Cavoli, the top general for US forces in Europe, has estimated that Russia is outgunning Ukraine at a ratio of 10:1—and Ukraine’s lack of ammunition, air defence and other military equipment is weakening its defence capability. On drones, it is also falling behind. For example, despite producing roughly four million drones in 2025, Ukraine does not have enough funding to support the continued development of its drone industry. The result is that Russia has taken the lead in drone technology, on which Ukraine had the edge since the beginning of the war. Russia simply has more funds and a well-established supply chain of spare parts from China.

Crisis of manpower

Ukraine’s dire situation is further complicated by its shortage of manpower. In some areas of intense fighting, it faces a ratio of one Ukrainian soldier to every 12 Russians; in Pokrovsk, this is eight to one. Ukraine’s draining of personnel is due to, among other things, declining morale, exhaustion and recruits taking absence without leave. Soldiers are hard to recruit, pessimistic about Ukraine’s chances and do not always have the necessary combat gear; commanders confess they have watched entire units perish due to the weapon shortage. Criminal offences linked to desertion grew from 3,687 cases in 2022 to 161,461 cases in 2025. Of those who leave, about 30% return voluntarily. Many, however, are still missing.

Over 2025, the Ukrainian armed forces and its international partners have called for a push in the recruitment of personnel. But mobilisation alone cannot produce a superior land army. Ukraine cannot replicate Russia’s policy of contracting and drafting tens of thousands of recruits each month, particularly because its population is much smaller (Russia’s population is around 144 million, while Ukraine’s is around 37 million), and because of a lack of funds and equipment.

Ukraine also needs to better understand how to prevent deaths among those already serving: about 80% of Ukrainian frontline losses are the result of Russian drone attacks carried out during rotations and logistic supplies. Conducting these exercises under the protection of armoured vehicles, electronic warfare and ammunition fire could lower the number of casualties. But mobilising more people without addressing the issues of equipment, training and coordination will only result in more deaths.

Addressing the weapon deficit

Securing future access to resources does not look promising. According to Ukrainian intelligence, the Russian production of guided aerial bombs (GAB) will reach around 120,000 by the end of 2025. About 500 GABs could reach up to 200km, thereby attacking Ukrainian positions and manpower. Russia is apparently also developing GABs with a reach of up to 400km, allowing for attacks on Kyiv and other cities far behind the frontline, without exposure to Ukrainian air defence. Additionally, Russia has scaled-up production of drones and missiles, surpassing NATO and Ukrainian air defence capabilities.

Europe’s slow-moving efforts to increase weapon production are not helping Ukraine. The lack of urgency among member-state governments is increasing the depth of Russia’s belief in its own victory; Europe is reliant on Ukraine’s own resilience, a perception reinforced through the army’s success and Ukrainian societal steadfastness. It is clear, however, that Ukraine’s long-term success is contingent on sustained external support. The diminishing rate of aid risks triggering a cycle of localised defeats in eastern Ukraine, undermining both national security and the strategic position of Ukraine’s international partners.

Bend but don’t break

US president Donald Trump’s contentious 28-point “peace plan” for Russia and Ukraine comes as Ukraine’s armed forces face the aforementioned challenges—and with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky under pressure following an energy sector corruption scandal. The slow withdrawal of the US from Europe suggests that the Trump administration does not believe that Russia is a threat beyond Ukraine. But the tactical reality on the ground suggest that Kyiv’s—and Europe’s—ability to defend itself is strongly connected to securing Western supply lines, now and in the future.

After all, despite the Russian army’s efforts, it has missed deadlines for capturing Pokrovsk multiple times. Moscow has secured only marginal territorial gains at an immense cost. It would be a mistake for the West to assume these successes are not connected to its own role as an aid and military resources supplier. Now, for the EU to avoid a capitulation that would shatter NATO deterrence, put Europe in peril and trigger a massive refugee crisis, it must come through with reparation credit. Ideally, this would restore European leverage at the negotiating table and foster negotiations towards a lasting peace deal.

Continuing to delay essential military packages does not bring peace closer. Instead, it validates Russia’s war of attrition and guarantees a far more expensive and dangerous future for European security. Ukraine’s allies must now decide between the resumption of support for Ukraine, or a catastrophic strategic failure that will cost far more than the current price of aid. The crisis facing the Ukrainian frontline is not one of resolve or capability, but a direct consequence of the 43% drop in military aid. Now the financial burden of arming Ukraine for victory is vastly superior to the cost of fortifying Europe’s eastern flank against an emboldened Kremlin.