Fool me thrice: The pattern of political instability in Bulgaria, Georgia, and Moldova

Two weeks have come and gone since Bulgaria’s seventh general election in just over three years, and an end to the country’s political crisis remains long way off. Unsurprisingly, Bulgarians had meagre confidence in their elections even before the latest instalment. Now, there are mounting calls from across the political spectrum for a partial or full annulment of the latest results due to alleged voting irregularities. Analysts suggest there is little hope that Boyko Borissov – the leader of the largest party after the recent vote, the conservative GERB – will be able to form a stable government.

Pro-European sentiment remains strong in Bulgaria. But nationalistic and pro-Russian voices have capitalised on election fatigue and contentious issues, such as military aid to Ukraine and the closure of coal power plants, to increase their share of the vote. The far-right party Revival, which earlier this year attended a gathering of Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party, came in third in the recent election, trailing the centrist coalition We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria by less than one per cent. Mainstream parties, meanwhile, have become embroiled in corruption scandals and internal quarrels, further fragmenting the political landscape and adding to the mistrust in democratic institutions. 

The latest edition of Bulgaria’s election saga lays bare two emerging trends: first, the campaigns were marked by voting irregularities and Russian disinformation campaigns on social media platforms. Second, anti-system parties such as Revival, There Are Such People, Morality Unity Honour, and Greatness echoed pro-Kremlin narratives that exploited citizens’ disillusionment. Although the specifics differ, this suggests that the European Union should view Bulgaria’s recent election (and the next one) alongside those in Moldova and Georgia. Together the three countries’ experiences signal an alarming trend in eastern Europe – one of democratic erosion paired with the rise of political projects that echo Vladimir Putin’s tactics of winning (back) friends abroad, as my ECFR colleague Ksenia Luchenko describes. A continuation along this trajectory risks undermining the EU’s global standing and the democratic future of its eastern neighbourhood.

The fragile trio

In Bulgaria, Russian interference has a footprint that often flies under the radar. Ahead of the double elections in June – the sixth snap general and European Parliament elections, the European Parliament expressed concern about Russian attempts to interfere in the process, identifying Russian control of a network of disinformation agents active on social media. The Kremlin also advances its interests in Bulgaria through extensive disinformation campaigns and by exporting its radical-right playbook. Anti-Western political projects in Bulgaria embrace the ultra-conservative, far-right narratives of Vladimir Putin and his United Russia party, showing hostility towards LGBTQ+ people and civil society, as well as claiming to be the defenders of national sovereignty and orthodox Christian values.

In Moldova, President Maia Sandu – who oversaw the country starting EU accession talks earlier this year – faced a difficult run-off to hold onto the presidency against her opponent, Alexandr Stoianoglo, who was promoting a “reset” of Moldova’s relations with Russia. The country’s referendum on EU accession saw the pro-European side win by a whisker. But the campaign was marred by external meddling and vote-buying schemes. Notably, dozens of Moldovans reportedly received training in destabilisation techniques at camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia ahead of the elections, with the training conducted by Bulgarians and Serbs connected to Russian intelligence services.

In Georgia, where EU support is impressively high at more than 85 per cent, the ruling Georgian Dream party won for the fourth time, running on a seemingly pro-EU platform. But the party presented the election as a choice between “war and peace”, suggesting that figures in the West want to drag Georgia into war with Russia. President Salome Zourabichvili, who is the key opposition figure, has rejected the results and international observers have expressed concerns over violation of international norms. Despite EU foreign ministers condemning these practices, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban’s visit to Georgia in the wake of the election – in his attempt to support the likeminded politicians from Georgian Dream – sparked controversy on just how united the EU is regarding the results of the election and Georgian Dream’s tilt towards Russia.

To be able to offer a collective response to geopolitical uncertainty and to safeguard the security in its neighbourhood, the EU must urgently address the problems revealed during the elections in Bulgaria, Georgia, and Moldova

Pro-European parties in all three countries are losing ground to those adopting Putin’s ultraconservative narratives, while election fraud leads to disillusionment and apathy in their democratic systems. Kremlin-aligned projects and politicians campaign effectively on messages of peace in Ukraine. This happens amid an uncertain geopolitical environment that will soon have to contend with a second Trump presidency, and all that could imply for the state of transatlantic unity and the war in Ukraine. To be able to offer a collective response to the geopolitical uncertainty and to safeguard the security in its neighbourhood, the EU must urgently address the problems revealed during the elections in Bulgaria, Georgia, and Moldova. Failure to act risks creating a weak link on the eastern flank through Bulgaria – and could serve Georgia and Moldova to Russia on a silver platter.

Why democracy promotion begins at home

Bulgaria’s political crisis indicates that the EU’s defence of the European project must begin at home. The stalemate enables the rise of opportunistic and anti-system parties, shrinking the space for pro-EU ones. And the pro-European parties that do exist often drift towards the narratives of the anti-system parties rather than offering a strong message of their own.

The all-consuming domestic chaos has also inevitably led to passive behaviour from the Bulgarian public administration at the European level. This has translated into indifferent treatment of Bulgaria by the EU – at the informal meeting on migration ahead of the European Council on 17 October, the Bulgarian prime minister was not at the table. For a country that borders Turkey and amid a war in the Middle East, this is illogical. The damage is twofold – the European project is less visible in Bulgaria and the Bulgarian public administration loses links to its European counterparts, limiting its ability to work efficiently on European level and implement the EU strategies fit for the current reality.

The EU needs to recognise the unique contributions Bulgaria can bring to strengthening strategic thinking in areas of waning influence, such as Moldova and Georgia. Bulgaria has valuable know-how about the post-Soviet space. In a context where the EU will pay closer attention to its neighbourhood because of the security risks and Russia’s hybrid warfare there, Bulgarian state agencies can play a critical role in gathering intelligence and participate actively in defending the West’s interests in the region. Bulgaria can also contribute by countering Russia’s propaganda machine in regions with Bulgarian minorities, such as in the autonomous region of Gagauzia in Moldova.

For this logic to materialise, Brussels and the more influential EU member states should ensure that smaller member states are not sidelined in critical policy discussions. Inclusivity in these discussions will strengthen the ability of authentic pro-European political parties to advocate for the European project within their countries. The EU must also engage its member states with closer geographic, historical, and cultural ties to regions of strategic interest. The new European Commission should urgently allocate funding to support joint civil society exchanges within eastern Europe – particularly among Bulgaria, Georgia, and Moldova. While each country’s civil society maintains strong links with Brussels, they lack connections with each other. EU support for such initiatives, in the framework of a future EU strategy on Russia, would reinforce efforts to counter Russian narratives and add valuable perspectives to the EU’s strategic thinking for its neighbourhood.