Explaining the Ukraine vote

Although turnout was low in Ukraine's parliamentary elections, the results show Ukrainians want an end to “politics as usual”.

Who voted?

There was much to be pleased about in the Ukrainian parliamentary elections held on 26 October. But first, the black spots. Turnout was only 52.4 percent, the lowest ever in a Ukrainian election. Some claim that the reason for the low turnout was that no artificial padding of the vote took place, unlike on many previous occasions. This might explain a few percentage points. But the more likely explanation is a dangerous degree of alienation or disillusion with the continuation of “politics as usual”.

The biggest problems were, of course, in the regions where no voting was possible at all, in Crimea and in the occupied areas of the Donbas. The 27 seats in the parliament that should have been filled by candidates from these regions were left empty. Turnout in Crimea was effectively zero, even though some people from the area travelled out of it to vote. In Donetsk 32.4 percent of the electorate voted and in Luhansk turnout was 32.9 percent.

The map of the voting districts, however, is not exactly the same as the map of the occupied and Ukraine-controlled areas. Several seats were in between both areas. In one bizarre instance, Yukhym Zvyahilsky, a Party of Regions stalwart who was briefly forced to flee to Israel after a notoriously corrupt stint as Ukrainian prime minister in 1993-1994, was able to win in Donetsk city’s district number 45 with only 1,454 votes, many of which were cast by voters who were apparently bussed in from the occupied areas.

Turnout was not particularly impressive in areas west of the “front line”.

Turnout was not particularly impressive in areas west of the “front line” either. The lowest was in Odessa, where only 39.5 percent of the electorate voted. In Dnipropetrovsk, where the governor-oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi has supposedly established order, turnout was still only 48.9 percent.

Even in areas of traditionally high turnout, voting figures were hardly stratospheric. In the Ukrainian heartlands of Galicia in west Ukraine, turnout has approached 90 percent in previous elections. But this time, turnout was barely 70 percent (70 percent in Lviv , 68.3 percent in Ternopil, and 63.7 percent in Ivano-Frankivsk). In Kyiv city turnout was just 55.9 percent.

New faces

The biggest positive development from the elections is that so many voted actively against “politics as usual”. President Petro Poroshenko’s eponymous Block, newly formed for the elections, was way out in front in early opinion polls, which generally predicted that it would receive more than 30 percent; there was even talk that the president’s party might be able to form a majority on its own. Early polls also suggested that the populist Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko would be the main beneficiary of any “anti-politics” protest vote.

As it turned out, in the end, post-Maidan forces recovered their confidence and their critical voices. The cease-fire in the east signed on 5 September may be extremely shaky on the ground, but it meant that opposition forces were no longer shy of criticising the new powers-that-be. The Poroshenko Block, as the main bureaucratic-administrative party, stumbled, but so did the populist parties (Lyashko’s Radical Party, Yuliya Tymoshenko’s Fatherland Party, Strong Ukraine) and the pro-big business parties (Strong Ukraine as well as the Poroshenko Block). The one exception was Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk’s Popular Front, which is also part of the old guard. However, by campaigning for Yatseniuk’s right to remain as prime minister despite manoeuvrings to replace him, Popular Front managed to pull off the difficult trick of seeming partly oppositional while remaining part of the current establishment.

The main beneficiary of the opposition vote was Self-Help.

The main beneficiary of the opposition vote was Self-Help, which stormed to third place and 11 percent of the vote. However, Ukraine’s electoral system includes not only seats filled by proportional representation on a national party list system but also seats allocated to territorial constituencies. As a new party with little organisation on the ground to challenge the traditional parties, Self-Help was able to win only one constituency seat.

The new parliament’s composition

Ukraine has restored the 2004 constitution, but it has not restored the electoral system that was supposed to go with it. If this year’s elections had been held under that system, using just one vote for a national list elected by proportional representation, the result would have been even more radical. But by maintaining the territorial constituency seats alongside the party list system, the outgoing parliament managed to protect its interests.

As it was, the Poroshenko Block was able to do better in the constituencies, where patronage and spending power count for more (in fact, it won more constituency than PR seats). It will no doubt hope to pull off the governing party’s traditional trick of sucking in most of the “independents”, of which there are 107 this time.

Party

Proportional Vote

= PV Seats

+ Constituency Seats

= Total Seats

Popular Front

22.2%

65

18

83

Poroshenko Block

21.8%

63

69

132

Self-Help

11%

32

1

33

Opposition Block

9.4%

27

2

29

Radical Party (Lyashko)

7.4%

22

22

Fatherland (Tymoshenko)

5.7%

17

2

19

 

 

 

 

 

Freedom Party

4.7%

6

6

Communists

3.9%

Civic Position

3.1%

Strong Ukraine

3.1%

1

1

Right Sector

1.8%

1

1

Independents

  –

107

107

Empty Seats

  –

27

27

Results by 29 October, with 98 percent of the vote counted (cvk.gov.ua). Half the 450 seats are elected by proportional vote (with a 5 percent minimum to win any seats), half in territorial constituencies. Twenty-seven seats remain empty in Crimea and the Donbas.

These details matter, as the key dynamic in the election turned out to be new politics versus “politics as usual”. The likely three-party coalition of the Poroshenko Block + Popular Front + Self-Help is solidly pro-European, but it is split along the dividing line of old and new politics.

“Independents”

The pro-Russian Opposition Block is also a little stronger than it appears. Ten out of twelve of those elected in Donetsk called themselves “independents”, including Zvyahilsky, as well as four out of five of those who won seats in Luhansk. But nearly all of these “independents” are former Party of Regions stalwarts in disguise. This is a paradox indeed – that so much Ukrainian blood was shed, only for former supporters of Yanukovych to be elected in the liberated areas, some of whom are the very same people who helped foment the rebellion in the first place.

Andrew Wilson’s latest book, Ukraine Crisis: What it Means for the Westwas published on 14 October, as both paperback and e-book. You can read an extract here, or listen to a podcast here.

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

Author

Senior Policy Fellow

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