Europe’s two wars: The danger of the comfort zone

Drones disrupting air traffic in major European airports. Sabotage operations against Polish and French railways. Arms caches found in Finland. This stream of news points to the reality of serious security threats in NATO and EU territory—and it is being matched by a stream of various European Union strategies focused on how to protect its population.

In October and November 2025 alone, the EU issued a defence Readiness Roadmap, plans for a European Democracy Shield, a Military Mobility Area strategy which aims to create a “military Schengen”, and it is still exploring ways to implement a drone wall. But these covert actions are a brutal reminder that Europe faces a second war alongside the first war: Russia’s highly visible, relentlessly documented and headline-dominating assault on Ukraine.

First war: “Kill zone” in Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—the largest conflict on European soil since the second world war—brought inter-state war on a large scale. It is endangering the whole continent, but nowhere more so than the “kill zone”, a perilous stretch of land, around 30-40km wide, across the Ukrainian front. The zone is visible from drones and any movement is a target. Here, neither side achieves dominance: tanks cannot penetrate, infantry cannot mass. Here “drone tunnels”, effectively fishing nets laid along roads to protect trucks from razor wire and fibre-optic cables linked to drones overhead, line the earth.

For Ukraine, the “kill zone” demands vast quantities of inexpensive, rapidly produced drones—and Ukrainian companies have ramped up production. A single Ukrainian company is churning out a drone every eight seconds, equal to up to 1.7 million per year.[1] Russia’s relentless drone barrage means that Ukraine maintaining rapid innovation and a high output of materiel are the latter’s lifeline. But it also requires Ukrainian personnel to fast learn, and fast adapt to, the demands of the frontline.

Second war: “Comfort zone” across Europe

As a kinetic struggle unfolds in the kill zone, a second war is engulfing Europe. This one is hybrid, insidious and often invisible. Its most dangerous battle is playing out instead across Europe’s “comfort zone”—and it is rooted in a dangerous European complacency.

For decades, European policymakers and commentators have found reassurance by comparing their GDP, GDP per capita or military budgets to Russia’s. Their discussions frequently dismiss Russian capacity by citing that its GDP is comparable to that of Spain’s, or that NATO military spending easily outstrips Moscow’s.

But such comparisons are ignorant of history and strategy. David did not beat Goliath with superior swords, shields or even with his fists; the Greeks did not conquer Troy by relying on mightier walls, smarter catapults, palintonos bows or battering rams. Israel has not been militarily dominant against almost two-dozen Arab states by having a bigger GDP or a larger population. And the Taliban has not spent more on weapons than the US military.

Russia considers itself at war with Europe and this hybrid conflict has many faces. Its most visible parts are well-known: propaganda, digital disinformation, social media manipulation and cyberattacks constitute major fronts. Reporters Without Borders has reported, for example, the discovery of another Kremlin-led network comprising dozens of cloned websites of regional newspapers in France, just ahead of the country’s local elections in early 2026.

But far more alarming are elements that elude public attention. Russia has trained commandos in EU candidate countries like Serbia and Bosnia to provoke violence and make explosives. Otherwise, it is flying drones into the airspace of EU member states such as Romania, or into accession candidate countries like Moldova. Moscow’s actions have even prompted Aleksander Vucic, the Serbian president, to complain that his own law-enforcement apparatus did not spot, or warn him about, such operations.

Moscow’s malign influence

While Russia’s methods in the hybrid war are at the cutting edge of influence-operation innovation—for example, using cryptocurrencies as a key conduit to finance hybrid operations across Europe—its objective is not outright military conquest. Instead, Moscow is aiming for the political destruction of NATO and the EU. By eroding trust between member states, sowing economic instability and undermining democratic institutions, its malign influence seeks to fragment European unity.

Moscow is aiming for the political destruction of NATO and the EU. By eroding trust between member states, sowing economic instability and undermining democratic institutions, it seeks to fragment European unity

Russia’s ultimate goal may be to set the stage for a confrontation in which military aggression erupts and see key countries veto invoking collective defence clauses such as Article 5 of NATO or Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty. This would, of course, be catastrophic. The foundational structures of the EU (including the eurozone, the single market, the Schengen Area and programmes like Erasmus) could falter or collapse. This would erode the cohesion that has underpinned European prosperity and security since 1945.

Europeans together

The best way for Europe to defend itself against the dangers of the potentially fatal “comfort zone” is to combat Russia’s hybrid war on Europe. But this could last decades. Once the active fighting in Ukraine stops, Russia and its interests could be reinforced due to more resources and political bandwidth, leading to Moscow’s rise in other areas of the world. For example, in 2015, the Minsk II agreement ended fighting in the Donbas between Ukraine and Russia—and a core of pro-Russian fighters were deployed in Syria and across swathes of Africa. Something similar could happen again, but on a much larger scale.  

As Europeans reevaluate their security, they will learn some uncomfortable truths. They must consider hybrid threats as seriously as the kinetic destruction in Ukraine’s “kill zone”. Investments in asymmetric warfare capabilities—drones, cyber defence and rapid-response teams—need to match the innovation seen on the Ukrainian battlefield. Strong political will to counter disinformation and covert operations must unite member states, not divide them. 

Europe’s future depends on it acknowledging the reality: that the war raging in Ukraine is accompanied by a second, more silent, war against its unity and values. This war on Europe will continue and is likely to intensify—especially if Ukraine is forced into losing.

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[1] According to author’s sources.