Europeans can’t let Trump define what it means to be European

The US National Security Strategy 2025 is little more than a guide to Trump’s culture war with Europe. EU member states and institutions, and its political parties and populations, need to resist America’s pernicious influence

Policy alert
Trump Meets President Zelenskyy of Ukraine and European Leaders
US President Trump and President Emmanuel Macron of France participate in a meeting with European leaders in the White House
Image by picture alliance / CNP/AdMedia | CNP/AdMedia
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Problem

If anyone was wondering whether it’s fair to speak of US president Donald Trump’s culture war with Europe, the 2025 US National Security Strategy removes all ambiguity. Washington is no longer pretending it won’t meddle in Europe’s internal affairs. It now frames such interference as an act of benevolence (“we want Europe to remain European”) and a matter of US strategic necessity. The priority? “Cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations”.

The US is explicitly backing its ideological favourites, cheering on “the growing influence of patriotic European parties” as a source of “great optimism”. It pursues narrative warfare instead of foreign policy by rehearsing a catalogue of culture-war tropes: “civilisational erasure”, “censorship”, “loss of national identities”. Washington is also casting doubt over Europe’s democratic integrity. Europe is apparently plagued by “unstable minority governments” that trample basic democratic norms—a bold claim from an administration not exactly famous for its love of institutional checks and balances.

Finally, the Trump administration continues to pin the EU as the source of Europe’s broader ailments; an actor that “undermines political liberty and sovereignty”. The security strategy instead promises to “stand for the sovereign right of nations”. But as it laments Europe’s “regulatory suffocation”, it neglects to mention where stands to gain. Spoiler: it’s Silicon Valley.

Solution

America’s posture towards Europe amounting to a culture war was clear months ago: J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, American interference in elections in Germany and Poland, and the US humiliating Europe in trade, defence, security and foreign policy.

But the way out for Europe is not rocket science—it just requires mobilisation on several levels at once. For a start, mainstream parties must regain confidence in Europe and defend its values. In the culture war, Trump has become a vital ally for the continent’s far-right—and centrists can no longer afford to disappoint pro-Europeans. In some countries, like Poland, EU scepticism is rising dangerously.

EU member states also need to develop in areas such as defence and technology; and in the continent’s broader partnerships with other countries and regions. Only this will allow Europeans to be assertive towards Trump and credibly take on greater responsibility for their own security.

Finally, Europe needs to ensure that social media platforms are not driving radicalisation and polarisation in European societies, nor abusing EU rules. The EU needs to be ready to lay down its digital rules and force some social media platforms to deactivate their polarising algorithms.

Context

Publication of the US National Security Strategy 2025 comes just two weeks after it emerged that Trump instructed US diplomats in Australia, Canada and Europe to stem panic over migration policies. But Europeans, wary of provoking Washington and losing the rest of its support for Ukraine, are seemingly resistant to standing up to Trump’s ever-growing encroachment on European sovereignty.

This appeasement remains even after Brussels accepted a deeply asymmetrical trade arrangement with the US in the summer. Until today, autumn was marked by little progress in terms of enforcing the Digital Services Act vis-à-vis “big tech”—and even the fine facing X is laughably low. The EU has instead watered down several climate and digital rules, part of the “omnibus” votes in the European Parliament.

Now the European Democracy Shield, as proposed by the European Commission and still in its developmental stages, appears too weak to equip the EU to fight the real threats to it democracy. True, some of these are from across Europe’s eastern border—but increasingly also from across the Atlantic.

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

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