Europe, Angola and the UAE: Navigating competition on Africa’s Atlantic coast

The next summit between the African Union and the European Union takes place in Luanda, Angola’s capital, from November 24th-25th 2025—just as Africa’s choice of external partners is changing. New actors, including the Gulf Arab states, are reshaping the continent’s economic geography; the Atlantic coast is fast becoming a key arena where this shift is playing out.

The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed between Angola and the United Arab Emirates in August 2025 is demonstrative of this change. The pact, which was inked by UAE president Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and his counterpart João Gonçalves Lourenço during the former’s first state visit to Angola, is accompanied by investment pledges and sectoral memoranda of understanding (MoU). These aim to triple trade between the countries from about $3bn in 2023 to $10bn by 2033.

Ripple effect

For Angola, the CEPA is part of the country’s effort to diversify its partnerships and position itself as a regional logistics, energy and agribusiness hub. This aligns with Lourenço’s agenda to advance Angola’s energy and industrialisation priorities. For the UAE, it upgrades a nascent diplomatic relationship (Abu Dhabi opened an embassy in Luanda in 2018) into one where the country has a long-term stake across Angola’s key economic sectors.

For Europe, however, Angola’s drive to diversify its economic partners—and the UAE expanding its presence in the country—exposes two weaknesses. First is Europe’s internal fragmentation and pursuit of uncoordinated initiatives, especially in comparison to Abu Dhabi’s unified, well-financed offerings. Second is Europe’s reliance on the US, particularly in the development of the strategic Lobito Corridor project, which links mineral-rich Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with the Angolan port of Lobito.

Europe’s reliance on the US risks limiting its ability to act autonomously, should American priorities, timelines or risk appetites diverge. For Europe to remain a relevant actor in Angola and the broader Lobito Corridor region, it needs to achieve stronger intra-European coordination. It should also demonstrate a willingness to engage beyond the Europe-US transatlantic framework and with emerging players like the UAE.

Areas of interest: UAE and Europe

Minerals

The UAE’s partnership with Angola fits into Abu Dhabi’s broader strategy to reach $1.1tn in non-oil trade by 2031. The UAE has long had a presence in the Horn of Africa: now it is investing elsewhere on the continent to secure minerals and food supplies—and new logistics routes similar to the Berbera Corridor between coastal Somaliland and land-locked Ethiopia.

Emirati investment in Angola spans agriculture, renewables, desalination and an industrial park, but minerals take centre stage. They are the UAE’s largest import from Africa after gold and precious stones, and Luanda is Africa’s largest producer of diamonds. These dominate Angola’s exports to the UAE. Indeed, the country’s position on the Atlantic coast, the prospect of new domestic mineral finds and its proximity to Zambia’s “Copperbelt” and the DRC—where Emirati firms have recently acquired stakes in mines and other companies—make it vital for mineral geopolitics.

The UAE is diversifying the investment field, which matters for the US and Europe. Its actions are occurring precisely as the two transatlantic partners are trying to reduce China’s dominance in the region by opening a westward export route—the Lobito Corridor—which links the Copperbelt to Angola’s Lobito port. The idea is to provide African investors with an alternative to China’s copper-centred Tanzania–Indian Ocean Corridor.  

Logistics

The UAE’s expansion into logistics could either reinforce or complicate Western ambitions. Emirati firms DP World and AD Ports have concessions in Luanda, Pointe-Noire in Congo-Brazzaville and Banana in the DRC: Africa’s Atlantic coast is now within Abu Dhabi’s strategic perimeter. This string of UAE-backed ports supports the UAE’s ambition to act as a global connector—including towards minerals and land-rich Latin America, where the UAE is rapidly expanding.  

DP World and AD Ports operate commercially but are part of a wider Emirati push for economic statecraft. Luanda port—which is located north of the European- and US-backed Lobito port—provides a connection between the Angolan coast and central Africa’s mineral resources. The port also offers alternative export options.

For Europe, this overlap in logistics investment is not inherently competitive. However, if Angola revamps its ports backed by different international partners and the country’s supply routes blossom, this could lead to the emergence of parallel logistics routes and standard systems. In turn, this would weaken the Lobito route, and America and Europe’s leverage in Angola, by fragmenting flows and reducing Lobito’ strategic weight.

Regional security

Security cooperation between the UAE and Angola is also deepening. During Sheikh Al Nahyan’s visit to Angola in August, the country’s Military Intelligence and Security Service (SISM) signed an MoU with Emirati space and tech company, Space42, to receive satellites, drones and AI-based border control.

In October, the Emirati defence industry conglomerate, EDGE, announced it was finalising a deal with Angola’s Ministry of the Interior. The company Abu Dhabi Ship Building (part of EDGE) pledged in 2023 to supply military corvettes to the Angolan navy. This signals the UAE’s interest in maintaining Angola’s stability as a transit hub and its potential to once again act as a regional stabiliser in the eastern DRC conflict.

Finance

Abu Dhabi’s financing tools also point to a preference for equity and investment capital, channelled through sovereign wealth funds and state-linked conglomerates. This contrasts with China’s loan-heavy, oil-backed “Angola model” which it pursued in the 2000s. For Angola, the Emirati approach reduces debt exposure and aligns with Lourenço’s push to rebalance external partners and attract risk-tolerant investors. The UAE is positioning itself between China’s state-to-state, loan-based model and Europe’s fragmented, process-heavy approach.

Angola and Europe

Angola sits at the intersection of Europe’s goals on connectivity, energy security and strategic autonomy. It is a major energy partner for those European firms which still dominate oil and gas such as Italian company Eni and global corporation TotalEnergies, while others expand into solar, hydrogen, grid modernisation and agribusiness.

For Europe to maintain its edge in Angola, it needs a three-pronged approach: first, strengthen intra-European cooperation; second, rebalance its strategic alignment with the US; and third, pursue smarter engagement with the UAE

These companies are increasingly competing in a crowded field; new entrants, like the UAE, are similarly interested in Angola’s assets. For Europe to maintain its edge in Angola, it needs a three-pronged approach: first, strengthen intra-European coherence; second, rebalance its strategic alignment with the US; and third, pursue smarter engagement with the UAE.

A refined European strategy

1. Europe should offer an integrated European ecosystem, not fragmented projects. Europe’s solar plants, grid expansion, corridor infrastructure and industrial pilot initiatives in Angola remain disparate, weakening its political and economic leverage. Europeans need to go beyond ambition and develop a strategic architecture to strengthen their competitiveness and influence. They also need to embed EU standards across the value chain. Europe also needs to accelerate its engagement along the minerals value chain, which is the geopolitical drive behind the Lobito Corridor and the heart of Europe’s competitiveness agenda, So far, financing, technical and governance challenges have limited its presence.  
2. Europe should rebalance the transatlantic partnership. America’s engagement with Angola is primarily driven by its ambition to secure mineral inputs for industrial reshoring. Angola and Europe, by contrast, seek to embed mineral access within a broader developmental and industrialisation agenda, intending for the Lobito Corridor to impact poverty reduction, employment creation, intra-African trade and regional integration. It is essential that Europe avoids over-alignment with Washington’s supply-centric minerals agenda if it wants to retain influence over where and how value is added.
3. Europe should engage selectively with emerging players to complement the transatlantic track. Europe competing with the UAE on logistics, industry and security would be inefficient; but ignoring Abu Dhabi is self-defeating. Europeans should consider co-investment with the UAE in logistics, renewables and industrial zones to avoid duplicating systems and reinforce governance and standards in Angola. Europeans can provide market predictability alongside technology and regulatory support while complementing Emirati outreach.

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Angola is where Europe confronts a broader question: can Europeans still define their own place in the world? After all, it is essential that Europe continues to deliver competitiveness at home; support industrial transformation abroad; navigate turbulent geopolitical waters steadily; and engage with rising global actors without diverting from its own aims.

Europe should now combine a firm strategic direction with realistic and inclusive delivery on the ground to remain anchored in the emerging Atlantic—and global—order.