Echoes of Minsk: Lukashenka’s potential gain in Trump’s Ukraine deal

Trump could grant Lukashenka sanctions relief without demanding any meaningful concessions in return. The EU must continue to maintain pressure

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko speaks to the media after voting in presidential elections in Minsk, Belarus, January 26, 2025
Image by picture alliance / ASSOCIATED PRESS | Pavel Bednyakov
©

After claiming 86.7% of the vote in unfree elections not recognised by the EU, President Aleksandr Lukashenka has once again extended his reign in Belarus. Local human rights advocates report major procedure violations during the campaign, including the obstruction of independent observers, forced early voting, and widespread intimidation of opposition candidates and activists. Undeterred by potential Western backlash, the authoritarian ruler continues to promote himself as a guarantor of stability at home.

Now, Lukashenka appears to be laying the groundwork to mend relations with the West via United States president Donald Trump, with whom Lukashenka has often expressed sympathy. The release of political prisoners throughout 2024 suggests Lukashenka is preparing for such a rapprochement – and Trump’s transactional style of foreign policy might just make that possible.

As the American president works on a deal for a Ukraine ceasefire, Lukashenka could present Belarus as a neutral venue for discussions, reminiscent of the framework of the Minsk Agreements. While Ukraine and Europe will categorically reject this, the Belarusian leader could also offer limited gestures, such as reducing direct Belarusian military involvement in Russia’s war efforts.

Lukashenka’s “pendulum” strategy of balancing between Russia and the West to extract economic and political concessions from both has long been his playbook. And although Belarus has grown more dependent on Moscow—and distant from the West—since the 2020 protests and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Trump’s return to office changes this calculation.

Global anticipation over a potential Russia-Ukraine deal could overshadow the struggle of Belarusian civil society for democracy

While former US president Joe Biden adopted a strategy of maximum pressure and isolation toward Belarus, Trump is unlikely to prioritise human rights concerns or demand meaningful concessions. Global anticipation over a potential Russia-Ukraine deal could overshadow the struggle of Belarusian civil society for democracy, ultimately playing into Lukashenka’s interests. Should the US president choose to lift sanctions on Belarus as part of a wider US-Russia deal, it would significantly undermine EU efforts to exert pressure on Lukashenka’s regime.

Difficulties mount for the opposition

Trump’s drastic freeze on international aid and the uncertain future of USAID has placed Belarusian independent media—most of which operates from abroad—in a precarious situation. Heavily reliant on external funding, these outlets are now struggling to survive.

Opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and other Belarusian pro-democracy figures abroad are also increasingly vulnerable. While they’ve achieved some success in raising awareness among high-level politicians, initiatives such as elections to the Coordination Council—the representative body of the Belarusian opposition—or the introduction of alternative passports have received criticism not just from EU politicians but also from within the democratic opposition itself.

Launched as an attempt to provide Belarusian exiles with an alternative form of identification, the passport project faced multiple setbacks, including a corruption scandal linked to the printing contractor and security concerns regarding personal data protection (as Lukashenka’s regime has a history of accessing sensitive opposition-related information). Resistance from EU member states to pledge recognition of the document have cast further doubt on the initiative’s feasibility.

From within Belarus, there is little hope for change: repression has reached extreme levels, instilling fear in every aspect of society and leaving minimal space for dissent.

The EU should keep up the pressure

The EU should continue its tough stance toward the dictatorship and its self-proclaimed president, including making it clear that the release of political prisoners will not be enough to restore relations. It should recognise the potential consequences of a Trump-Lukashenka rapprochement and take proactive measures.

Strengthening ties with exiled Belarusian civil society is essential to counter any diplomatic shifts that might favour Lukashenka. Should the US disengage from supporting Belarusian democratic movements, Germany, Poland and the Baltic states should intensify their efforts to fill the void by ensuring sustained humanitarian aid, facilitating legal protections for Belarusian exiles, and bolstering independent Belarusian media operating from abroad.

While Poland has vigorously advocated for sanctions and support programs for Belarusian exiles, their situation in Lithuania has deteriorated lately, with many facing denials of visas and extensions of residence permits, or being deemed “national security risks”. Urgent measures should be taken to resolve this. Germany, as a key EU player, should take a leading role in sustaining support for Belarusian democratic forces and leverage its diplomatic influence to keep Belarus on the EU’s foreign policy agenda.

Meanwhile, the EU should actively engage with the US Congress, key policymakers, and transatlantic institutions to ensure Belarus remains a priority in US foreign policy. This includes leveraging joint EU-US sanctions coordination and highlighting the strategic risks of allowing Lukashenka to rebrand himself as a legitimate actor. European leaders should emphasise to the Trump administration that appeasing Lukashenka strengthens Putin’s influence, contradicting broader US interests in limiting Russian expansionism.

If the US shifts priorities, the EU must shore up its independent Belarus strategy by engaging more deeply with exiled Belarusian political actors and implementing targeted economic support mechanisms. This could include direct financial assistance for independent Belarusian media, grants for civil society organisations, scholarships and employment programs for exiles, and expanding EU sanctions on Belarusian state enterprises and oligarchs linked to Lukashenka’s regime.

As the geopolitical landscape changes, the EU must remain proactive in preventing Lukashenka from exploiting potential openings. A clear approach will be crucial in ensuring that Belarus remains on the international agenda and that its democratic forces are not abandoned.

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

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