Deconstructing Russia’s anti-colonial posturing in the global south

One of the first session themes of the First Ministerial Conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum in November, attended by representatives of all 54 African states, may surprise many: “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”. Despite the creation of the African Space Agency in 2023, very few African countries have established space programmes, as most prioritise resource extraction and industrial development.

Conferences focusing on such symbolic topics have become a staple of Russian foreign policy since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with the Kremlin’s significantly increasing its outreach to African countries. These initiatives align with Russia’s strategy to promote itself as an “anti-colonial leader” that challenges the perceived injustices of the Western-centric global order. Largely absent from the Kremlin’s diplomacy before 2022, this anti-colonial narrative is now a significant component of the its evolving official ideology, aimed at bolstering the regime’s legitimacy both at home and abroad.

But Russia’s ability to translate this narrative into tangible alliances or practical cooperation remains limited. Even within BRICS+, Moscow has struggled to gain substantial support for its proposals. This leaves the European Union with an opportunity to articulate its own pro-global south narrative, make amends for its past, and head off the threat from Russia while there is still time.

Russia as an anti-colonial leader

For the global south, anti-colonialism is certainly a powerful idea. It taps into historical and legitimate grievances about unequal development in nations across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. And it resonates deeply with countries that feel marginalised in international institutions dominated by Western powers.

For Russia, this narrative serves several purposes. Firstly, it allows the Kremlin to rehabilitate its international image, distancing itself from its own colonial past while asserting itself as the legitimate successor of the Soviet Union (which provided military and financial support to global south nations in their fights against Western colonialism). At the same time, it positions Russia as a defender of conservative values against Western universalism.

More importantly, it enables the Kremlin to recast its self-interested political objectives as part of a global struggle for a more equitable and multipolar global order. Its war on Ukraine, along with election interference in eastern Europe, is reframed as being a legitimate defence of sovereignty and stability. Its support for alternative cooperation structures – such as BRICS+ and the revival of the Russia-India-China trilateral format – serve not simply to circumvent Western isolation, but to create a more inclusive international financial system.

A recent prominent example of this evolving narrative is a manifesto-style article by Dmitry Medvedev, former president and chair of Russia’s ruling party. In the article, he outlines how Russia, with the support of BRICS+, seeks to restructure the world order to “eliminate Western neo-colonial practices,” which he identifies as manifesting in legal, financial, and climate-related forms.

One other important aspect is that the Kremlin prefers the term “world majority” (mirovoye bolshinstvo) rather than “global majority”, as the term “global” can be associated to “global elites” (globalniye elity) which the Kremlin’s ideologists often uses to refer to the West with conspiratorial undertones.

Education and digital cooperation with Africa

In addition to space, digitalisation and cybersecurity were prominent themes in the ministerial conference. There is indeed potential for cooperation in this area – the Kremlin could, for example, offer African countries technology and capacity for state digital services for citizens based on the relatively successful Gosuslugi portal, aligning with Africa’s stated ambitions.

However, the final joint statement lacks any mention of concrete actions, focusing instead on abstractions such as “ensuring a fair and secure international security system”.

Similarly, the conference also discussed science and education, also with limited results. This area has a historical foundation dating back to the Soviet era, when Moscow allocated quotas for students from friendly African regimes – usually children of the political elite – to study in Russia. After the Soviet Union collapsed, these quotas sharply declined. However, from 2022, the Kremlin has doubled them, aiming to reach 4,816 by 2026 – but this is still a fifth of the levels of the late-Soviet period. 

The establishment of an African branch of Moscow State University, one of Russia’s leading higher education institutions, still seems elusive. The “Russian-African Network University” remains a mere meeting platform, with no joint training programmes or scientific cooperation.

Meanwhile, only two sessions in the conference were dedicated to the economy. Russian trade with African nations remains stagnant, with most deals revolving around exchange between military support and access to mineral resources.

Any new forms of practical cooperation between Russia and Africa will require funding from the Kremlin, currently difficult to achieve while the Russian economy is dedicated to the war effort in Ukraine.

Any new forms of practical cooperation between Russia and Africa will require funding from the Kremlin, currently difficult to achieve while the Russian economy is dedicated to the war effort in Ukraine. Meanwhile, African states have generally maintained a neutral stance on this conflict, making sure that their engagement with Russia doesn’t affect cooperation with the West.

Reforming the United Nations

Another Russian appeal to the “world majority” is support for reforming the United Nations, in particular the expansion of permanent seats in the UN Security Council (UNSC) – a longstanding aspiration for countries like India and Brazil. As Russia seeks to strengthen relations with its key BRICS+ partners, it has changed its historical position on the inviolability of the UNSC composition. Last year, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov advocated several times for its reform, emphasising that Brazil’s and India’s aspirations were “legitimate”.

But this position is riddled with contradictions. Throughout Putin’s presidency, Russia’s strategic documents consistently highlight its veto power in the UNSC as a cornerstone of its geopolitical influence, defending the current composition as a legitimate result of second world war and the international order established after that.

This contradiction was evident during the UN General Assembly this year. On the preceding days, Russia had again reiterated its support for UNSC reform. But when it came time to vote on the reform proposal, Russia – along with Belarus, Iran, Nicaragua, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria – voted against it. The Kremlin had 25 comments on the final text, advocating for “continued discussions” on the matter – which is typically interpreted as an attempt to the delay the process and evade any compromises.

Alternative financial infrastructure

The third aspect of this strategy is the Kremlin’s push for the development of non-Western financial infrastructures. At the recent BRICS+ summit in Kazan, Russia promoted this agenda as a key practical and not merely ideological tool.

Moscow proposed the creation of three interconnected financial instruments: the BRICS Bridge, a transnational settlement system; BRICS Pay, an alternative to Western payment systems like Visa; and BRICS Clear, a parallel international clearinghouse. It framed these initiatives as necessary to counter the perceived injustice of Western sanctions and to challenge the United States ability to leverage the global dependency on the dollar to advance its national interests.

Despite Moscow’s considerable efforts, these proposals gained limited traction. The Kazan declaration mentions them with numerous caveats, such as a commitment to “discuss and study” (rather than “develop”) these systems, or the acknowledgement that adherence to them is voluntary. Indeed, the only tangible outcome in that matter in the Kazan summit was the integration of Russia’s domestic payment system MIR with Iran’s Shetab.

China has been developing its similar swift-less settlement system, mBridge, since 2017, which is in direct competition with Russia’s projects in this area. While experts believe that China’s initiative has made progress, it took six years for only three countries (Thailand, Hong Kong, and the United Arab Emirates) to join it.

A pragmatic and positive EU agenda

These limitations illustrate that Russia’s outreach to the global south remains more of a rhetorical device than a foundation for sustainable partnerships.

The EU can counter Russia’s influence by intensifying economic engagement with these nations that actually produces concrete results. By addressing pragmatic challenges such as access to infrastructure, education, and healthcare, the EU can demonstrate a commitment to equitable development that Russia cannot match.

In this engagement, the EU should emphasise positive narratives, acknowledging that the global order does not adequately reflect the interests of developing nations and promoting reform of the UN.

By embracing these strategies, the EU can strengthen its position in the global south, positioning itself as a more reliable and future-oriented partner for the “world majority” compared to Russia.