The Euros interviews Jose Ignacio Torreblanca:
This is the 4th time Spain will hold the six-month
rotating Council Presidency. If, compared to 1989, 1995 and 2002, what can we
expect to be the 2010 Presidency’s main characteristics?
J.I. Torreblanca: The three previous
presidencies took place in very favourable European contexts. In 1989, the
surprised the other member states by an efficient and well run Presidency. In
1995, Spain had already
revealed itself as a key country in pushing for more EU integration: from the
Mediterranean Policy to the new Transatlantic relation or the cohesion and
citizenship policies, Spain
earned a good reputation. And in 2002, despite all the odds, which pitched Spain against the candidate countries of Central
and Eastern Europe in the fight for the EU budget, Spain managed to close the most
delicate chapters of the enlargement negotiations without trouble. Now, with an
employment devastated country and with France
and Germany adopting
different strategies for getting out of the economic crisis, Spain will have
quite a lot of trouble in getting results. So, despite the will to make the
crisis the goal of the Presidency, the odds for success are quite dim.
If compared to González and Aznar, how can Zapatero’s
Europeanism be defined? Is it a typical “socialist Europeanism” based on the
idea that what is good for Europe is good for Spain?
J.I. Torreblanca: Yes, still very much for a
good number of Spaniards, Europe is instinctively good for Spain. Compared
to González and Zapatero, Aznar was much more assertive when defending national
interests. But González was ideologically more liberal and closer to the centre
of European politics than Zapatero, who is more isolated in economic and
ideological terms in Europe, thus making his
life much more difficult.
The Spanish presidency is happening at a crucial time: the
application of the Lisbon Treaty, the economic
crisis, the failure of Copenhagen,
etc. Is it well prepared to cope with these challenges in terms of economic
resources and adequate planning?
J.I. Torreblanca: I’d say the administrative and
diplomatic machinery is well trained and used to deal with Europe,
so I expect no surprises. The political level can however be more problematic
due to the lack of sufficient coordination among different bodies and
Ministries. The debate on whether to introduce sanctions in the renewed Lisbon
Agenda has been a bad start: the announcement took place in an informal press
conference and the other EU governments were caught by surprise. Zapatero first
backed up and then reaffirmed his proposals.
So you wouldn’t attribute the “Mr Bean” issue in the
Presidency’s official website to a lack of adequate preparation?
J.I. Torreblanca: Sincerely, I do not know
enough about Internet security to tell the difference between a website which a
12 year old can hack and a professional assault. This is the key question and
so far I have not seen any credible answer to it.
Would you consider that Spanish priorities for the
Presidency are well defined and that they can be considered feasible
J.I. Torreblanca: The goals dealing with the
Lisbon Treaty, the economic crisis and Europe
in the world are clear and feasible. I am more how skeptic about the innovation
and citizens’ dimension, which reflect more domestic political priorities than
well thought through policies and goals at the European level.
Regarding the institutional context where they will have
to be implemented: If Europe was difficult to understand for average citizens,
the “multiplication of Presidents” as foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty doesn’t make it easier. How
manage these changes and what role is it willing to take?
J.I. Torreblanca: I am not quite sure. On the
one hand, Zapatero European instincts have led him to naturally accept Van
Rompuy’s leadership. Zapatero does not want to appear as a problem and the
obstacle to the Lisbon Treaty which Spain so badly has fought for. On
the other hand, it is hard to ask Zapatero, badly damaged at home because of
the economic crisis, not to have any protagonism and to renounce to cash in the
political visibility and benefits associated with the Presidency.
So, can we still expect Zapatero, as he has promised, to
let the new President Van Rompuy and the High Representative Ashton take the
lead? Would this be in contradiction with Spain’s extensive agenda and the
many Council meetings it has scheduled?
J.I. Torreblanca: Due to the uncertainty
associated with the Lisbon Treaty, Spain had to plan for a standard
Presidency. The amount of meetings seems standard, including the international
summits. The problem now is who is going to chair some of these meetings and
who the content is to be coordinated between Spain’s foreign Minister, in
charge of the GAC and COREPER, and Ashton, dealing with the new Foreign Policy
Council and the COPS.
Certainly, the new institutional set-up demands a lot of
“consensus” or “institutional balance”. Can this imperative harm the European
aim to have a decisive international role? Could it make it appear even less
democratic in the eyes of the average citizen?
J.I. Torreblanca: Consensus and institutional
balance is the way the EU works. The costs are evident, but the alternative is
not clear to me. In the context of the EU, “democratic” can only mean that
there is consensus, balance, but, overall, transparency. This is often the
problem: that citizens do not know who decided what, when and how.
priorities for Europe in the world: will these six months be a good occasion to
re-launch the relationship with Latin America and the Mediterranean?
J.I. Torreblanca: I doubt it. These two regions
lack internal cohesion, and the EU has already exhausted all its instruments.
Some countries in these regions are persuaded by the EU and have moved quite
fast; others are quite skeptical. Probably the EU can offer more to the already
-convinced. But is it willing to? And no matter what the EU offers, it can
hardly change the reluctants’ view.
On internal priorities: as you pointed out, some aspects
of the Spanish agenda for the Presidency are very much related to domestic
politics issues (reduction of unemployment, terrorism, gender violence, etc).
How can Zapatero capitalise on these 6 months for domestic purposes?
J.I. Torreblanca: Spain will not see light at the end
of the economic crisis until late this year: even then, it might get positive growth
levels but employment will very slowly rise, and only in association to
external demand (i.e. Franco-German economic recovery). Zapatero’s approval
rate has suffered heavily because of the crisis, and his 2011 budget may well
lead to severe expenditure cuts to contain soaring deficits and public
expenditures. In this adverse context, any political capital is welcomed, and
both the Spanish Presidency and the Obama factor are to play a role. A
successful Presidency will help the government buy time and get much needed
If you could give an advice to the Spanish Presidency for
these six months, what would it be?
cool! And if necessary, be boring. It may be a sign of efficiency.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of its individual authors.