The Rostov summit
Russian and EU leaders will gather in Rostov-on-Don for their bi-annual summit on 31 May ? 1 June. The geographical symbolism is not good: Rostov is only a few kilometres from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The political mood leading up to the summit seems a little better.
The EU and Russia are gathering for their bi-annual
summit in Rostov-on-Don on 31 May-1 June. The geographical symbolism is not
good. Rostov is close to Russia’s troubled North Caucasus, as well as to Sochi
where Russia will host the Winter Olympics in 2014, only a few kilometres from
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the other hand, the political mood-music before
the summit is much better. The last summit in Stockholm in November arrested
the deterioration in relations since the war in Georgia in 2008; now the main
theme for the summit is set to be a ‘partnership for modernisation’.
EU Member States are closer together on Russia than
they have been for a long time. Germany and France were always in favour of a
new partnership. The Polish-Russian rapprochement is gathering pace. The Baltic
States, led by Lithuania’s new President, are newly pragmatic, given their
pressing economic problems. Sweden has dropped its objections to Nordstream;
the UK continues to push the Litvinenko affair, but with little hope of progress.
Southern European states eye expanding business opportunities to aid their
troubled economies. That leaves nearly all the main Member States in favour of
a ‘reset’ of relations.
Russia, on the other hand, was already hard-hit by the
global economic crisis, but also finds its basic energy export model challenged
by the rise of LNG and shale gas. The ‘reset’ with the US and more locally with
Ukraine have decreased Russia’s traditional fears of the West undermining its
‘near abroad’, leaving it freer to look further afield. Russia’s internal
debate on ‘modernisation’ is becoming more substantive. Prolonging the life of
the Putin Model is still the Kremlin’s priority, but, as the global economic
crisis puts the domestic social contract under increasing strain, a
rapprochement with the West is
increasingly seen as a potential bolster for the regime rather than a threat.
But the EU
should follow four key principles to get the new ‘partnership’ right. First,
the recently leaked letter by Foreign Minister Lavrov talks of Russia creating separate
‘alliances for modernisation’ with no less than fourteen EU Member States. In order
to avoid duplication, the relationship would be best handled at the Commission
level. Second, the new Partnership cannot simply replace existing agreements.
Russia hasn’t delivered on everything it has already promised, and the new
relationship should not simply allow it to cherry-pick whatever it wants from
the EU. Third, the Partnership must not be a lofty statement of general principles,
but offer concrete benefits for both sides. For the EU that should be an improved
investment climate, a stronger rule of law and Russian progress towards the
WTO. Fourth, in order to maintain internal EU unity, progress with Russia
should be balanced with progress with Eastern Europe. Too obvious a quid pro
quo will undermine basic conditionality principles, but, if for example Russia
is offered a road-map towards visa-free Ukraine should be offered the prospect
too. Neither state should get it for free. Russia should abolish
the obligatory registration process for foreigners, Ukraine should toughen up
its borders and make progress on biometric passports.
Russia, however, also thinks the EU is preoccupied by
the Euro crisis. The summit is a good opportunity to show that the EU’s powers
of attraction are still strong.
Read this piece in Spanish on the ECFR, FRIDE & Foreign Policy Español “Shadow Presidency blog”.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.