The ongoing discussion of Europe's leaders on how to handle the refugee crisis in Europe should not only put a spotlight on weaknesses in the European asylum system, and the fragility of freedom of movement across the EU when trust between neighbours breaks down. It should also trigger a renewed political focus on finding adequate foreign policy responses to the origins of the crisis.
But investing diplomatic energy in the conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa which are contributing significantly to the recent surge in arrivals in Europe should not mean kneejerk reactions with little chance of long term success. Europe’s scope to shape events in the region has limits, and lies largely in diplomatic co-operation with regional actors and focusing aid and support on a number of countries which are affected, but not yet consumed by crisis, and have pivotal roles in ensuring that regional instability does not spread further.
Though it is welcome if the refugees arriving on Europe’s doorstep serve as a wake-up call that the regional fire emanating from Syria should not have been allowed to burn for so long, the laudable desire to do something should not be allowed to lead to unhelpful intervention at this point.
There are ten key home truths that Europe’s leaders need to pay attention:
1. Europe needs to step up with strong diplomacy in the search for a solution to the Syria conflict
As the recent nuclear deal with Iran has shown, European leaders are capable of putting in concerted effort, working with unfamiliar partners, and making compromises to achieve their goals.
However, on the Syrian crisis, there has been an insufficient attempt to come to a diplomatic solution. Strong European diplomacy is now likely to mean using multilateral formats which incorporate regional actors – and cooperation with Putin – to talk to Assad’s regime. There is no easy solution to the problem, and there may not be a palatable one, but Europe has to find the best possible one.
“In such a context of spiralling violence and the implausibility of intervention, it is becoming more urgent that ever to craft a political solution. While a political solution involving direct, unconditional talks with Assad understandably remains anathema to many, the reality is that the regime could stay in power for some time yet, while continuing to inflict more losses on its citizens. Although Assad is politically and economically weak, his demise could take many months or even years to unfold. If only from a humanitarian perspective, it is imperative to renew political alternatives.‘Syria: towards a political solution’ Julien Barnes-Dacey, March 2012
If the West wants to use real diplomacy to stop or slow the killing, it will need to make unpalatable compromises – in particular, accepting that Assad’s fate must be a question for the transition process; not a pre-condition or assumed outcome, and that Iran must play a role in the diplomatic process.”‘Syria, the imperative of de-escalation’, Julien Barnes-Dacey & Daniel Levy, May 2013
2. Europe and the US cannot and should not act alone: regional actors are central to any diplomatic solution
ECFR has pointed out the need to up Europe's diplomatic efforts not just with traditionally less friendly states but also with allies in the Gulf, notably Saudi Arabia, which has emerged as a key regional actor, including in Syria. Gulf states have emerged as central drivers of developments across the Middle East, deploying serious diplomatic, political, military and economic resources. While partly responding to legitimate concerns, Gulf policies are contributing to the cycle of conflict, state breakdown, terrorism and migratory flows.
“The hard reality is that the scope for Europe – and indeed the United States – to play a significant role in handling this growing threat, or managing other aspects of the chaos engulfing the Middle East, is and should remain limited. Developments are orchestrated from within the region, largely among the triangle of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Iran, and Turkey”‘The road back to European power’ , Susi Dennison, François Godement, Richard Gowan, Daniel Levy, Kadri Liik, Jeremy Shapiro, and Nick Witney, July 2015.
“European states need to develop a more coherent approach that cements important ties at the same time as addressing differences….Gulf states are unlikely to quickly moderate their contentious regional interventions. But Europe should try to encourage constructive shifts given the possibility that Gulf policies will hit a wall, while looking to create problem-solving openings between Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular.”‘Responding to an assertive Gulf’, Julien Barnes-Dacey, June 2015
3. Europe needs a post-Ukraine crisis strategy towards Russia
As is documented in our Foreign Policy Scorecards of 2013, 2014 and 2015, Europeans haven’t been able to find a way to convince Russia to act the way they wanted it to on Syria from the outset of the conflict. Europe’s relationship with Russia has changed dramatically since its annexation of Crimea.
As Mark Leonard and Ivan Krastev argued in ‘The New European Disorder’, Europe has misunderstood post-Soviet Russia, and has to find a new way to co-exist with this powerful neighbour. Our publications on issues as varied as the gas market in Ukraine and Russia’s smart tactics in the UN show how wide Putin’s reach is. In recent months, reports of Russia’s activities on the ground in Syria have made the adoption of a realistic policy towards Russia all the more urgent.
“Without pressure from Moscow, the regime will neither relent in its use of violence nor enter into a political process. Thus engaging with Russia may be the only way of halting the bloodshed and stopping Syria from falling into a deep and prolonged civil war. (…) Russia should be treated less as an obstacle and more as a channel of dialogue with forces around Assad. (…) To draw Russia on board, other diplomatic players, including Europe and the US, need to better understand its motivations. Moscow has voiced fear about the establishment of a precedent of Western intervention, whether direct or indirect, following NATO’s perceived disregard of the UN mandate on Libya. More broadly, in the context of President Putin’s own democratic deficit, joining forces with a Western-led initiative to empower popular protests against a longstanding ally is highly unattractive.”‘Syria: towards a political solution’ Julien Barnes-Dacey, March 2012
4. Europe needs to capitalise on the post-nuclear deal dynamics to intensify efforts with Iran to work towards diplomatic solutions to the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and to the threat of the Islamic State
The nuclear deal concluded with Iran earlier this year has been an all-too-rare foreign policy success story for European governments. Now, with relations between Iran and European nations thawing there is a real opportunity to engage more closely with Iran on issues of regional security.
As a key regional power invested, to a greater or lesser degree, in many of the conflicts that characterise today’s Middle East, Tehran some many of the keys that might unlock doors to potential diplomatic or political solutions. European policymakers should intensify efforts to explore how far Iranian cooperation can be secured, and at what cost.
“So far, Europeans have not sufficiently tested the possibility that Iran might be able to cause the Assad regime to change its behaviour in advance of a comprehensive political settlement. (…)One method would be to ascertain whether and how far Iran can provide the UN with humanitarian access into Syria by instructing Hezbollah forces and IRGC personnel on the ground to allow deliveries through. Europeans would like to see Tehran exerting pressure on Damascus to halt the use of barrel bombings and other egregious methods being used by the regime in civilian-populated areas. As part of exploratory dialogue on the broader political arrangement in Syria, Iran could perhaps be persuaded to narrow its goals to focus on maintaining strategic access routes into Lebanon and protecting Shia shrines and Alawite areas as a way of reducing sectarian tensions with Sunnis.” ‘Engaging with Iran: a European agenda’ Ellie Geranmayeh, July 2015
5. There needs to be more attention to the Libyan conflict and the enabling role it plays as a transit country
Libyan coastal cities have turned into major hubs for refugees and economic migrants from Syria, Eritrea, and sub-Saharan countries, and, crucially, the trafficking industry which preys upon them. Those who attempt to cross the sea to go to Europe face a dangerous route which has claimed many lives.
At the same time, the situation in the country itself is steadily deteriorating. As our mapping project on Libya’s factions shows, the turmoil in the country has many facets. In order to have an impact on people smuggling, Libya will need both continued European support for UN negotiations for a national ceasefire and new work to support local ceasefires in some of the areas most affected by trafficking, as we argued in August.
“Human trafficking is just one component of the mix between illegality, smuggling, and Jihadism that thrives in what could be defined as the “insecurity belt” stretching from the Sahel to the Sinai, with its central tier in Libya’s southern porous borders. This includes the smuggling of weapons and establishment of training camps for Jihadis across the belt but often with an origin or a foothold within Libya’s borders. Ultimately, Europeans cannot afford to have a failed state, both crucial to their energy security and to stemming illegal trafficking, 350km south of Malta and the Italian island of Lampedusa.
“At the same time, a Libya on the right track could be an asset for Europe and for its efforts in the region. First, because it could take in immigrants from Tunisia, Egypt, and sub Saharan Africa. Second, for its financial potential as a country with a small population and high oil revenues. Moreover, Europeans who supported Operation Unified Protector in 2011 did so in the name of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This includes also a responsibility to rebuild Libya and to make sure its transition gets on track. It is not only about moral commitments; it is a crucial component of Europe’s credibility when dealing with other scenarios in which R2P is at stake.” ‘A European agenda to support Libya’s transition’, Mattia Toaldo, May 2014
6. Europe should focus attention and aid on a few key countries not yet consumed by crisis
A post-financial crisis Europe, divided in its priorities, and finding it harder to justify increasing the levels of overseas aid and resources to diplomacy, should focus its attention on the countries where it has influence and which are important for regional stability.
“We should recognise that our aid and assistance, while still necessary in many cases, will buy less, especially with the Gulf showering billions on pet projects (for example, $23 billion in Gulf aid to Egypt in the 18 months after President Mohamed Morsi’s ouster). We should therefore be more selective in where we deploy our limited largesse – continued subsidising of the Israel/Palestine status quo via Palestinian Authority funding might be a good place to draw a line. We might seek to add value in this complex region by focusing our support on the countries – including Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia – that are not yet engulfed by crisis but are under severe pressure from it. ”‘The road back to European power’, Susi Dennison, François Godement, Richard Gowan, Daniel Levy, Kadri Liik, Jeremy Shapiro, and Nick Witney
7. The impact on the Western Balkans should not be ignored
The Western Balkans, the source of the last big refugee flow in Europe in the 1990s, are now the transit area for refugees making their way through Turkey to the EU. For a region that, as we explained in Scorecard 2015, has been deteriorating slowly while promises of EU membership have been put on ice, this could be a dangerously destabilising factor.
“Even in the midst of its own internal crisis and the worsening global crises from Ukraine to Iraq, Europe can ill afford to neglect the one region in which the EU has assumed full leadership as a foreign and security policy actor. It was the Balkans’ 1990s dramas that provided the catalyst for the idea of an EU with security responsibilities.”‘Europe must not ignore the Western Balkans’, Francisco de Borja Lasheras, September 2014
8. EU needs more structured diplomacy towards Turkey which takes account of the shifting regional picture.
Due to its size, location, and ties with both the EU and Middle Eastern countries, Turkey is a key country in the fight for regional stability. It was one of the last countries to cut ties with Assad, and one of the first countries to pursue military action within Syria. Hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees have left their country through Turkey with many staying there; hundreds of foreign fighters have joined ISIS and other groups via Turkey. Domestic tensions are running high ahead of the Turkish elections, fuelled by the impact of the refugee crisis, and recent escalation in government- PKK fighting. However, coordinated EU policy toward the country has been lacking, including a serious attempt to find a solution for the conflict between Turkey and the PKK.
“The shifting regional order should push the EU and Turkey to build on some tentative steps towards greater co-operation such as the dialogue between the Turkish foreign ministry and the EEAS. But the crisis in Syria – until recently a good friend of Turkey – and the intensified Turko–Iranian rivalry have mostly led to a rapprochement with the US rather than the EU.”‘Scorecard 2012’
“Turkey’s neighbourhood is in chaos. Ankara and Europe are faced with crises both to the south and to the east, but cooperation has been limited. There was no effort by the EU to consult Turkey along the way, and Turkey did not sign up to a majority of the EU’s foreign policy positions.”‘Scorecard 2015’
“Europe should regard Turkish policy towards the PKK as a matter that directly affects its own interests in the region, including the aim of pulling together a coordinated and effective fight against IS. Europe should therefore devote considerable diplomatic attention to supporting the revival of the Turkey–PKK peace process.”‘Turkey, the Kurds, and the fight against Islamic State’, Cale Salih, September 2015
9. Europe’s support to countries hosting refugees in the region needs to be increased and coordinated.
Opponents of more European support for the refugee crisis have pointed out that many of the refugees that are now finding their way into Europe have not come straight from war zones, but from relatively safe areas in neighbouring countries like Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. However, these countries have been dealing with incredible pressure on their own stability, hosting very large refugee populations while facing direct threats from a spillover of violence.
It was not realistic for the EU to think that the refugee problem would stay in the region, and it is now not realistic to do nothing to relieve the countries most affected. Some EU states, such as Czech Republic, Greeceand the UK, are pressing for redirection of international aid towards these host countries in the region while others are pushing for prioritisation of intra-European support for the countries hardest hit by inflows. The answer probably lies in a balance of both, but this needs to be coordinated rather than member states all acting independently.
“The financial burden of supporting the Syrian refugee population must be shared by all EU member states. While critical dialogue is needed on issues relating to internal reform, Europe should be fulsome in offering financial support to help the country deal with the consequences of a crisis for which it bears no responsibility and that appears likely to further deteriorate.”‘Jordanian tremors: elusive consensus, deepening discontent’, Julien Barnes-Dacey, November 2012
“Sitting in Europe’s immediate backyard, what happens in Lebanon should matter to European states. Any descent into violent conflict in Lebanon not only promises a humanitarian crisis, but also could signify a collapse into prolonged violence and radicalism at a moment of deep regional uncertainty.”‘Lebanon: containing spillover from Syria’, Julien Barnes-Dacey, September 2012
“Aid levels for the overwhelming refugee crisis in the Middle East have rightly been high, but a willingness to resettle significant numbers of those whose lives have been destroyed in the wider Syrian conflict would make a real difference.”‘Scorecard 2015’
10. Europe must remember its commitment to conflict prevention and management.
Many Europeans feel – rightly, in our view – that further Western military intervention in the Syrian conflict would, in current circumstances, be likely to do more harm than good. But elsewhere on Europe's periphery, notably the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, the UN and African Union are struggling to douse the flames of conflict and badly need more European help.
Most member states have become lukewarm at best about the EU's role as a security provider. But unless Europeans contribute, including militarily, to preserving or restoring stability where they can, they should not be surprised if desperate people try to move to Europe.
“Unless the EU rediscovers a willingness to bear the costs and risks of military operations to control conflicts, Europe can expect ever-intensifying refugee pressure on its southern borders. Although military force will not help in Ukraine or the turmoil of the Middle East, the EU could make a big difference if it were prepared to do more in crisis-management in Africa.” ‘Why Europe must stop outsourcing its security’, Richard Gowan and Nick Witney, December 2014
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
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