Cast no shadow: How the EU can advance the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process

The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, initiated in 2011 under the stewardship of the European Union, is one of Europe’s most complex and enduring diplomatic negotiations. It seeks to normalise relations between Serbia (which does not recognise Kosovo’s independence) and Kosovo (which declared independence in 2008 after breaking away from Serbia). But Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022 prompted the EU to make a more concerted effort to push for peace and stability in the Western Balkans, amid fears that Russia could impart its geopolitical influence in Serbia and further destabilise European relations. The bloc should now focus on moving the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue beyond its current impasse and mitigating Russian regional influence in the process.

At the heart of the Kosovo-Serbia dispute is Serbia’s refusal to recognise Kosovo as an independent state. While some incremental steps towards normalisation are possible without resolving the issue of sovereignty, it remains the most significant hurdle. The latest proposal tabled by EU special representatives, the Basic Agreement on Normalising Relations between Belgrade and Pristina, is therefore centred on improving bilateral affinity without directly addressing Kosovo’s independence. Amid political developments following the recent European parliamentary election, major EU member states such as France and Germany, as well as the current United States administration, continue to support the EU-facilitated discourse. Additionally, a new potential EU special representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue will be appointed in January 2025, to replace incumbent Miroslav Lajcak – the change could see a renewed momentum towards finding a lasting solution.

But the level of trust among parties is at an all-time low. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the EU-led dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia has suffered several setbacks due to disagreements on the vision of a sustainable solution for the Serb community in Kosovo, especially in the country’s north. Now it seems that Serbia is unlikely to officially recognise Kosovo in the near future – not only due to domestic political pressures, but also because of influence from its key UN Security Council ally, Russia. The threat of an unchecked Russia spreading its malign geopolitical influence throughout Serbia and the region had, along with the country’s actions in Ukraine, led to a new EU-led diplomatic effort which culminated in  the second Brussels Basic Agreement endorsed by the parties in February and March 2023.

Despite the initial enthusiasm, relations have quickly soured. The parties have not signed the agreement, with hopes for any timely implementations stalling as a result. Kosovo’s leaders are hesitating to apply one of its key facets, the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM), through fears of not achieving the desired outcome (in which Kosovo achieves full integration of its northern territories and mutual recognition from Serbia). But Serbia wants the opposite: and if it sees no will from Kosovo to implement the ASM from the outset, then it is unlikely that the rest of the Basic Agreement will succeed.

At a national level, Kosovo and Serbia remain intransigent in their stances; neither seem equipped to move towards the normalisation of bilateral relations. Structural problems continue to hinder the implementation of diplomatic agreements, including the latest EU proposal. While Kosovo claims to accept the Basic Agreement in its entirety, Serbia’s main objections, as stipulated in the letter sent by its ex-prime minister Ana Brnabic to the EU in 2023, are “the de facto and de jure recognition of Kosovo.” Similarly, the Kosovar leadership fears that once Serbia “gets what it wants” – namely, implementation of the ASM – it will forgo the normalisation of relations with Kosovo. Pristina is uneasy: it wants to prevent Kosovo lagging in, or being blocked from, strengthening its statehood and gaining further international recognition. As a result of these differences, the asymmetry between the two countries continues to grow.

Observers[1] believe that governments in both Kosovo and Serbia are waiting for more stable European and US political conditions to be established, which may be more conducive to each of their preferences. Serbia wants the return of Donald Trump: he would push for the land swap and take back the north of Kosovo into Serbian control. On the other hand, Kosovars want the consensus of the Biden administration to continue as it seems more able to provide the region with the security it needs. Regardless, the EU is determined to continue to push for the implementation of the Basic Agreement, with the prevailing thinking that the parties lack the necessary political will to normalise relations. This is despite the EU so far being unable – and unwilling – to offer the parties the prospect of EU membership. Furthermore, for now the EU treats Kosovo as ‘status neutral’ due five member states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Spain) not recognising the country as independent. Not only does this categorisation hinder Kosovo’s ascension prospects, but it provides Serbia with an impetus to work with the ‘non-recognisers’ to maintain the status quo.

The EU needs to develop a workable dialogue process to normalise relations and foster mutual recognition. On the side of Kosovo and Serbia, several issues need urgent attention

As such, the EU needs to develop a workable dialogue process to normalise relations and foster mutual recognition. At the same time, on the side of Kosovo and Serbia, several issues need urgent attention.

First, to create conducive conditions for sustainable peace, the EU, Kosovo, and the US must take practical steps to improve the security situation on the ground in a way which appeases the local Serb population. Recent conflict and incident has marred the security situation in Kosovo – especially in the Serb-heavy north – sometimes resulting in fatalities. As a result, the NATO-led international peacekeeping Kosovo Force (KFOR) has strengthened its presence: together with other Kosovo security institutions, it aims to provide a safer domestic environment. Nonetheless, the situation remains fragile, with the local Serb population viewing the presence of Kosovo police in the country’s north as forceful integration. While developing and maintaining an effective security environment is crucial, Kosovo institutions must also ensure not to come across as punitive to prevent the alienation of the region’s Serb community. Moreover, the security situation in and around the country’s north should improve once Belgrade starts delivering on accountability for the Banjska attack.

Second, the successful integration of Kosovo Serbs is crucial for the normalisation of inter-community relations in Kosovo, which could be achieved via free and fair elections. In April, however, a lack of Serb participation meant local elections failed. This had negative repercussions on Kosovo’s northern community, which would benefit from self-managed integration to alleviate the impact of hostile external actors such as Russia. Kosovo’s political institutions should provide a democratic election process while the Serbian government should refrain from pressuring the Serb community in Kosovo into non-participation at the ballot box. Furthermore, the withdrawal of Serbs from Kosovo institutions in November 2022 in protest at the supposed breaching of EU-mediated agreements created a vacuum in local Kosovo institutions, including the judiciary and the police. It is paramount that Serbs return to these positions to secure future integration – which will only be successful without malign influence from Belgrade.

Last, without tangible EU enlargement benefits, both countries will remain on opposing sides. EU ascension is an important motivation in order for each country to understand the other’s perspective. The EU should therefore reassess what kind of solution to the Kosovo-Serbia dispute might pave the way for an easier ascension track: with this in the pipeline, a concerted effort to improve bilateral dialogue might be undertaken with the promise of reaching a common goal. Should the EU make the promise of membership more tangible, this could incentivise both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the various agreements previously impeded by structural obstacles. But for the EU to be credible in its offer to Kosovo, it first needs to develop a joint understanding among member states regarding how to treat Kosovo’s statehood – and to offer Kosovo EU candidate status.

While the EU remains committed to facilitation and mediation, the deep-rooted nature of the conflict, as well as nationalist politics and international rivalry, means the future of Kosovo-Serbia dialogue is fraught with challenges. Incremental progress on technical issues such as Kosovo-issued car registration plates, ID cards, and diplomas, is likely to continue: but without a resolution of the non-recognition issue, the dialogue may remain incomplete. For lasting regional stability, both countries will need to make difficult compromises. But the EU and the US could help Kosovo strengthen its rule of law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity in the north and push for deeper integration of its Serb community. The coming months and years will be crucial in determining whether the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue can lead to a durable solution; or whether the conflict will continue to cast a shadow over the Western Balkans.

---

[1] As a result of the author’s own research in Kosovo and Serbia