Breaking free: Why ending Russian gas transit via Ukraine strengthens EU energy security

On 1 January 2025, an agreement between Russia and Ukraine which had allowed the transit of Russian gas through the Ukrainian pipeline network to customers in the European Union and Moldova (including Transnistria) came to an end.

Authorities in Kyiv have consistently reiterated that they have no intention of concluding a new agreement with Russia on gas transit through their territory. Nor has Ukraine implemented an alternate option, in which Azerbaijan could be an intermediary in the supply of gas through Ukraine to European customers. Kyiv’s decision provoked criticism and alarmist statements from governments in Slovakia and Hungary; it also poses challenges to Moldova’s energy supplies.

The EU and its member states need to detangle themselves from reliance on Russian gas imports and strive to become independent in the face of potential future energy insecurity

In reality, Ukraine preventing the transit of Russian gas through its territory is no threat to EU energy security. But the bloc should not be complacent. The EU and its member states need to detangle themselves from reliance on Russian gas imports and strive to become independent in the face of potential future energy insecurity.

Going external

Countries which have imported Russian gas via Ukraine in recent months, primarily Slovakia and Austria, are well-prepared for the suspension of transit. Although Slovakian prime minister Robert Fico had warned that Ukraine pulling the gas transit route would constitute a “gas crisis”, data from January 2025 instead demonstrate that Austria and Slovakia smoothly switched to sourcing gas via alternative routes.

For example, Slovakia has concluded gas supply agreements with, among others, Polish company Orlen, and energy companies such as BP, Eni, Exxon Mobil, RWE, and Shell. Austria, which in December 2023 was still sourcing 98% of its gas from Russia, has also secured supplies from Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Austria and Slovakia also had levels of stored gas exceeding 75% in both countries at the end of 2024.

The Kyiv authorities were likely motivated by preventing Russia from making more money from the gas which transits through Ukrainian territory: the value of gas shipped to Ukraine and sold to EU customers was around $6.5 billion annually.

Furthermore, Slovakia has gained income from the transit of Russian gas to other EU countries, as well as by selling the surplus gas imports which exceed its domestic needs to other EU countries. According to EuroNews, Slovakia’s total annual earnings in transit fees—which could also include gas trading—are estimated at €500m. As such, Ukraine is countering the narratives from Slovakia and Hungary that suspending gas transit is a threat to EU. Instead, Kyiv argues that Slovakia’s position is driven by its worries over economic losses from a lack of transit fees and lower amounts of Russian gas trading. In terms of overall energy security, the EU has nothing to fear.

(Not) in the mix

Furthermore, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the importance of Russian gas in the EU’s energy mix has declined significantly. Around 16.5 billion cubic metres (bcm) of Russian gas flowed through Ukraine in 2024, of which the EU received 14.5bcm—representing less than 6% of total EU gas imports for that year.[1] This is in contrast to the previous significant transit volumes through Ukraine, for example 136bcm in 2005 and 93bcm in 2017.

Russia’s decision to cut and suspend supplies to EU customers in 2022 led to Gazprom’s share of EU gas imports falling from over 40% in 2021 to just over 11% in 2024. Of the four pre-war gas pipelines linking Russia to Europe, only one line from the TurkStream pipeline is still used to supply Russian gas to European customers (mainly Hungary and Serbia). In total, around 15bcm of gas flowed to Europe via this line in 2024.

But Ukraine’s suspension of Russian gas transit is having little effect. Most EU countries that were among the major consumers of Russian gas, such as Germany, Italy, and Poland, have found alternative gas suppliers and concluded long-term supply contracts with American companies, Qatar, or other liquified natural gas (LNG) producers. To cement this position, the EU aims to uphold its REPower programme target of abandoning supplies of fossil fuels from Russia by 2027.

Pursuit of further energy independence from Russia is also part of the Polish presidency of the Council of the EU, which has only just begun.

Securing energy security

But while EU countries have made significant progress in reducing their dependence on pipeline gas supplies from Russia—and most have a clear desire to continue on this trajectory—Russian LNG imports to the EU grew from 13.3bcm in 2021 to over 21bcm in 2024. It now comprises over 7% of the share of total EU gas imports. Although Russia has so far not weaponised LNG supplies, with no disruptions to date, this might change in the coming years.

There are several steps the EU could take to realise its energy independence goals. First, the bloc is well-placed to utilise common trade policy instruments—such as increased tariffs on LNG or pipeline gas imports—to limit persistent fossil fuel imports from Russia. This could reduce the volume of gas imports from Russia and, at the same time, reduce Russia to EU gas sales revenue. According to CREA calculations, from 1 January 2023 to 5 January 2025 this amounted to almost €36bn.

Second, in the absence of any prospect of an agreement on sanctions on Russian pipeline gas or LNG imports to the EU, its member states and institutions should focus on implementing sanctions adopted so far on the Russian LNG sector. This could include the June 2024 ban on the provision of reloading services of Russian LNG on EU territory for transhipment operations en route to third countries; and the ban on new investments in ongoing LNG projects in Russia.

Third, EU member states should strengthen cooperation on the joint purchase of gas using EU-wide mechanisms, such as the Energy Platform, and bilateral or multilateral agreements. This cooperation, which aims to reduce gas imports from Russia, would see countries share information related to their energy needs in the mid- to long-term and aggregate demand in order to avoid oversupply in the EU.

Such collaboration could then lead to a direct increase imports from other sources including Africa, the Middle East, Norway, and the US, all of which will see a significant increase in export capacity in the coming years. At the same time, the agreements should increase the use of existing LNG import infrastructure, which is still below the maximum available regasification capacity across the EU.

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The EU has already achieved significant successes on the road to independence from Russian gas. As such, the suspension of Russian gas transit through Ukraine had no major impact on EU energy security.

However, EU countries should continue to work towards full independence from Russian gas supplies, including LNG, in order to completely reduce their energy cooperation with Russia. Member states should focus on strengthening their partnerships with reliable energy suppliers, and ideally with other countries which can also contribute to the process of energy transition in the EU.

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[1] Argus Agency data.