Beyond deterrence: How Zelensky’s victory plan can live up to its name
Ukraine’s victory plan can only move beyond being a deterrence strategy with less prevarication from Europeans. But Kyiv will also need to adapt to the realities of fluctuating Western support
Since Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky unveiled his victory plan earlier this month, the situation for Kyiv has only worsened. Moscow has intensified its attacks and Zelensky has yet again asked the West for more support. The nearing possibility of a second Trump term, meanwhile, means these pleas could soon fall on even deafer ears.
Yet Zelensky’s plan – which emphasises that Ukraine’s victory hinges on the support of its partners and that Ukraine will not accept territorial concessions in exchange for peace – does not quite account for these realities. Rather, it overlooks some significant hurdles to victory, most notably, wavering Western support. To clear them, Ukrainian and European leaders will need to quickly adapt their approach.
Deterrence and dependence
Contrary to its name, the plan does not focus on securing a comprehensive victory, but rather on how to deter further Russian advancement. The first three of the plan’s five pillars will come as no surprise to Western observers: an immediate invitation to join NATO; permission to use long-range weapons on all occupied Ukrainian territories by Russia and on military targets on Russian soil to bring the fight within its borders; and deploying a non-nuclear deterrence package within Ukraine.[1]
In the short-term, therefore, the plan would see Ukraine remain heavily dependent on sustained military and economic aid from Western partners. But with waning public support and political shifts in some Western nations, maintaining this aid could prove difficult. If the West continues its “enough not to lose but not enough to win” policy, discussions in Kyiv will stay focused on deterrence not victory. The plan also doesn’t address Western fears of Russian escalation. Proposals such as bringing the war to Russian territory with long-range strikes using allies’ weapons, for example, are not supported in the Western capitals for this reason.
And while Zelensky stresses NATO integration, the uncertainty and timeline for Ukraine’s actual membership could leave the country vulnerable in the interim. Even after the invitation to join the alliance, it could take up to two years for Ukraine to become a member, as was the case with Sweden and Finland. It therefore seems vital thatEuropean members intensify diplomatic pressure to fast-track Ukraine’s accession or at least provide enforced security guarantees and not just bilateral agreements during the interim.
The plan also overlooks the challenges in reclaiming the occupied territories. While Ukraine’s deterrence strategy is critical, the lack of a robust offensive strategy risks prolonging the war and leave Ukrainians living under occupation for an uncertain period.
But even without a clear path to victory, the latter part of Zelensky’s plan takes a bolder look at a post-conflict Ukraine. The fourth pillar focuses on Ukraine’s economic potential, including the country’s vast reserves of natural mineral resources, such as uranium, titanium, and lithium, which could be developed in partnership with the European Union and United States. But he stressed that without proper support, these resources could instead fall into Russian hands. Finally, the plan proposes that Ukraine’s battle-hardened military could play a critical role in Europe’s future security. With Ukraine’s experience in modern warfare, after the war its forces could take over some responsibilities currently held by US military forces in Europe. This would strengthen NATO’s capabilities while ensuring that Ukraine remains a key player in European security architecture, solidifying its place within the alliance. However, these innovative plans could go to waste without stronger support for Ukrainian soldiers currently on the ground.
Beyond the West
Zelensky’s plan rests on the fundamental premise that Ukraine cannot win this war alone. But with the US presidential election just days away, the country faces the potential loss one of its key partners, the US, while already grappling with manpower shortages and limited resources.
To mitigate at least some of this loss, Kyiv should more actively diversify its diplomatic outreach beyond the West, where anti-colonial sentiment and openness towards Russia are common. Building stronger ties with countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America can counter Russia’s narrative and gain diplomatic support in international forums. By continuing to present Ukraine’s struggle as for territorial sovereignty and against Russian imperialism, and by offering economic partnerships (for example, in critical raw materials), Ukraine could attract more support. This broader coalition could reduce Ukraine’s reliance on Western aid, making its victory plan more sustainable.
In turn, Europeans should begin adequately addressing their own security realities. In his speech, Zelensky reiterated that the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine carries significant implications for the continent. If Russia retains the occupied territories, it will not only mark a failure for Ukraine but will destabilise countries across Europe, threatening the Baltic States, Poland, and other eastern European countries. And yet Europeans seem to have missed the wake-up call and have become too comfortable with US leadership, even on threats to their own security.
European governments should therefore increase their support to Ukraine to maintain their own security, despite potential public and political resistance to doing so. This commitment should go beyond providing more weapons and financial aid but also stepping into leadership roles that may have been previously led by the US. European countries need to coordinate more effectively on sanctions, ensuring that the pressure on Russia remains high, while offering Ukraine the financial support needed to stabilise its economy during and after the war. Anticipating potential reductions in the US support, European governments should expand their defence budgets and solidify lasting security agreements and economic partnerships with Ukraine. Ukraine has presented its victory plan. Now it’s high time for European governments to develop their own plan to ensure the future of European security. Through a combination of military, economic, and diplomatic support, Europe can help turn Ukraine’s deterrence plan into a feasible path towards victory, lasting peace, and security.
Zelensky’s plan calls for firm and, most importantly, timely action. The US election only adds to this urgency
If Russia succeeds and is allowed to redraw international borders by force, it will deeply undermine a cornerstone of post-second world war international security. This would set a dangerous precedent, encouraging similar aggressions elsewhere. Meanwhile, Ukraine is caught in a bind: arguing the need for more determined support for the use of force against Russia in the face of reluctance among its partners. Zelensky’s plan calls for firm and, most importantly, timely action. The US election only adds to this urgency. Whatever the result, Europeans must face the reality of taking the lead on their own security and all the challenges that will entail. Equally, Kyiv must also stare reality in the face and adapt to a future in which the unwavering support of its current partners is not a given.
[1] The plan also includes three classified annexes which have not been revealed to public
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
