Between two Donalds: How Tusk’s relationship with Trump could foster EU-US cooperation

When America’s then-president Donald Trump visited Poland in 2017, he enjoyed a warm reception. Warsaw’s residents remained true to their country’s historical allyship with the United States, lining the route of the presidential column to take photos and wave American flags.

The nationalist and conversative Law and Justice (PiS) party was then in power, and its relationship with Trump – particularly on defence and ideology – was more than friendly. Poland was spending 1.99 per cent of its GDP on defence, including on large amounts of US military equipment, with Trump comparing the country favourably to other NATO members he saw as not pulling their weight. Ideologically, the American president overlooked controversial PiS judicial reforms, which European Union member states were concerned could lead to the deterioration of democracy and the rule of law in Poland. Indeed, for Trump, such topics generally went unnoticed unless they directly affected American interests.

For its part, Poland remains among the most pro-American nations in the world – in 2023, according to the Pew Research Center, 93 per cent of Poles held “a favourable view” of the country. This is largely down to the countries’ alliance through various unrests in the twentieth century: for example, when Poland unwillingly became a USSR satellite state, the CIA supported the Solidarność trade union to operate effectively against the oppressive regime. Then, when the Cold War led to the dismantling of communist regimes in the eastern bloc, the US advocated for NATO’s expansion in central and eastern Europe to ensure countries like Poland would enhance regional stability and support the post-Cold War democratic transition.

As Poland’s foreign affairs minister Radoslaw Sikorski says, “It has also been thanks to security guarantees given by NATO that Poland could flourish. Without Poland’s joining NATO, its accession to the EU would not have been so prompt.”

This historical relationship – alongside continued security guarantees from the US – explains why the Polish people are generally unconcerned about whether there is a Republican or Democrat in the White House. Nevertheless, the 47th president is a wild card for eastern Europe: Trump has not condemned Russian president Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, instead appearing to admire his strong-man style; he has previously tried to blackmail Ukraine by withholding military assistance; and many of his advisors say he will pull the US out of NATO.

The current Polish government under centrist, Europhile prime minister Donald Tusk therefore has much riding on trying to convince Trump to maintain NATO’s ‘deterrence and defence’ posture through its military presence in the east. If Trump scales down America’s NATO commitment, its members face a growing threat from Russia – to which Poland is especially vulnerable due to its proximity and Russia’s imperial ambitions.

But Tusk holds his own wild card: the US president-elect also has a predilection for countries that spend their fair share on defence. Indeed Trump’s recent election campaign made it clear that he expects other NATO countries to take responsibility for their own defence. During his first presidency, he called on Europeans to heighten their defence spending. While Poland’s fulfilment of NATO ally commitments is driven by the requirements of a changing security environment rather than as a direct response to US calls for action, it remains NATO’s top spender on defence and is vociferous in its purchasing of American weaponry. In 2023, 35 per cent of Poland’s defence budget went to the US; by 2025, Poland will spend 4.7 per cent of its overall GDP on defence.

Furthermore, while Tusk lacks the same ideological kinship with the incoming Trump administration as his predecessor, Poland’s PiS-affiliated president Andrzej Duda will remain in power until spring 2025. And there are – despite political rivalry and opposing views on EU relations, social values, social policy, media freedom, and economic policy – three topics on which Tusk and Duda agree: supporting Ukraine, a disdain for Russia, and the need to collaborate with any American administration. Duda’s foreign policy competences, such as ratifying and terminating international agreements and attending NATO summits, means that the two Polish figureheads must be able to collaborate effectively if Tusk wants to open a dialogue with Trump.

But Tusk also retains strong relations with the EU and western European allies, such as the United Kingdom, France, the Baltics, and the Nordics, and desires a ‘European solution’ to the multiple crises facing the continent. This includes a Europe that doesn’t “outsource” its security to the US. With recent elections leaving France and Germany in a weaker domestic position, EU officials now expect Tusk to step up and provide this leadership[1] – for example, by Poland forging a minilateral EU coalition to minimise its vulnerability to Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy moves.

In this regard, Poland’s current role as America’s strategy ‘anchor’ towards Russia – its ability to deter Russian expansion into wider Europe and its role as the current golden child of NATO – means it is well-placed to negotiate on security protections and defence spending. Other western ally countries, such as France, the UK, and Italy, have more clout to bring topics including the Middle East, trade policy, and the climate, to the fore.

The beginning of the new European Commission, which coincides with Poland’s presidency of the EU council, also provides an excellent opportunity for deeper cooperation between the EU and the US. European defence and security – as well as joint EU spending – will no doubt feature prominently in the upcoming commission agenda.[2] But Poland is also an advocate of keeping the US involved in European security. It will call for further synergy between NATO and the EU; and the EU and the US. In this sense, the Polish government’s goal for the EU is a modified version of European ‘strategic autonomy’, which Sikorski has dubbed “strategic harmony.” The aim is not to remove the US as a European power, nor to replace NATO as the main provider of European security – rather, the Polish government will argue for extra defence money on top of NATO. And the US-Europe relationship will benefit: it is in America’s interest the country to retain its leading part in the alliance.

On the other hand, the Polish government will want to avoid putting all its eggs into one basket. While Trump was a strong ally to Poland during his first administrative term, his promise to end the war in Ukraine on his terms has changed the calculation. If Trump seeks to end the war in a way unfavourable to Ukraine, Russia could be tempted to seize more of its old Soviet territory. Russia’s potential successes in Ukraine might then encourage Putin to act aggressively, targeting Western countries and forcing a revision of the normalised European order. In December 2021, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs formulated a list of expected concessions from the US and NATO aimed at reversing the effects of NATO’s expansion into central Europe.

The worst possible outcome for Poland is if Trump agrees to Russian president Vladimir Putin’s demands that the US forgo any military activity in eastern Europe, including a decrease in the number of US troops in Poland[3]. As such, while Tusk has a clear interest in trying to convince Trump’s administration to continue with America’s previous foreign policy strategy, he is also determined to depend less on the US security guarantees. The Polish government will therefore try to keep the Americans onside while simultaneously encouraging the EU to consider how its member states can increase their support for Ukraine if the US pulls the plug while spending more on the defence of their own countries.

It is many years on from the Cold War; the US-Polish alliance has gone beyond security and historic ties to encompass energy cooperation, economic cooperation, and counteracting Chinese regional expansion. In this regard, the relationship’s foundations – Poland buying American, exceeding expectations on defence spending, and having a Trump ally in president Duda – are as dynamic and valid now as they always were. A crowd may have booed Trump’s former deputy national security advisor K.T. MacFarland when she visited Poland in 2023 and defended Trump’s actions on 6 January 2021, but she responded: “You may not like it, but Donald Trump loves Poland.”

Poland has done its homework in the areas that matter to Trump. As such, Duda extending the offer of a Poland visit to Trump means one Donald may well welcome the other with open arms

And MacFarland is right: Poland has done its homework in the areas that matter to Trump. As such, Duda extending the offer of a Poland visit to Trump means one Donald may well welcome the other with open arms.

But to ensure greater future stability, economic security, and strong border defence, Poland should use all the means at its disposal to modify Trump’s plans for a world order in which the US has a different involvement with Europe.

---

[1] From the author’s own research in Warsaw

[2] Based on meetings with Polish government officials

[3] Based on ECFR conversations with government officials