Between the lines: Monitoring Putin’s response to Ukraine’s long-range missiles

Problem

For many months, Ukrainian authorities had sought permission to use longer-range, Western-made strike missiles to hit targets deep inside Russian territory. On 17 November, Joe Biden acquiesced.

Now Biden’s decision has prompted another public debate about Russia’s red lines; and Vladimir Putin’s subsequent actions demonstrate how the expanded use of Western missiles is creating military dilemmas for Russia. His immediate response was to release a revised Russian nuclear doctrine, which only slightly expands on nuclear scenarios and marginally lowers the nuclear threshold. Russia then also used a new type of intermediate-range missile to attack the central Ukrainian city of Dnipro, a “test” for which the United States received a 30-minute warning.

The launch was clearly intended to demonstrate Russia’s capability to strike inside European territory, and Putin’s public and televised appearances were aimed at dramatising the launch of the (previously leaked) revised nuclear doctrine in order to play on Western fears. Overall, however, Putin’s reaction has been limited. His strategy is more concerned about being seen to “do something” – but in practice, he seems to have reluctantly swallowed America’s new policy.

Solution

Despite this seemingly muted reaction, however, European governments need to carefully interpret Putin’s underlying message – which again demonstrates that a Russian “red line” is proving to be not-quite-red – and base their own response on several pillars.

1. European countries and the United States should sustain and expand their military support to Ukraine. The conflict is in a critical phase: Russian attempts to seize a decisive advantage in the battlefield could precede ceasefire discussions. Assistance should therefore focus on enabling Ukraine to approach future talks in the strongest possible position, while altering Putin’s calculus.
   
2. European governments, as well as NATO and the European Union, should expose the live testing of “Oreshnik” as unnecessary and dangerous. This would also expose Russia’s use of nuclear rhetoric – at a time when nuclear deterrence requires the avoidance of confusion and miscalculation – as inappropriate and inflammatory. That the missile is prohibited under the (now-defunct) Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty only amplifies Putin’s problematic behaviour.
   
3. With this in mind, the West needs to develop a clear deterrence message which shows Putin that any use of nuclear weapons remains unacceptable.
   
4. NATO, the US, and European governments should also carefully manage escalation to avoid following Putin in his escalatory rhetoric.

Context

Biden’s decision to allow Kyiv to utilise Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs) is overdue and welcome. It ends a constraint that, far from having an international legal basis, was in place for fear of escalation. In practice, Ukraine was on the backfoot while Russia expanded its offensive along Ukraine’s border with the assistance of North Korean troops.

The move should help Ukraine counter the Russian army’s current offensive by threatening important military targets such as fuel and ammunition depots, and troop concentrations on Russian soil.

Furthermore, Biden’s decision releases any constraints on Britain or France supplying SCALP/Storm Shadow air-launched missiles, which could be effective when used alongside the ground-launched ATACMs. However, all the relevant weapon systems have a range of only a few hundred kilometres – for example, 300km for ATACMs – meaning they are incapable of striking too deep into Russian territory.

As such, America’s permission for Ukraine to strike Russian soil is not in itself a game-changer: but it remains militarily significant.