Behind the times: Waiting for the Polish Zeitenwende

After the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Germany and France both made profound changes to their Russia policy. Berlin’s new approach won the title of Zeitenwende—a “watershed moment”. It was instrumental to extensive European support for Kyiv.

In Poland, events appeared to vindicate Warsaw’s long-held distrust of Moscow, its insistence on the need to spend more on defence, and Polish advocacy of the security relationship with Washington and NATO.

But now, Poland’s strategic positioning is looking dangerously behind the times. Freshly back in power, Donald Trump repeats Moscow’s talking points about the war. He bypasses Ukraine and Europe and goes straight to Vladimir Putin, and refuses them a seat at the table. It is hard to pretend Europeans can still trust the United States when it comes to their security. Even the US role in NATO is now freighted with uncertainty.

Listen to Polish officials, however, and Warsaw sounds happy enough to keep calm and carry on. Radoslaw Sikorski, Poland’s foreign minister, said he felt “relieved” by the words of J.D. Vance in Munich—because at least the vice-president did not announce cuts to the American military presence in Europe.

But this is very likely just for show. Behind closed doors, Warsaw must be perfectly aware of the major challenges it and its European allies are facing. And yet, for the moment, Polish leaders refuse to recognise, explicitly, that the old transatlantic relationship is over; and that preparations are needed now for a new, more pragmatic and equitable relationship. They are still to demonstrate a greater appreciation for European, and not just US- or NATO-led, cooperation for the continent’s security. Unlike France and the United Kingdom, they have not shown readiness to send troops to Ukraine to keep the peace and prevent conflict returning.

A change in position by Poland on these questions would help build a more united European approach to the US, Russia and Ukraine. It would strengthen European claims to participate in negotiations. And, by exiting its strategic comfort zone, Warsaw—which currently presides over the Council of the EU—would demonstrate its rising regional profile and leadership credentials.

A change in position by Poland would help build a more united European approach to the US, Russia and Ukraine

One reason this is not happening is Poland’s particularly difficult location: just next to Ukraine, making up NATO’s eastern flank, and with a 650km border with Russia and Belarus. Its security would be much more exposed than France or the UK should European troops be sent to Ukraine. Poland would not perhaps exclude “boots on the ground” altogether; but it would need to know that it was a serious initiative, rather than a symbolic, face-saving act on the part of Ukraine’s European allies. Ultimately, Poland would need to be sure that Europe is ready to go to war with Russia.    

Warsaw must also be grappling with finding the right language to talk about the looming strategic recalibration, especially to its domestic audience. On the face of it, many Poles have already revised their perception of the US—most of them regard it as a “necessary partner” for the EU, rather than its “ally”, according to ECFR’s latest poll. Being seen to make a choice between America and Europe is likely not going to fly—decision-makers will, instead, need to show how they are adjusting to account for the role the US and the EU each now have to play on security. Get this delicate framing wrong, and it could poison any attempt to change policy.

Finally, there is the country’s high-stakes presidential election in May. The government might be hoping to insulate the campaign from the contentious matters of the future of transatlantic relations and the prospect of Polish troops in Ukraine. It may, justly, fear these issues would only work in the far-right’s favour. Many supporters of Law and Justice and Konfederacja still consider the US to be the EU’s “ally”; and both parties can claim close ideological alignment with the Trump administration.

But failing to address these questions directly carries two major risks. Domestically, such muted debate could explode unpredictably, and with redoubled force—putting the government on the defensive at the least convenient moment and giving political opponents the upper hand. And the fast pace of developments around any peace settlement between Ukraine and Russia makes them hard to ignore, especially given the closeness of the race. Meanwhile, a head-in-the sand approach could also meet with growing incomprehension, incredulity and distrust from Poland’s European partners, at a time when several capitals and the EU institutions are hurrying to synchronise their approaches to Trump 2.0.

Those European partners will need to be patient as they wait for the Polish Zeitenwende, recognising the complex realities that the Polish authorities are facing domestically—at least until May. But the government in Warsaw also needs to understand that it cannot bide its time forever. At stake is not just Poland’s reputation in Europe, but also its security, as well as Europeans’ collective capacity to build strategic leverage vis-à-vis Washington and Moscow. By May, it could already be too late.

Poland’s choice could make all the difference between a Europe able to stand up for itself—or a cacophonous Europe, pushed around by the playground bullies.