Avoiding the next front: Iraq’s fight to stay out of the Israel-Iran conflict

The cycle of escalation between Israel and Iran seems to have entered a cooling period as the two sides assess how US president-elect Donald Trump will approach the Middle East when he takes office in January. But neither this pause nor the uneasy ceasefire in Lebanon will soothe nerves in Baghdad that Iraq could find itself drawn into the widening war in the region.

Before the US election, Israeli intelligence claimed that Iran’s possible next attack on Israel could be launched by Iraqi Shia armed factions allied with Iran – an outcome that would invite retaliatory strikes on Iraq. Baghdad has dismissed these claims, but drone attacks from Iraq have targeted Israel in recent weeks. Rising US-Iranian tensions could see these Iranian-allied paramilitary groups launch a violent campaign against Israel – a close US ally.

With the failure to secure a ceasefire in Gaza, Europeans need to remain focused on preventing the conflict from spreading further. Iraq’s government and Shia religious leaders have been fundamental in preventing Iraqi Shia armed groups from launching attacks against US and Israeli interests over the past year. Given the considerable resources European governments have spent stabilising Iraq after waves of violence over the past two decades, they now need to support Iraq’s leadership and religious figures as they safeguard the country from renewed conflict.

Iraq’s balancing act

Iraq is no stranger to balancing tense relations between Iran – its largest neighbour with which it shares religious and cultural ties  – and the United States, an ally that helped Iraq defeat the Islamic State group. This dynamic has been exacerbated by the presence of both Iranian-backed paramilitaries and the US army on its territory for the past two decades. The US still has 2,500 troops stationed in Iraq. The Biden administration agreed to begin withdrawing them in 2025 and complete the process by 2026. Iran’s allies in Iraq view the removal of US troops as a top priority. This has been a longstanding goal for them, but it has become more urgent due to the US support for Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon. However, there are other Iraqi officials who may pragmatically see the US presence as a form of deterrence against Israeli attacks on Iraqi territory.

Iraq’s government and Shia leaders have pressed armed groups to hold fire and avoid entangling the country in a new cycle of conflict. Up until the expansion of the Israeli war into Lebanon last year, for example, Baghdad had successfully convinced the Iranian-backed armed groups, which make up the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, to pause their attacks on US military interests so as not to invite retaliation. But since Israel invaded Lebanon, these groups have resumed limited attacks on Israel and threatened to target US troops again.

Iran-allied armed groups are now under intense domestic pressure to behave responsibly and avoid reckless action that invites further conflict. Although the Iraqi public sympathises with the Palestinian cause and the plight of the Lebanese, public opinion increasingly resents Iranian interference domestically. The public is not willing to endure another devastating conflict. With federal elections due in the autumn of 2025, politicians will look to secure public support by distancing themselves from Iran. Iraqi paramilitaries, especially those with political party affiliations, may also be assessing Lebanese public anger now channelled towards Hizbullah for dragging the entire country into conflict with Israel. They may be wary of the military price that Hizbullah has paid, with a sense of foreboding about what could happen to them if they provoke Israel.

Although the Iraqi public sympathises with the Palestinian cause and the plight of the Lebanese, public opinion increasingly resents Iranian interference domestically.

But the success of the renewed pressure to cease attacks risks being short-lived if the ceasefire in Lebanon fails to hold and the incoming Trump administration intensifies its actions against Iran and its allies. Iraq’s Shia political and religious leaders will be crucial in preventing this outcome.

The role of Shia leaders

Most notable for his efforts so far is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Sistani is one of the most powerful figures in Iraq and the spiritual leader of Shia Muslims globally. Since 2003, he has been instrumental in shepherding Iraq towards stability and democracy. In a meeting on 4 November with the special representative of the UN secretary general for Iraq, Mohammed al-Hassan, Sistani made clear that the country’s Shia religious authority would not tolerate Iranian interference domestically and called for paramilitary groups to be under Baghdad’s authority, not Tehran’s. This came a day after the Islamic Resistance in Iraq pledged to escalate its attacks on Israel.

Iraqi political parties, including Shia Islamist parties, have voiced support for Sistani’s message. President Abdul Latif Rashid and the prime minister, Mohammed al-Sudani, alongside members of the ruling coalition in Iraq – which includes all the major Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish parties – all pledged their commitment to Sistani’s message and to keeping Iraq out of a regional war. Former prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, long considered by the West as a staunch ally of Iran, also spoke frankly about Iraq facing a choice between preserving its hard-earned domestic stability or accepting its role in a regional conflict.

Leading figures close to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq have demonstrated an understanding of these dynamics. Hussein Moines, the head of the Huquq Party (the political wing of one of the factions that make up the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, Kataib Hizbullah), has repeatedly claimed that the group does not want to entangle the Iraqi state in a war. Hadi al-Ameri, the head of the Badr Organization, a group that was once considered the parallel of Hizbullah in Iraq, also spoke of the need to avoid drawing Iraq into a regional conflict.

What can Europeans do?

EU member states, many of which have a presence in Iraq, should support Iraq as its leaders strive to protect the country from being drawn into war.

European diplomats in Iraq face less resistance than US officials in meeting Iraq’s political and religious leaders. They should use this access to support Iraqi leaders, including the Shia religious establishment in Najaf, who are pressing Iranian-backed paramilitaries to refrain from launching attacks from Iraq. They should signal this message to Tehran and apply concerted pressure on its leaders and regional allies not to use Iraq as a launchpad for new attacks.

Europeans should communicate to Israel and the incoming Trump administration that Iraq’s relationship with Iran is not merely a proxy one and that they should not impede Iraq from gaining greater autonomy from Tehran. They can better achieve this by not undermining Iraqi efforts to achieve greater political independence, and not letting it succumb to a conflict that will inevitably bolster hardline forces with ties to Iran.