All change: How Europeans and Gulf Arab states can promote Syria’s political transition

European and Gulf Arab states share common interests in Syria – they should work closely together to ensure a stable transition

(250203) — RIYADH, Feb. 3, 2025 (Xinhua) — Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (R, front) shakes hands with Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa (L, front) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Feb. 2, 2025. Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa arrived in the Saudi capital on Sunday for his first official visit abroad. (SPA/Handout via Xinhua)
Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa arrived in Riyadh for his first official visit abroad, meeting with Saudi Crown Prince and PM Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, Saudi Arabia, February 2, 2025
Image by picture alliance / Xinhua News Agency | SPA
©

Across the Middle East, states are vying to influence the political transition in Syria following the Assad regime’s collapse. Neighbouring Turkey is set to be especially influential. But the Gulf Arab states also have strong views about what should happen next. Amid this mêlée, Europeans are seeking to ensure an inclusive transition for Syria—one that puts the interests of Syrians first, allows refugees to return home and leads to a stable future for the country. To achieve this, Europeans must work with all regional partners. The existing Europe-Gulf relationship offers great potential to bring Syria the stability it deserves, but there is more Europeans can do to make the most of this opportunity.

The Gulf states turn on a dime

There is no doubt that many Gulf Arab states have performed a pragmatic about-turn on Syria. In the days preceding Bashar al-Assad’s downfall, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), along with other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, including Oman and Bahrain, expressed solidarity with the tottering regime. The advance of Syrian rebels also raised significant concerns in Saudi Arabia. The fears of nearly all GCC countries lay in the Islamist complexion of Hayat Tahir al-Sham (HTS)—a former al-Qaida affiliate. Only Qatar-affiliated media underlined HTS efforts to distance itself from transnational jihad.

Yet now, Gulf Arab states share a common interest in trying to make the new Syria work. They have expressed their willingness to test the new HTS leadership, which, despite its past, is demonstrating moderation and pragmatism on key issues. GCC states’ interest lies in strengthening their political, security and economic ties with Damascus and using this to address questions that matter to them, such as trafficking of the Captagon drug and counterterrorism. Indeed, they have already got to work on promoting a political process that they hope will secure international supportas demonstrated by the Saudi conference on Syria that took place last month in Riyadh. The Syrian caretaker foreign minister and Turkish and European representatives, including the European Union’s top diplomat Kaja Kallas, were in attendance. Discussions focused on lifting sanctions to accelerate humanitarian and economic aid, with a renewed emphasis on supporting a Syrian-led and inclusive political transition. A key point emphasised by participants was the rebuilding of Syria as a “unified, independent, and secure Arab state” safeguarded against terrorism and external aggression.

Behind the show of unity, Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain sceptical of HTS’s declared moderation and its ability to unify Syria

Behind the show of unity, Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain sceptical of HTS’s declared moderation and its ability to unify Syria. They are also concerned by other radical Islamists still present on the ground, and by Turkish influence in the country. They view Turkey as a significant regional challenge to their own influence. The two states do not want to see the emergence of a Turkish-dominated, Islamist-leaning Syria and fear tensions in the country’s north-east between the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces and Turkey could be exploited by Tehran. Despite these concerns, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh recognise that there is no alternative to engaging and testing HTS if they want to secure their strategic interests in Syria, including to try and dilute Turkey’s strong influence on the ground.

In Syria, the new HTS leadership has itself demonstrated a distinct interest in partnering with Gulf Arab countries. It is anxious for diplomatic backing for the political transition, reintegration into the Arab camp and, perhaps most importantly, economic and reconstruction support to help stabilise the country. It chose Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha as the three legs for the first international trip by the caretaker foreign minister, defence minister and intelligence chief. Working with Turkey, Qatar has already stepped up by facilitating the reopening of Damascus airport, being the first country to restart regular flights to Syria. Doha has also started providing electricity support in cooperation with Ankara and offered to help pay public sector salaries. Saudi Arabia is also pressing for increased international diplomatic engagement and a lifting of Western sanctions. Only the UAE appears to be maintaining a more hesitant approach, given its ongoing concerns about HTS’s Islamist character.

Why Europeans should work with Gulf states

Europeans should seize the opportunity to establish a joint position with the Gulf on Syria’s future. While Europeans are not set to be the major player in Syria’s immediate future, they now share key interests with Gulf Arab states in terms of fostering a stable Syria that contributes to regional stability, preventing it from becoming a base for extremism, and enabling the voluntary return of refugees.

The EU’s Strategic Partnership with the Gulf offers the basis for a shared strategy towards Syria; it identifies the country as a key regional issue for European and Gulf coordination. Building on January’s Riyadh gathering, the first step should be for EU and Gulf Arab leaders to agree shared political messaging when engaging with HTS. The two sides should lay out a shared political commitment to an inclusive Syrian-owned transition process, making clear that deepening engagement and support will depend on this stabilising trajectory. They should also both press Turkey and Israel to end destabilising military interventions that risk undermining the transition.

The two regional blocs should also work closely together to address Syria’s immediate needs, particularly in terms of getting economic and humanitarian assistance into the country and assisting with the provision of vital services. They should already channel increased funds for aid and map out how they can move forward with reconstruction support if an inclusive transition is secured. The Gulf Arab states can provide the most substantial serious funding in this regard, but Europeans can also work hard to get Western sanctions lifted—if Damascus meets key steps. Following Washington’s recent issuing of a six-month sanctions relief licence, the EU has approved a political roadmap for the temporary and conditional easing of a series of sanctions on Syria, beginning with the country’s energy and transport sectors. The EU now needs to move with greater speed to implement this roadmap. The EU and the GCC should then work to ensure effective implementation on the ground, also partnering with Turkey to do so in order to ensure that international efforts push in the same stabilising direction. But, while these steps are welcome, Gulf Arab states will be reluctant to make significant investments in reconstruction and long-term growth without more comprehensive Western sanctions lifting.

Europe and the Gulf Arab are both pressing HTS to follow through on its stated intention to reform, reject extremism and unify Syria. Both blocs are interested in preventing HTS from U-turning, and stopping more radical Islamist groups, including jihadist militants, from thrusting Syria into renewed conflict. To ensure Syria does not become a theatre of new instability, a strong relationship between Europeans and Gulf Arab partners is essential.

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

Author

Pan-European fellow

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