Air of superiority: What the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine can teach Europeans about NATO readiness

Air superiority lies at the heart of modern military victory. It gives armed forces the ability to control the skies; it enables ground manoeuvres, protects logistics, suppresses enemy capabilities and provides the freedom to strike at will. Without air superiority, even the most powerful armies are vulnerable. With it, even distant targets become reachable. Mastery of air superiority can determine the outcome of wars, even before they are fully under way.

The decisive impact of air superiority is clear through comparing two recent conflicts that are roiling global affairs: Israel’s campaign against Iran, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Israel is small and geographically compact: with around 10 million inhabitants, its population is just over a tenth the size of Iran’s. Iran is vast, mountainous and defended by a network of air bases and missile batteries stretching more than 1.6 million km². And yet in the initial stages of Israel’s air war against Iran, it gained air superiority over Iran’s skies within 48 hours of launching strikes.

Russia is a sprawling military power next door to Ukraine, with hundreds of aircraft stationed just minutes from Ukrainian targets. But three years into its invasion, Russia still cannot dominate Ukrainian airspace. Its jets are hemmed in by Ukrainian air defences and forced to launch standoff munitions from afar. The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) failed, in the early stages of the war, to achieve air superiority, resorting to attritional warfare. This has, to date, caused over a million Russian casualties.

Tools of national power

The contrast between a small country striking far away and winning control of the skies, and a large country fighting next door and failing to do the same, is arresting—even if military analysts can easily explain it. They focus on the technological superiority of Israel’s air force relative to the Russian fleet, particularly Israel’s US-produced F-35 stealth fighter. They also praise Ukraine’s formidable air defences. But, while quality (and quantity) of aircraft and air defences are certainly important, these alone do not ensure victory in the air. Arguably, what matters more is planning, intelligence, innovation—and the capacity to integrate all tools of national power.

NATO, which faces the (distant) possibility of a future Russian military campaign against its eastern flank, needs to learn from Israel’s success and Russia’s failure. With sufficient cohesion among the alliance, NATO may already be able to establish air superiority. But this necessitates a strong US commitment, which currently seems uncertain. If it is to prepare for the air superiority mission with little or no US support, NATO’s European members would be wise to take on board three lessons from Israel and Ukraine.

1. Air superiority is as air superiority does

Israel gained air superiority over Iran due to a long-standing military doctrine that prioritises air superiority as a central strategic objective across the entire Israeli security establishment. The Israeli Air Force trained rigorously for suppression and deception missions, while intelligence services prepared the battlespace from within. Israeli cyber units mapped out Iranian communications and air-defence architecture. Ground special forces were positioned to strike key nodes during the opening attack wave. Even logistics units were configured to support long-range, sustained sorties. In short, Israel approached gaining air superiority as a joint, integrated national campaign, not an isolated air-force operation.

Russia, by contrast, treated air superiority in Ukraine as a tactical enabler rather than a strategic imperative—in part because it expected a quick victory. Opening strikes targeted Ukrainian radar and airfields, but did not dismantle Ukraine’s layered air-defence network. The VKS operated largely in parallel to ground forces, with limited coordination; it did not unify electronic warfare units, missile forces and tactical aviation under a coherent suppression strategy. When Ukrainian resistance proved fiercer than expected, Russia simply shifted to standoff missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure, and curtailed deep air operations. While often damaging, this is no substitute for air superiority.

The lesson is clear: NATO should prioritise air superiority across the whole alliance, embedding it into planning, procurement, training and intelligence. Instead of patchy interoperability, competition between rival national suppliers and the squabbles marring the European Sky Shield initiative, NATO requires a concerted and joined-up air-superiority doctrine. Its ground forces should be prepared to support suppression of air defence (SEAD) missions; special operations forces should be integrated into targeting and disruption. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and cyber units should pre-emptively map and dismantle adversary air defence networks. After all, winning the air domain starts long before the first sortie.

2. Air defence is the best air offence

Ukraine has been able to hold its airspace in part due to a continual resupply of air defence systems and—critically—interceptors (which are required to shoot down incoming aircraft, drones and missiles). Indeed, the number of available air interceptors has become the single most critical supply issue in the war: Patriot batteries, national advanced surface-to-air missile system (NASAMS) launchers, IRIS-T systems and Soviet-era platforms like the S-300 are only as effective as the interceptor stockpiles behind them. But they are scarce and expensive. Without a robust and replenishable supply, even the most advanced systems go silent.

Ukraine has also been able to mitigate its supply issues with constant innovation and adaptation. It successfully integrates its various forces (for example air and intelligence, cyber) into the air-defence mission and demonstrates substantial capacity to innovate and adapt, such as using relatively cheap drones to counter Russian attack drones.

For its part, Israel’s rapid air superiority over Iran depended in part on Iran’s air defence lacking depth, adaptation and sufficient munitions. Once Israeli forces degraded Iran’s command structure and eliminated key launchers, Iran had no capacity to absorb losses or replenish quickly. Israel, meanwhile, apparently maintained ample stocks of its own standoff weapons and could sustain operations without pause.

NATO already has the necessary technology: most of Ukraine’s systems are NATO systems. However, it lacks sufficient numbers. NATO should view interceptor stockpiles as a strategic asset, rather than a logistics afterthought. The alliance should move beyond peacetime inventory models and begin stockpiling enough missiles, reloads and components to support sustained high-intensity operations.

Perhaps more importantly, NATO allies should integrate the air-defence mission with other elements of national power and armed forces training, to better adapt to inevitable surprises.

3. Air superiority begins on the ground

Both Israel and Ukraine have demonstrated the importance of intelligence in achieving or denying air superiority. Israeli forces had spent months mapping Iranian air defences, embedding operatives, launching cyber probes and identifying weak points. They even smuggled drones into Iran, which could take out Iranian air defences early in the campaign. When the strikes began, Israel knew exactly how to destroy Iranian air defences—and it had the assets in place to do so.

Ukraine, too, has benefitted from ISR support, much of which NATO countries provided. Ukraine has used satellite imagery, surveillance and electronic intercepts to anticipate Russian air activity and reposition mobile SAMs. Real-time feeds have ensured a numerically inferior force has become a defensively effective one. In June 2025, the Ukrainians similarly used their knowledge of Russian force disposition to smuggle drones into Russia and attack offensive air assets.

NATO should now fully integrate ISR into its air-defence doctrine. Intelligence-sharing should be seamless across the alliance; electronic warfare capabilities should be scalable and deployable

NATO should now fully integrate ISR into its air-defence doctrine. Intelligence-sharing must be seamless across the alliance; electronic warfare capabilities should be scalable and deployable. NATO should conduct multi-domain suppression of enemy air defences, combining kinetic, electronic and cyber effects in real time.

The superiority choice

For NATO, denying Russia command of the air should be relatively easy. Achieving air superiority over the Russian military is possible, even with little US participation. But it can only be done with sustained, strategic investment. NATO members must prepare a joint integrated plan to maintain and expand their inventory of mobile and networked air defence systems, pre-position interceptors and spare parts, and integrate intelligence and other assets into an alliance-wide picture.

Of course, NATO’s European members should not assume that Russia’s current failures are permanent. Its military is learning, adapting and rebuilding—investing in drones and standoff weapons, and probably adopting a new air-combat doctrine. Once the war in Ukraine ends, Russia will no doubt embark on a (yet another) period of military reform to address (and perhaps even fix) long-standing problems in its forces.

But NATO has a window to prepare for air superiority—and that time is now. Its members should treat air superiority as a deliberate goal that can be accomplished through readiness, integration and forward planning.