After Novi Sad: How the EU can help Serbia resurrect its democratic path

On November 1st 2024, 16 people died after the canopy of a railway station collapsed in Novi Sad, Serbia. This weekend marks the first anniversary of the tragedy, for which Serbian president Aleksandar Vucic and his corruption-based system of power are to blame. In response, a grassroots student movement has organised large-scale protests which demand governmental accountability and a snap election. If Vucic decides to use force against the protestors, which is likely, his actions may lead to bloodshed. The situation could spiral out of control.

The new normal

Violence and instability are becoming normalised in Serbia—on every scale. Minor clashes in small towns and the country’s latest show of military might in Belgrade both indicate a troubling resurgence of the type of aggression seen in the late 1990s and 2000s. Police officers have been arresting and beating students across the country; in September 2025, over 500 weapons—which had been handed in by citizens—were stolen from a police station in Serbia’s south. This is a stark reminder of the country’s fragile security situation.

Across Serbia’s population, negative sentiment is reaching boiling point. Reports indicate that more than 60% of citizens vocally disapprove of the regime. With young activists, political opposition and civil society organisations increasingly aligned against the government, their collective call for accountability and reform is growing stronger. But the EU lies at the heart of their discontent. For years, the European political elite has treated Vucic with kid gloves, believing that—despite his flaws—he remains a guarantor of stability in the chronically unstable Balkans. Today, it should be obvious that the opposite is true. Vucic’s domestic and foreign policy is contrary to the EU’s interests in the rule of law, the power of independent institutions and the promise of free elections. Europeans continuing with their policy of appeasement towards Vucic is a recipe for spectacular failure.

Slide away from freedom

European leaders have always found reasons to praise Vucic, rather than criticise his actions as being contrary to the EU’s values and interests. “Congratulations on the steps you have taken. The progress is incredible” said European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen during a press conference in Belgrade in 2021—just after the Serbian political opposition boycotted the 2020 parliamentary election, citing unfair electoral conditions. During Polish prime minister Donald Tusk’s visit in October 2024—a week before the disaster in Novi Sad—he called Vucic “my friend” and expressed his conviction that “Serbia’s goodwill and active work will serve to stabilise the entire region”. 

For years, Europeans have treated Vucic with kid gloves, believing that—despite his flaws—he remains a guarantor of stability in the chronically unstable Balkans. Today, it should be obvious that the opposite is true

According to the 2025 Freedom House report, however, Serbia has experienced the seventh-worst decline in freedom over the last decade. The Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has also criticised the conduct of Serbia’s election in 2023, stating that “pressure on public sector employees to support the incumbents, significant campaign finance disparities and misuse of administrative resources led to unequal conditions for contestants”.

The Serbian government has been applying for EU membership since 2012 and its president is a self-declared committed European: but, as the ODIHR points out, democracy in the country is almost farcical. Furthermore, Vucic is an ally of Viktor Orban, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. Serbia has not joined the EU sanctions against Russia and its interests with Moscow and Beijing are flourishing; Vucic even attended Putin and Xi’s propaganda parades to mark the anniversaries of the Soviet and Chinese victories in the second world war.

But the challenges are multifaceted. Despite Serbia’s pro-Russian stance, there is evidence that the country has sold ammunition to Ukraine. This has reinforced the beliefs of EU decision-makers that Serbia is strategically important for the bloc. Furthermore, EU politicians have been deterred from criticising Vucic further due to the threat of Belgrade drifting further towards Beijing and Moscow. Other European leaders are being persuaded to maintain good relations with Vucic through the prospect of cooperating over the extraction of important raw materials, primarily lithium. Serbia’s reserves could theoretically cover 90% of the EU’s demand.

True colours

Now Serbia’s citizens are prepared to publicly call Vucic’s actions out—and the EU’s arguments no longer hold. Vucic supports anti-European forces which are attempting to hinder the EU accession bids of Balkan countries such as North Macedonia and Montenegro. Serbia is also accused of fuelling ethnic tensions in Kosovo; in September 2023, militias under Vucic’s government’s control carried out an act of aggression in the village of Banjska, in Kosovo’s north.

Putin has openly shown his support for Vucic amid his clashes with the public; both have promoted the idea that Serbia’s student protests are another Western-inspired “colour revolution”. Under pressure from Russia, Serbia introduced restrictions on arms exports in June. There is also unease regarding plans for the construction of a lithium mine in Serbia’s Jadar Valley. Around 62% of Serbia’s population is against the initiative; the mine perceived by its critics as part of the regime’s corrupt system, few causes are uniting and mobilising Serbian society more.

Times are changing

Now there are signs the EU is changing its tune. On October 22nd, the European Parliament adopted an exceptionally critical resolution condemning Serbia’s violation of human rights and democratic principles. It also called on the European Commission and EU member states to consider imposing sanctions on representatives of the Serbian regime. Von der Leyen recently visited Belgrade, but she did not speak of “dear Aleksandar”. Instead, she indirectly criticised the Serbian president, who in March 2025 had ordered the arrest of dozens of demonstrators on charges of “terrorism” and instructed authorities to use sonic weapons against them. These are strong signs that the EU is no longer prepared to give Vucic the benefit of the doubt—but the EU needs to further emphasise its strict expectations for a country which is supposedly interested in joining a democratic, peaceable bloc.

On November 1st, Serbia’s students and various civil actors need to unite and cultivate a shared understanding of their goals for the protests to remain peaceful. The demonstrators should work with the political opposition to produce credible leadership as a real alternative to Vucic. The EU should encourage this by establishing a connection with the student protest movement. It needs to also communicate to Vucic that any violence against demonstrators commemorating the Novi Sad tragedy will lead to personal sanctions, the freezing of EU funds, and the withdrawal of EU countries from participation in Expo 2027 in Belgrade: the Expo, the apple of Vucic’s eye, is intended to highlight the greatness of his rule.

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Under Vucic, Serbia is not playing—and will not be able to play—the partnership role that the European Commission and many EU member states would like to see. But the EU, by continuing on its current course, risks losing the rest of its credibility among the democrats in Serbia. It will also gain nothing from Vucic. European leaders should remember Mikhail Gorbachev’s words when addressing the hardline communist leader of East Germany, Erich Honecker, in 1989: “Life punishes those who come late”. But it is not too late for Serbia to change its course.