A united front: Why Meloni should form a ‘Harris plan’ to secure US-Italy relations
The potential return of Donald Trump to the White House could affect US support for key Italian priorities. Giorgia Meloni should drop the political chameleon act and prepare for the possibility of a Democratic president
With just two weeks remaining until America’s presidential election, Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni is demonstrating political ambiguity towards the race’s two frontrunners. Throughout 2024, the year of Italy’s G7 presidency, Meloni had appeared the perfect sparring partner for President Joe Biden on advocating for G7 priorities such as migration, AI, and especially support for Ukraine. But during Meloni’s September visit to the United States, she completely ignored Biden’ dinner invitation – and accepted the Atlantic Council ‘global citizen’ award directly from the hands of “Trumpist” Elon Musk.
Meloni’s chameleonic behaviour, in which she showcases great relations with both sides of the US political spectrum to avoid any blatant political positioning, has led to strong domestic criticism. But Meloni is known for forging her own path in international politics: this summer vote against ‘friend’ Ursula von der Leyen as Europe Commission president showed her willingness to renege on their previous political allyship. She then showcased her success in securing Italian Raffaele Fitto’s inclusion on the European Commission’s list of executive vice presidents. However, the move exacerbated mistrust towards Meloni among European Union leaders, with the possibility of condemning her to further political isolation.
And an isolated Meloni in Europe might eventually lead to a more vulnerable Meloni in the world. A potential Trump presidency could jeopardise future US support for Italian foreign affairs priorities including migration, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), NATO, and Ukraine. In this situation, Meloni may require the support of her European counterparts – especially on MENA stabilisation, considering the immediate impact any regional crisis has on migration flows towards Italy.
But while Trump 2.0 would no doubt exacerbate a more marked US disengagement from EU regional and global affairs, Meloni should also develop a ‘Kamala Harris plan’ in the event that the next occupant of the White House is a Democrat whom Meloni must appease in order to retain strong support for her foreign policy objectives. Such forward-thinking would enable her to better manage the foreign policy consequences of Italy’s continued alignment with the US. This is especially vital since, in many other areas, Rome is likely to remain a stable global partner for Washington – regardless of who is in the White House.
Meloni seeks multilateralism
According to UNHCR data, between January and August 2024 the top five countries of origin for migrants in Italy were Bangladesh, Guinea, Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, while the top three countries of departure were Libya, Tunisia, and Turkey. Throughout Italy’s G7 presidency, Biden has recognised its efforts to develop a multilateral plan to manage migration and forge deeper trade partnerships with Africa. However, a Trump administration is likely to focus on closing domestic borders and expelling migrants from US territory; without showing much interest in how migration is affecting Europe. This could make Meloni’s vision for multilateral management of migration, as included in the G7 final communiqué, redundant. The document implies the support and cooperation of all G7 partners, including the US, to avoid isolating Italy and other countries affected by the ongoing migration crisis.
Similarly, Trump’s MENA strategy is likely to focus on his support for Israel; and on securing economic and trade relations with selected Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. In MENA, Libya and Lebanon have historically been key for Italy’s economy, stability, and security – but a Trump administration might be tempted to sacrifice future US security engagement requests in favour of regional disengagement. For Italy, this presents a danger with regard to Libya, especially on the economic impact of oil exports to Italy and managing ongoing migration flows. The danger from Lebanon derives mostly from how potential compromises on Middle East regional security could impact Italy and other EU member states.
In NATO, Meloni faces another difficult dossier – and Trump has a different view on its future. He has already made it clear that allies not meeting the 2 per cent GDP target spending on defence is not in America’s interests, since some NATO members would benefit from its security umbrella without sticking to defence-spending rules. But this puts Meloni in a difficult position: she has already declared that Italy will “do its best” to achieve this “according to our schedule and our possibilities.” This might mean Italy does not achieve the 2 per cent target by the 2028 deadline, although here Meloni is not alone as according to public data, Belgium, Croatia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain are also not on target. But she cannot rely on political allyship and good relations with the Republican party to excuse her forgoing the defence requirement. Meloni should instead draw attention to Italy’s geographic position which exposes the country to security threats from potentially hostile neighbours; and also on Italy’s commitment to NATO missions as an asset for the entire organisation.
Finally, a Trump victory would likely see the US change its course of action in support of Kyiv. But should Meloni position herself as his ally, this would put her in a difficult position both domestically and internationally. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, she has voiced full support for Kyiv’s right to its territorial sovereignty and has met with Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky twice in the past two months. Even during the previous Italian government, led by Mario Draghi, she was the only Italian political party leader to be fully aligned with his pro-Ukraine stance. For two years Meloni has justified her position on Ukraine to Italian voters, including the 29.3 per cent of the electorate which voted for her – but her electoral targets are tiring of the war. If Trump decides that his Ukraine policy is to achieve peace at any cost, Meloni must decide whether to toe the line of her political ally and renege on her prevailing pro-Ukraine foreign policy agenda. But the uncertainty of Ukraine’s future is not a problem unique to a Trump victory; it is likely to continue under Harris, albeit with more subtle methodology and less abrasive language.
A Harris plan
Instead of biding her time and hoping for a Trump victory, Meloni should therefore consider why a Trump 2.0 scenario might not have a positive impact on the biggest foreign issues at stake for Rome. Instead of continuing her ‘political chameleon’ act, she should develop a ‘Harris scenario’ strategy. While a recent ECFR podcast episode describes Harris as being somewhat of a foreign policy enigma, Meloni would still benefit on continuity with the Biden administration’s approach to foreign affairs. Her and Harris would likely find common ground on several priorities, starting from those included in the Italian G7. And even if Harris decides to completely overthrow the Biden administration’s policies, although more difficult at the beginning, for Meloni it would still be a better option than Trump. The Republican candidate has already determined how he sees Europe’s role in the future of common transatlantic issues. On the other hand, Harris’s opposite political tradition represents an ideological challenge for Meloni; but her election would create the possibility of building a relationship from scratch.
During the first Trump administration in 2018, Meloni led her party with 4.3 per cent public support; in a Trump 2.0 scenario, she will lead a government with almost 30 per cent public support. Now the geopolitical conditions, and Meloni’s expectations and aspirations, have changed. Certainly, the ideological views of the two apparent political allies would not fit as well as they might previously: and as it stands, Meloni positioning herself constructively towards a potential Democratic president would also differentiate her from coalition partner and biggest political enemy, Matteo Salvini. He leads Italian political party the League and is a long-standing Trump supporter.
Meloni should therefore ditch the political chameleon approach and develop a concrete ‘Harris strategy’ based on constructiveness and ignoring political prejudice. Considering the political backsliding she has undertaken to retain Italy’s central role in the EU, in a likely “Europe with less America” scenario Meloni should prioritise keeping the transatlantic dialogue alive over ideological (dis)alignment.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.